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THE WORD COMMONS AND FOREIGN LAWS 
Thomas O. Main*  
Dual trends are colliding in U.S. courts. The first trend is a tidal wave of 
cases requiring courts to engage the domestic laws of foreign legal systems; 
globalization is the principal driver of this escalation. The second trend is a 
profound and ever-increasing skepticism of our ability to understand foreign law; 
the literature of pluralism and postmodernism has illuminated the uniquely local, 
language-dependent, and culturally embedded nature of law. Courts cope with this 
dissonance by finding some way to avoid the application of foreign law. But these 
outcomes are problematic because parties are denied access to court or have their 
rights and responsibilities determined pursuant to the wrong law. 
This Article offers an exposition of lexical meaning to explain the source 
of these oppositional trends and to illuminate possible solutions. Legal words and 
ideas transcend geographic, social, and cultural boundaries. For this reason, the 
words of another legal system look familiar and, thus, appear knowable to an 
outsider. Yet autonomous national legal systems tend to tailor the meanings of 
these shared words for idiosyncratic purposes. Thus ironically—even 
paradoxically—the more commonly a word is used, the less predictable is its 
meaning. This differentiation of meanings makes actual knowledge of the foreign 
law difficult to achieve. 
As a framework for examining this phenomenon, this Article demonstrates 
that the common meaning of a word is a limited resource. The common meaning of 
a word erodes when legal systems assign a new meaning to a shared word. 
Idiosyncratic meanings are useful and generative, but they also introduce an 
important negative externality because the common meaning of a word is 
essentially the starting point for measuring the meaning of that word in a foreign 
system. The more robust the common meaning, the lower the measurement costs. 
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2 __ Cornell Int’l L.J. __ (forthcoming)  
The prototypical solutions to common-pool problems—privatization and 
regulation—are infeasible here. And ubiquitous efforts to unify, approximate, or 
harmonize laws tend to exacerbate the problem rather than help solve it.  
We could drop the pretense that we are able to understand foreign law 
and eliminate the demand for it. Or, if the doctrines are going to presume 
familiarity with foreign law, we must address the supply-side and ensure that 
courts are, in fact, better able to ascertain foreign law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the article that popularized the tragedy of the commons, Professor 
Garrett Hardin suggested that a common-pool resource might be justifiable for a 
substantial period of time before it ultimately collapses.1 Providing an open pasture 
for farmers to graze their cattle, for example, worked satisfactorily for a long time 
because wars, theft, and disease kept the numbers of both farmers and cattle below 
the carrying capacity of the land. But there arrives a moment in time when 
conditions demand that that approach be abandoned as unsustainable. Because 
inevitably comes the “day of reckoning” when the “inherent logic” of the 
commons leads inexorably to tragedy.2  
Globalization is leading to a similar tipping point regarding the 
                                                                                                            
    1. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 
(1968). 
    2. Id. 
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ascertainment of foreign law. There is an ever-increasing number of disputes with 
multi-national contacts. These cases implicate constellations of doctrines and 
statutes that, in turn, require courts to engage foreign laws. “As you read these 
words, there are half a dozen U.S. courts that are assiduously citing foreign law.”3 
Courts confront matters involving Korean contract law,4 Egyptian corporate law,5  
Peruvian civil procedure,6 Russian criminal process,7 and so on. And this spectacle 
is just getting underway.8 
Yet rather than actually applying the foreign law that they cite, courts 
usually avoid it.9 The artful dodge comes in many forms, and the consequences of 
evasion can be serious. Cases that would otherwise require the court to apply 
foreign law are frequently dismissed.10 In other instances, litigants may have their 
rights and responsibilities determined pursuant to the wrong law.11  
The salient reason for the avoidance of foreign law is the mismatch 
between what the courts are able to do and what the doctrines and statutes require. 
Ascertaining foreign law presents a formidable challenge. The inherent complexity 
of a legal system poses a tremendous burden for someone not trained in that 
system to navigate and decipher. The legal pluralism literature warns of nuance in 
layers of ordering: a mandate that is considered out of context can be incomplete 
or misleading.12 And scholars of different orientations have sharply illuminated the 
vagaries of cultural and language translations.13  
Moreover, the content of foreign law cannot be buried, as a question of 
fact, in the black box of jury decision-making. Rather, it is a question of law.14 
Accordingly, this shines a spotlight on judicial resolution of the question—for both 
trial and appellate judges. Unfortunately, the adversarial system tends to magnify 
the problem.15 
The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law is somewhat peculiar since 
many legal systems throughout the world use thousands of the same Latin,16 
                                                                                                            
    3. Stephen Yeazell, When and How U.S. Courts Should Cite Foreign Law, 26 
CONST. COMMENT. 59, 61 (2009). 
    4. See, e.g., LG Electronics, Inc. v. ASKA Appliances, Inc., 2012 WL 2365901 
(D. Del. June 21, 2012). 
    5. See, e.g., Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 675 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2012). 
    6. See, e.g., Application of Consorcio Minero, S.A. v. Renco Group, Inc., 2012 
WL 1059916 (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2012). 
    7. See, e.g., Starski v. Kirzhnev, 682 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2012). 
    8. See infra notes 171–175, and accompanying text. 
    9. See infra notes 281–287 and accompanying text. 
  10. See infra notes 288–298 and accompanying text. 
  11. See infra notes 301–324 and accompanying text. 
  12. See infra notes 191–195 and accompanying text. 
  13. See infra notes 196–233 and accompanying text. 
  14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. 
  15. See infra notes 254–280 and accompanying text. 
  16. Popular Latin words include certiorari, coram nobis, ex parte, in rem, 
mandamus, pro rata, quantum meruit, res ipsa loquitur, and respondeat superior. For a 
longer list, see DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 14–15 (1963). Latin’s 
place in the history of the development of the law is well documented. All major sources of 
4 __ Cornell Int’l L.J. __ (forthcoming)  
French,17 and English18 words in their codes and discourse. Another large corpus 
of words is shared between and among legal systems, although not verbatim. 
Instead, these words are translated from one language into another. For example, 
purchase and sale in English resembles compra y venta in Spanish, compravendita 
in Italian, achat et vente in French, einkauf und verkauf in German, and so on. 
However, shared words do not necessarily have shared meaning. Legal 
systems tailor the meanings of words to reflect the unique priorities, preferences, 
and goals of a judicial, political, or social system.19 The meaning of the word class 
action, for example, will vary among countries for good but idiosyncratic reasons. 
In one country, the word can refer to a joinder device that only a government actor 
                                                                                                            
our knowledge of Roman law are written in Latin, including the Corpus Iuris Civilis, 
arguably the most influential law book ever written. JUSTINIAN, JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 18 
(Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1987) (c. 535 C.E.). Law Latin is 
especially durable as a technical language for the legal profession. See 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *320–21 (“[L]aw-latin is . . . a mere technical language, 
calculated for eternal duration, and easy to be apprehended both in present and future times; 
and on those accounts best suited to preserve those memorials which are intended for 
perpetual rules of action.”). 
  17. Popular French words include: cestui que, cy pres, demurrer, force majeure, 
mortgage, refoulement, renvoi and voir dire. “It would be hardly too much to say that at the 
present day almost all our words that have a definite legal import are in a certain sense 
French words.” 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 80 (Cambridge 
1968) (1895). Other examples include:  
Contract, agreement, covenant, obligation, debt, condition, bill, note, 
master, servant, partner, guarantee, tort, trespass, assault, battery, 
slander, damage, crime, treason, felony, misdemeanor, arson, robbery, 
burglary, larceny, property, possession, pledge, lien, payment, money, 
grant, purchase, devise, descent, heir, easement, marriage, guardian, 
infant, ward, all are French. We enter a court of justice: court, justices, 
judges, jurors, counsel, attorneys, clerks, parties, plaintiff, defendant, 
action, suit, claim, demand, indictment, count, declaration, pleading, 
evidence, verdict, conviction, judgment, sentence, appeal, reprieve, 
pardon, execution, every one and every thing, save the witnesses, writs 
and oaths, have French names.  
Id. at 81. See also PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 25–26 (1999). 
  18. Popular English words include class action, forum-shopping, franchise, 
lease, punitive damages, and shrink-wrap license, for example. See generally HEIKKI E.S. 
MATTILA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL LINGUISTICS 210–11 (2006); Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, 
Language and Style in a Mixed System, 78 TUL. L. REV. 151, 164 (2003) (discussing 
Hebrew as a modern legal language, and the incorporation of English loanwords therein).  
  19. On the fundamental differences between societies, see William P. Alford, On 
the Limits of ‘Grand Theory’ in Comparative Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 945, 956 (1986) 
(discussing the Chinese criminal justice system); George P. Fletcher, Constitutional 
Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 737 passim (1993) (comparing U.S. and European legal 
cultures); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and the Cultural Contingency of Constitutional 
Categories, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 865, 868–72 (1993) (exploring different countries 
treatment of speech and expression rights); Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Special Substantive 
Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law 
Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REV. 347, 350–56 (1974) (explaining that differing expectations 
complicate multistate litigation). 
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can initiate; while in another it can refer to a joinder device permissible only for 
consumer cases. Difference in word meaning can range from subtle to dramatic. 
Because words have more than one meaning, we can discern from those 
variant meanings what we might call a common meaning—defined here as that 
which is common to all of the variant meanings. For example, if the term class 
action has different meanings in the systems of the United States, Finland, and 
Norway, the common meaning of that term is the common ground among the 
various extant meanings. 
The most novel contribution of this Article is the characterization of a 
word’s common meaning as a limited resource. Common meaning is a limited 
resource because the introduction of variant meanings can diminish, but will never 
enhance the content or scope of a word’s common meaning. By using the word 
class action, for example, each system’s variant meaning may, in turn, 
progressively erode the common ground. The more disciplined and uniform the 
meanings assigned to a word, the more robust its common meaning. At the other 
extreme, promiscuous use of the word could deplete its common meaning rather 
quickly. 
Characterizing the common meaning of a word as a limited resource 
invites consideration of this language phenomenon as a common-pool problem. In 
the classic scenario, the tragedy of the commons is a product of the fact that the 
farmers enjoy all the benefits of their actions yet bear only part of the expense of 
those actions. The part of the expense borne by the others is a negative 
externality.20 Here, a legal system that introduces an idiosyncratic meaning to a 
shared word likewise enjoys all the benefits from that customization. Yet that 
system bears only a fraction of the expense it creates. Idiosyncratic meanings 
create a negative externality because they diminish the content or scope of a 
word’s common meaning. Like the farmers who bring additional cattle to graze on 
the common, national systems, acting independently and rationally, will introduce 
variant meanings that progressively consume the common meaning of a word. The 
common meaning is diminished not only in the system that introduces the 
variation, but everywhere else as well.21  
While it may be easy to see why a common grazing land is valuable to 
cattle farmers, the utility of a word’s common meaning is less obvious. To 
understand why the consumption of a word’s common meaning is, in fact, a 
tragedy, one must appreciate how often participants in a legal system ascertain or 
“measure” the meanings of words. Participants measure the meaning of words in 
their own legal system; but more to the point of this Article, they also measure the 
meaning of words in other legal systems. Of course, measurement is undertaken to 
ascertain the tailored meaning of the word in the foreign system, not the word’s 
common meaning. But the common meaning of the word can play an important 
role in this exercise. Specifically, the cost of measuring the tailored meaning rises 
as content in the common meaning falls. Common meaning is like the starting 
                                                                                                            
  20. See generally RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF 
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 39–43 (2d ed. 1996). 
  21. See infra notes 105–108 and accompanying text. 
6 __ Cornell Int’l L.J. __ (forthcoming)  
point, and the closer that the starting point is to the finish line (of understanding 
foreign law), the shorter the distance traveled. Because idiosyncratic meanings 
erode common meaning, idiosyncrasy in one system can increase the information 
processing costs of all other systems that are interacting with any other system.22  
The erosion of a word’s common meaning helps explain why courts may 
be ill-equipped to reliably and confidently measure the meaning of foreign words. 
For courts navigating these waters, a robust common meaning could operate as 
something of an anchor of familiarity. The absence of that anchor leaves them 
adrift. Avoidance of foreign law is a predictable consequence. Unfortunately, 
avoidance converts an information problem into a justice problem. 
This Article brings into sharper relief a problem that is inchoately 
understood yet poorly addressed. Ubiquitous reform efforts to draft model 
legislation, to promote the harmonization of laws, or to advance multilateral 
protocols are premised explicitly or implicitly on the notion that difference among 
national laws is expensive, problematic, archaic, or unnecessary.23 I refer to these 
reforms as demand-side efforts because they would reduce the demand for 
customization (which, in turn, consumes common meaning). There is no foreign 
law to measure, the thinking goes, when the foreign and forum laws are the same. 
But I argue that this is not a text problem, and, therefore, there is no textual 
solution. Demand-side efforts cannot solve the problem because the common 
meaning of a word is a limited resource that will inevitably (or “tragically”) 
degrade. Harmonization efforts, in fact, exacerbate the information problem.24 
To solve the problem, attention must turn to supply-side efforts: obtaining 
better information about the content of foreign law. I survey several supply-side 
techniques that are already available to courts yet are comparatively under-utilized, 
such as appointing special masters and using court-appointed experts.25 I also 
identify a role for new foreign law institutes.26 But more important than these 
particular suggestions is the argument for supply-side reforms (and against 
demand-side reforms) more generally. 
I. COMMON WORDS 
Countries can design their own legal systems with whatever components 
and words they desire. Although most national systems have some distinctive and 
unique features, there is also commonality between and among many legal 
systems. Some of this overlap is a product of countries’ shared histories and 
common traditions.27 Another primary source of overlap is the transplantation of 
                                                                                                            
  22. See infra notes 234–237 and accompanying text. 
  23. See infra notes 328–353 and accompanying text. 
  24. See infra notes 354–356 and accompanying text. 
  25. See infra notes 365–388, and accompanying text. 
  26. See infra notes 389–400, and accompanying text. 
  27. See H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal 
Traditions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 421, 432–34 (Mathias Reimann & 
Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2006). See generally KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998). 
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practices and concepts from one system into another.28 Especially (although not 
exclusively) in these many areas of overlap, legal systems throughout the world 
draw from a common well of words.29  
Legal words and ideas move from one system into another for a variety of 
reasons. Such movement can be characterized as diffusion, transplantation, 
approximation, harmonization, evolution, hegemony, reception, unification, or 
something else.30 These labels suggest subtly different levels of intent and 
intensity, but each conveys the notion of the movement of laws and words across 
national borders. The importation of a word from another legal system may be 
deliberate, voluntary, and wise; or it might be none of these.31 This migration of 
words is not a new phenomenon—quite the contrary.32 However, technology and 
globalization can introduce network effects that create new incentives or pressures 
to transplant, and these might affect the pace of a word’s movement.33 
Shared words need not have shared meanings. Indeed, legal systems can 
ascribe whatever meaning(s) they desire to the words that they borrow, inherit, or 
invent.34 And of course, difference in meaning can range from subtle to obvious. 
Common examples of faux amis (false friends)35 include the words: brief, 
contempt, demand, doctrine, domicile, fact, jurisprudence, law, magistrate, notary, 
                                                                                                            
  28. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW 95 (2d ed. 1993) (“Most changes in most systems are the result of borrowing.”). For 
arguments suggesting that Watson’s thesis should be limited to the spread of Roman private 
law in Western Europe, see William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of 
Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 500–04 (1995); Eric Stein, Uses, Misuses—And 
Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 198, 203–04 (1977). 
  29. See, e.g., Paolo G. Carozza, “My Friend is a Stranger”: The Death Penalty 
and the Global Ius Commune of Human Rights, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1045 (2003) 
(describing how, in virtually all foreign nations courts “borrow[] from, respond[] to, or 
otherwise interact[] substantially with external sources of law, including foreign sources”).  
  30. See generally Nuno Garoupa & Anthony Ogus, A Strategic Interpretation of 
Legal Transplants, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 339, 343 (2006); Pierre Legrand, On the Unbearable 
Localness of the Law: Academic Fallacies and Unreasonable Observations, 10 EUR. REV. 
PRIVATE L. 61, 68 (2002); David Nelken, Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in 
ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 15–20 (David Nelken & Johannes Fees eds., 2001); William 
Twining, Diffusion and Globalization Discourse, 47 HARV. J. INT’L L. 507, 510–12 (2006). 
  31. The normative implications of the diffusion of laws and language are 
explored only peripherally in this Part. For a full discussion, see infra notes 328–356 and 
accompanying text. 
  32. See WATSON, supra note 28, at 22.  
  33. For a discussion of network effects, see infra notes 332–333 and 
accompanying text. 
  34. See BASIL MARKESINIS & JÖRG FEDTKE, ENGAGING WITH FOREIGN LAW 336–
37 (2009); James Gordley, When Is the Use of Foreign Law Possible? A Hard Case: The 
Protection of Privacy in Europe and the United States, 67 LA. L. REV. 1073, 1075 (2007). 
  35. See generally ROMAN JAKOBSON, Why “Mama” and “Papa”?, in SELECTED 
WRITINGS, VOL. I: PHONOLOGICAL STUDIES, 538–45 (1962); W.E. Weisflog, Problems of 
Legal Translation, in SWISS REPORTS PRESENTED AT THE XIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 
OF COMPARATIVE LAW 179–218 (1987). 
8 __ Cornell Int’l L.J. __ (forthcoming)  
process, res judicata, and trial.36 The French word contrat includes agreements 
that Americans would instead regard as gifts, conveyances, or trusts, and excludes 
various documents that Americans would label contracts.37 Marriage is a contrat in 
France but it is not a contratto in Italy.38 Administrative law means very different 
things in civil law and common law countries.39 What the Japanese call discovery 
does not resemble its supposed American forbearer.40 And American corporate 
lawyers might not recognize as directors of Japanese companies individuals who 
                                                                                                            
  36. See Menachem Elon, The Legal System of Jewish Law, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
& POL. 221, 242 (1985); Stephen Goldstein, On Comparing and Unifying Civil Procedural 
Systems, in PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE 1, 4, 8–10 (Stephen Goldstein & Michael Joachim 
Bonell, eds., 1995). “The word ‘law’ in Western languages has four different interpretations 
in Chinese as in li [order], li [rites, rules of property], fa [human-made laws] and zhi 
[control].” DEBORAH CAO, TRANSLATING LAW 1 (2007). Cao also distinguishes demand in 
English from demands in French; domicile in English, from domicile in French and domizil 
in German; la doctrine in French, which means legal writing or legal scholarship, from the 
English notion of doctrine; notaire in French and notary in English; common law in English 
and droit commun in French; the haute Cour de justice of French and the English notion of 
High Court of Justice. Id. at 58–59. 
For more examples, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Application and Avoidance of 
Foreign Law in the Law of Conflicts, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 602, 629 n.121 (1976) (“The 
French contrat, domicile, tribunal administratif, notaire, prescription and juge de paix, are 
not the English ‘contract’, ‘domicile’, ‘administrative tribunal’, ‘notary public’, 
‘prescription’ and ‘justice of the peace’.” (quoting ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: 
AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 11 (1974)); H.C. Gutteridge, The Comparative 
Aspects of Legal Terminology, 12 TUL. L. REV. 401, 402 (1938); Rodolfo Sacco, Legal 
Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 12–15, 20 
(1991) (discussing different meanings of trespass); Gloria M. Sanchez, A Paradigm Shift in 
Legal Education: Preparing Law Students for the Twenty-First Century: Teaching Foreign 
Law, Culture, and Legal Language of the Major U.S. American Trading Partners, 34 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 635, 662 (1997) (considering the word investment which, in Spanish, is 
inversion; in English the term means long-term benefits, while in Mexico it means short-
term profit); id. at 663 (discussing how different meanings of the word chicken led to 
litigation). The phenomenon is not limited to translations across languages. See CAO, supra, 
at 68–69 (discussing the changing meaning of words even within one language, using the 
term warranty in England and the United States as an example). 
  37. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1200–07 
(1993); see also Sacco, supra note 36, at 12–15. 
  38. See generally Alberto Musy & Alberto Monti, The Law of Contracts, in 
INTRODUCTION TO ITALIAN LAW (Jeffrey S. Lena & Ugo Mattei eds., 2001) (discussing 
Italian contract law). 
  39. See generally COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Susan Rose-Ackerman 
& Peter L. Lindseth Eds., 2010); John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil 
Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 852 (1985); Susan Rose-Ackerman, American 
Administrative Law Under Siege: Is Germany a Model?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1279, 1289–96 
(1994). 
  40. See Richard Marcus, Exceptionalism and Convergence: Form versus Content 
and Categorical Views of Procedure, in COMMON LAW, CIVIL LAW AND THE FUTURE OF 
CATEGORIES 521, 538 (Janet Walker & Oscar G. Chase eds., 2010) (“[T]he introduction of 
something like discovery in Japan or Germany . . . [is] so different in context from the 
American version that they are insignificant as evidence of meaningful convergence.”). 
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are also employees.41  
The complete list of shared words with different meanings may be almost 
as long as the list of shared words itself.42 In support of this basic proposition, 
anthropologists emphasize that legal language develops characteristics that 
conform to the unique history and culture of the system in which it operates.43 Put 
another way, there is “no transportation [between systems] without 
transformation.”44 Philosophers reach a similar conclusion by focusing on the fact 
that legal words have meaning and meaningfulness only within the context of a 
                                                                                                            
  41. See generally Kenichi Osugi, What is Converging? Rules on Hostile 
Takeovers in Japan and the Convergence Debate, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 143, 154 
(2007). 
  42. For contours of the debate regarding the transplantability vel non of words, 
contrast Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 
5–6 (1974) (suggesting translatability), with Pierre Legrand, On the Singularity of Law, 47 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 517, 527 (2006) (“[E]ach manifestation of law is an event, that is, it occurs 
or deploys itself as ‘something’ that is never the repetition of anything else and that will 
never be repeated either—it occurs as something operating within a specific historical 
situation . . . which, because time is what it is, is inevitably specific.”). See generally 
Nicholas Foster, Transmigration and Transferability of Commercial Law in a Globalized 
World, in COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 58–60 (Andrew Harding & Esin Örücü 
eds., 2002). 
  43. See generally PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, 
RHETORIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 2 (1987); Susan Sarcevic, Translation of Culture-Bound 
Terms in Laws, in 4 MULTILINGUA 127, 127 (1985); see also infra notes 200–223 and 
accompanying text. 
  44. WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM A 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 284 (2009). Twining elaborates on this point:  
[N]o serious student of diffusion can assume that what is borrowed, 
imposed or imported remains the same. This is not just a matter of the 
interpretation and application of received law, but also of its use or 
neglect, impact, and local political, economic and social 
significance . . . . How and to what extent any particular “import” retains 
its identity or is accepted, ignored, used, assimilated, adapted, rooted, 
resisted, rejected, interpreted, enforced selectively, and so on depends 
largely on local conditions. 
Id. See also Richard L. Abel, Book Review, Law as Lag: Inertia as a Social Theory of Law, 
80 MICH. L. REV. 75 (1982) (reviewing ALAN WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE 
(1977)); Anna Lise Kjær, A Common Legal Language in Europe?, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND 
METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 377–79 (Mark Van Hoecke ed., 2004); Ugo Mattei, 
A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. 
GL. LEGAL S. 383, 408 (2003) (“Legal reception is a highly creative activity.”).  
For examples of how transplanted law often operates quite differently in the target 
country than in the source country, see, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-
Francois Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 165, 165–68 (2003); Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois 
Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 163–65 (2003); Bernard Black, 
Reinier Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: 
What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1754–57 (2000); Mark D. West, The Puzzling 
Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence and Explanations from Japan and the United 
States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 527 (2001). 
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specific legal system and particular rules of law.45 Finally, linguists and 
semioticians emphasize that the legal language of any system is an autonomous 
technical language.46 These literatures confirm what experience and common sense 
suggest about geographic variance and the differentiation of a word’s meaning. 
Part I demonstrated two basic facts: that legal systems share words, and 
that the meanings of those words can differ. Both of these observations should be 
obvious and uncontroversial. But notice a paradox that is already taking shape: on 
one hand, words are shared between and among legal systems. In this respect, legal 
language, like many other professional languages,47 transcends geographic, social, 
and cultural boundaries. But on the other hand, legal systems are also autonomous 
and unique. Each national law constitutes an independent legal system with its 
own vocabulary, structure, and methodology.48 Thus the shared words may have 
different uses, purposes, and meanings. Accordingly, the more popular a word is 
used worldwide, the less predictable is its meaning. 
II. WORD MEANINGS 
This Part focuses more deliberately on what is intended by reference to 
the meaning of a word. For the purposes of this Article, meaning refers to a word’s 
“purpose or intent or function or aim or effect.”49 The goal here is not to provide a 
philosophical theory of meaning; this Article does not focus on why or how a word 
                                                                                                            
  45. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994). See also Mary Jane 
Morrison, Excursions into the Nature of Legal Language, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 271–72 
(1989). “Legal language . . . describes a metaphysical phenomenon. Law does not exist in 
the physical world. Since it is entirely created by humans, law is always linked to the 
culture of any particular society: it therefore constitutes a social phenomenon.” MATTILA, 
supra note 18, at 105. 
  46. See CAO supra note 36, at 24 (“[L]aw is culturally and jurisdictionally 
specific.”); BERNARD S. JACKSON, SEMIOTICS AND LEGAL THEORY 46–50 (1985); 
FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 9, 13 (1966) (“Language is a 
system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results solely from the 
simultaneous presence of the others . . . . [A]ll values are apparently governed by the same 
paradoxical principle.”). 
  47. See generally Gutteridge, supra note 36, at 401 (“The physician, the 
theologian, the mathematician, the chemist and the economist employ technical terms which 
are well understood throughout the scientific world . . . .”). 
  48. Susan Sarcevic, Legal Translation and Translation Theory: A Receiver-
Oriented Approach, in LA TRADUCTION JURIDIQUE. HISTOIRE, THEORIES ET PRATIQUE 329 
(ASTI 2000); FREDERICK KARL VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR 
LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE 27 (Legal Classics Library 1986) (1828) (noting the 
“organic connection of law with the being and character of the people,” and analogizing a 
people’s law to their language); Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial 
Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 409, 411 (2003) (“Legal systems reflect the cultures within 
which they are situated and thus have unique and highly contingent identities . . . . Given 
this close connection between law and local culture, foreign law seems to have very little 
place in judicial reasoning.”); see also infra notes 196–204 and accompanying text. 
  49. Lessig, supra note 37, at 1177 n.46. 
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has the meaning it does, nor even what meaning it has.50 Indeed, everything that 
follows in this Article can stand while remaining agnostic about a particular 
conception of meaning, provided one accepts the premise that legal words have 
meaning.  
Most importantly, this Part defines three terms: original meaning, local 
meaning, and common meaning. These terms are defined so that we can use them 
in later parts to explore the overlap and interaction of meanings that result when 
different legal systems use the same words. 
A.  The Meaning of Lay Words and Legal Words 
The meaning of a word, whether a lay word or a legal word, is not a 
function of that word itself (nor the letters that constitute that word) but rather the 
use to which that word is put.51 A word is a symbol for something else—often a 
thing, idea or concept.52 The word cat, for example, is a symbol that means 
something. It may be useful to think of that word written on the exterior of a box; 
inside that box is the meaning or meanings of the word (i.e., what the symbol 
represents). When one sees or hears the word cat, the brain invokes a meaning or 
meanings akin to something within the content of the box that corresponds to that 
word-symbol. Of course this is no ordinary “box”: it must contain cats of different 
breeds and sizes, both tame and wild, cartoon and real, young and old, metaphoric 
and literal, and so forth. Exactly which of these various cats our brains invoke 
when the word is read or heard is a function of the word’s use and context.53  
Words also symbolize ideas and concepts, not just things (like cats) that 
can be placed inside a box. Still, a word like catch or catatonic has an associated 
box of meaning(s), even if that box includes only metaphysical entities or abstract 
propositions.54 The words cat, catch, and catatonic are symbols that evoke 
                                                                                                            
  50. C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards collected 16 definitions of meaning—the 
“arch-ambiguity.” C.K. OGDEN & I.A. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING 186–87 (8th 
ed. 1947). See also Lessig, supra note 37, at 1181; infra note 71. 
  51. The notion that words are not intrinsically meaningful generally is built 
largely upon the assumption of modern analytic thought that the function of language is to 
communicate. For a general introduction to Locke, see E.J. LOWE, LOCKE ON HUMAN 
UNDERSTANDING 143–65 (1995) (dealing with Locke’s account of language); E.J. 
Ashworth, Locke on Language, 14 CAN. J. PHIL. 45, 46–52 (1984). See also H.P. Grice, 
Meaning, 66 PHIL. REV. 377 (1957) (recounting how communication is the business of 
language).  
  52. OGDEN & RICHARDS, supra note 50, at 186–89. 
  53. Wittgenstein is credited for emphasizing the connection between a word’s 
use and its meaning in the “language game.” LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS § 7 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3rd ed. 2001). 
When a word is read or heard without any corresponding context, prototype theorists 
suggest that our brains are inclined to evoke prototypes for the word. Upon seeing or 
hearing the word cat, for example, we are more inclined to consider a specific prototype of 
cat (from the box of meaning) rather than to survey all of the different cats in the “box.” The 
locus classicus for prototype theory is Eleanor H. Rosch, Natural Categories, 4 COG. 
PSYCH. 328, 328–30 (1973).  
  54. Words that push the box metaphor toward its breaking point are words like 
behalf or is. But the simplicity of the box metaphor will suffice here. 
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something because of the association between these words and certain things, 
ideas, and concepts.55 There is an infinite loop because a word symbolizes 
something that can be described with words that, in turn, symbolize more concepts 
and more words, and so on.56 But the essential learning here is very simple: it is 
our associations with a word-symbol that suggest the meanings of words, not 
anything that is intrinsic to the words themselves; after all, these letters and words 
could just as easily symbolize anything else. 
The association between a word symbol and its meaning(s) is the product 
of dynamic inter-subjective social construction.57 The meaning of lay words like 
cat, catch, and catatonic are neither officially announced nor formally policed.58 
Instead, the box that informs a word’s meaning contains something plural and 
contingent upon the social discourse within the applicable community.59 Words 
                                                                                                            
  55. See Gerald Graff, ‘Keep off the Grass,’ ‘Drop Dead,’ and Other 
Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEX. L. REV. 405, 408 (1982). Graff 
stated:  
[M]eaning is not a substance but an activity and has the determinacy of 
an activity rather than of a physical object . . . . The question of what any 
text means, then, is neither more or less open to ‘determinate’ inference 
than the question of . . . whether an historical event occurred or didn’t 
occur. Just as we have reason to believe that we know a lot about some 
historical occurrences, less about others, so it is with texts: the degree to 
which we can be confident about our inferences depends on the amount 
of evidence available, evidence which itself is open to criticism and may 
well be fallible. 
Id. This is deconstruction at work. See generally C. NORRIS, DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 31 (1982) (“Deconstruction is . . . an activity of reading which remains closely 
tied to the texts it interrogates….”); C. NORRIS, THE DECONSTRUCTIVE TURN: ESSAYS IN THE 
RHETORIC OF PHILOSOPHY xi (1983) (“Deconstruction is first and last a textual 
activity. . . .”). 
  56. For a discussion of this infinite regress, see F.H. BRADLEY, APPEARANCE AND 
REALITY 17–18 (Clarendon Press, 1930). The same sort of regress occurs when one 
considers looking at the dictionary for the meaning of a word, because dictionaries use 
words to define words. See generally Cliff Goddard, Can Linguistics Help Judges Know 
What They Mean? Linguistic Semantics in the Court-Room, 3 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 250, 
252–53 (1996). 
  57. WILLIAM G. LYCAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 68 (2008). 
  58. Dictionaries are private, non-binding, and in any event, descriptive rather 
than prescriptive. “A dictionary definition is, after all, just a meaning postulate.” Brian G. 
Slocum, Linguistics and “Ordinary Meaning” Determinations 33 STATUTE L. REV. 39, 44 
(2012). But see ACADÉMIE FRANÇAISE, http://www.academie-francaise.fr (last visited Sept. 
24, 2011) (acting as an official authority on the French language). 
  59. See LAWRENCE VENUTI, THE TRANSLATOR’S INVISIBILITY: A HISTORY OF 
TRANSLATION 18 (1995); Dennis M. Patterson, Realist Semantics and Legal Theory, 2 CAN. 
J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 175, 177 (1989). 
A “discourse community” refers to the social context in which speaking or writing 
takes place. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 87–140, 372–98 (1989). 
Individuals may be members of various discourse communities simultaneously—at one’s 
church, workplace, home, gym, and so forth. Linguists also use the term register when 
referring to a discourse community’s use of the language and instruments of 
communication. Register incorporates the lexicon or specialized terms created by the 
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mean what we construct them to mean.60 Of course, what one speaker envisions as 
a word’s meaning may or may not match what the listener assigns to that symbol. 
From the perspective of a discourse community, then, the meaning of a word may 
be contained in a “black box” (or at least an opaque one), rather than a transparent 
container. What some members think is inside the box, others may not; and neither 
group is necessarily right or wrong.61 
Language is famously indeterminate.62 Even within a single discourse 
community, one word can have multiple meanings.63 Multiple words can share one 
meaning.64 The meaning of words can change over time.65 New ideas and concepts 
spawn new words.66 And ambiguity,67 vagueness,68 and generality69 are de 
rigueur.70 Accordingly, the study of meaning can be the study of something 
ephemeral, elusive, and enigmatic. 
Our discussion so far has focused on the meaning of words. Yet in fact 
meaning is a function not only of words, but of sentences—and punctuation, 
paragraphs, and more. Most of the contemporary philosophy and linguistics 
literature focuses on the construction of meaning in the sentential context 
                                                                                                            
community. See generally JOHN M. SWALES, GENRE ANALYSIS: ENGLISH IN ACADEMIC AND 
RESEARCH SETTINGS 40 (1990). 
  60. LYCAN, supra note 57, at 68 (“[M]eanings are not ideas in the mind.”). 
  61. See generally Glanville L. Williams, Language and the Law–IV, in LAW AND 
LANGUAGE 141–42 (Frederick Schauer, ed.1993). 
  62. Contemporary discussion of the “indeterminacy of meaning” is rooted in 
Willard Van Orman Quine’s Word and Object and challenges to his thesis. See generally 
WILLIAM VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT (1966). Notwithstanding decades of 
criticism, an irreducible indeterminacy persists. See JAN G. KOOIJ, AMBIGUITY IN NATURAL 
LANGUAGE: AN INVESTIGATION OF CERTAIN PROBLEMS IN ITS LINGUISTIC DESCRIPTION 3 
(S.C. Dik & Jan G. Kooij eds., 1971) (suggesting that ambiguity is an unavoidable part of 
any natural language) (citing OTTO JESPERSEN, LANGUAGE: ITS NATURE, DEVELOPMENT AND 
ORIGIN (1964)) . 
  63. See generally Geoffrey Nunberg, The Non-Uniqueness of Semantic 
Solutions: Polysemy, 3 LINGUISTICS & PHIL. 143 (1979). 
  64. See Klaas Willems, Logical Polysemy and Variable Verb Valency, 28 
LANGUAGE SCI. 580, 583 (2006). 
  65. See Andreas Blank, Why Do New Meanings Occur? A Cognitive Typology of 
the Motivations for Lexical Semantic Change, in HISTORICAL SEMANTICS AND COGNITION 61 
(Andreas Blank & Peter Koch eds., 1999). 
  66. See JOHN ALGEO, FIFTY YEARS AMONG THE NEW WORDS: A DICTIONARY OF 
NEOLOGISMS 1941–1991, at 1–17 (1991). 
  67. See D.A. CRUSE, LEXICAL SEMANTICS 49 (1986); Arnold M. Zwicky & 
Jerrold M. Sadock, Ambiguity Tests and How to Fail Them, in 4 JOHN P. KIMBALL, SYNTAX 
AND SEMANTICS 1 (1975). 
  68. See ROSANNA KEEFE, THEORIES OF VAGUENESS, (2000); H. PAUL GRICE, 
STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 151, 177–78 (1989). 
  69. See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MIND (2006); NOAM 
CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE: THE MANAGUA LECTURES (1988). 
  70. I do not intend to suggest that this indeterminacy is necessarily pathologic. It 
may even be virtuous. Indeterminacy is not “the common cold of the pathology of 
language.” KOOIJ, supra note 62, at 1. 
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(sentence-level), rather than at the word-level.71 Indeed, the sentential context is 
critical because the words and punctuation marks of a sentence can be rearranged 
to convey very different things. However, it is important to appreciate that “words 
are … atomic in an account of meaning.”72 We can break down the meaning of an 
essay into paragraphs, and divide the meaning of a paragraph into sentences, and 
divide the meaning of a sentence into words. But we must stop there because, as 
we have already seen, the meaning of a word does not depend systematically on 
the letters that comprise that word.73 To focus on the meaning of words, then, is to 
focus on the building blocks of meaning.74 One might analogize the study of word-
meaning to playing chess, and the study of sentential-meaning to playing three-
dimensional chess.75 
Lexical meaning is a more focused—and less complicated and 
controversial—inquiry than studying sentence-meaning. But more importantly, it 
is also the core of legal discourse.76 Researchers of language distinguish between 
nomothetic sciences (which focus on universal rules) and idiographic sciences 
                                                                                                            
  71. For the traditional theories of meaning, see OGDEN & RICHARDS, supra note 
50. For a discussion of the more contemporary use theories, psychology theories, 
verificationism, and truth-condition theories, see LYCAN, supra note 57, at 76, 86, 98, 109. 
The distinction between lexical meaning and sentential meaning is somewhat artificial 
since the meaning of words is fundamentally constitutive: words are involved in the 
constitution of sentences, and the meaning of words is constituted through sentences. See 
Gottlob Frege, On Sense and Meaning, in COLLECTED PAPERS ON MATHEMATICS, LOGIC, 
AND PHILOSOPHY 157 (Max Black et al. trans., Brian McGuinness ed., 1984) (suggesting 
that individual words make sense only in the context of sentences); CRUSE, supra note 67, at 
51 (“the meaning of any word form is in some sense different in every distinct context in 
which it occurs”). 
  72. MICHAEL MORRIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 15 
(2007). An atom is a common metaphor for anything that cannot be divided. But see The 
Manhattan Project: The Birth of the Atomic Bomb in the Words of its Creators, 
Eyewitnesses, and Historians (C. Kelly, ed. 2009). 
  73. Id. Onomatopoeia may be something of an exception that proves this rule. 
These are words that imitate the sound they convey—e.g., moo, meow, pow, hiccup, sizzle. 
See generally Hugh Bredin, Onomatopoeia as a Figure and a Linguistic Principle, 27 NEW 
LITERARY HIST. 555, 556 (1996). Even these words are somewhat culture-bound, however. 
See W.G. Aston, Japanese Onomatopes and the Origin of Language, 23 J. 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. GR. BRIT. & IR. 332, 353 (1894) (noting how the Japanese use 
“nya” to describe the mewing of a cat). See generally WINFRED PHILIPP LEHMANN, 
DESCRIPTIVE LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION (1st ed. 1972). In any event, these are 
exceptional words with a relatively insignificant role in legal discourse. 
  74. “The principle of compositionality states that the meaning of a complex 
linguistic expression is built up from the meanings of its composite parts in a rule-governed 
fashion.” M. LYNNE MURPHY & ANU KOSKELA, KEY TERMS IN SEMANTICS 36 (2010). 
  75. Analogizing language to a game is one of the major contributions of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 53. 
  76. A reference to a single discourse of law is a short-hand. In fact, legal 
discourse is not homogenous, but is rather “a set of related discourses.” See Yon Maley, The 
Language of the Law, in LANGUAGE AND THE LAW 11, 13 (John Gibbons ed., 1994). 
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(which describe the unique and non-recurrent cases).77 The nomothetic sciences, 
which include the law, formulate generalizations and thus have a greater need for 
terminology than the idiographic sciences, which focus on individual 
phenomena.78 This emphasis on terminology in legal discourse suggests that words 
are important not only for their role as building blocks in the constitution of 
sentences, but often, as the focus of the legal inquiry itself.79 Indeed, many judicial 
opinions announce something along the lines of: “This case turns on the meaning 
of the word x.”80 
Meaning is also far less abstract in legal discourse as compared with other 
discourse communities.81 For practical reasons, as opposed to epistemological 
considerations, legal words and legal sentences must have meaning and authority 
in a way that the words in a poem need not. A judge or a statute, for example, can 
                                                                                                            
  77. See WILHELM WINDELBAND, HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY (Herbert 
Ernest Cushman trans., 1956) (1899); James T. Lamiell, Nomothetic and Idiographic, 8 
THEORY & PSYCHOL. 23 (1998). 
  78. See Stefan Ziemski, Two Types of Scientific Research, 10 J. FOR GEN. PHIL. 
SCI. 338 (1979). 
  79. See generally Weisflog, supra note 35, at 207. 
  80. See e.g., Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (2012) (“To 
resolve this case, we must decide whether the Capato twins rank as “child [ren]” under the 
Act’s definitional provisions.); Hall v. U.S., 132 S. Ct. 1882, 1886 (2012) (“Our resolution 
of this case turns on the meaning of a phrase in § 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code: ‘incurred 
by the estate.’); Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1706 (2012) (“The 
ordinary meaning of the word [“individual”] fortified by its statutory context, persuades us 
that the Act authorizes suit against natural persons alone.”); Argonaut Great Cent. Ins. Co. 
v. Mitchell, No. 11-12063, 2012 WL 2947757, at *1 (11th Cir. July 20, 2012) (“[T]he 
instant case which turns on the meaning of “getting on” and “getting off” the insured 
vehicle.”); Hall v. United States, 677 F.3d 1340, __ (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“This case centers on 
the proper meaning of the word ‘summoned’ in 5 U.S.C. § 6322(a).”); St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co. v. Schilli Transp. Services, Inc., 672 F.3d 451, 457 (7th Cir. 2012) (“At the 
center of this dispute in this case is the meaning of the word ‘you’ in this [contract].”); Egan 
v. Planning Bd. of Stamford, No. 32371, 2012 WL 2546806, at *6 n.17 (Conn. App. July 
10, 2012) (“[O]ur analysis turns on the meaning of the term ‘front lot line.’”); Foothills 
Texas, Inc. v. MTGLQ Investors, L.P., No. 09-10452, 2012 WL 2974907, at *5 (Bankr. D. 
Del. July 20, 2012) (“[T]he dispute turns on the meaning of the term ‘executory contract’ 
under the Code.”). 
Remember also Kenneth Starr’s account of President Clinton’s testimony in his report 
to Congress: “It depends on what the meaning of the word ‘is’ is.” OFFICE OF THE 
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, REFERRAL TO THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
PURSUANT TO TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, § 595(C) n.1091 (1998), reprinted in THE 
STARR REPORT: THE FINDINGS OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL KENNETH W. STARR ON PRESIDENT 
CLINTON AND THE LEWINSKY AFFAIR 325 n.1091 (PublicAffairs 1998).  
  81. To be sure, when a philosopher or semiotician examines laws as a patterned 
system of meanings, the insubstantiality of legal language becomes evident, and the inquiry 
presses on both jurisprudence and epistemology. See Mary Douglas, The Future of 
Semiotics, 38 SEMIOTICA 197, 199 (1982). Yet in legal practice, laws are treated as though 
they are substantial—with boundaries and consequences. This Article focuses on these 
practical outcomes. 
16 __ Cornell Int’l L.J. __ (forthcoming)  
definitively resolve the scope of a word’s meaning in a particular context.82 This is 
an unusual condition compared to other language discourse, which is more open-
textured and unregulated, sometimes even anarchic.83 The meaning of a word in a 
William Blake poem, for example, can be discussed for centuries without 
definitive resolution.84 
In the legal context, legislators and judges actualize the semantic potential 
of words and utterances in particular speech acts.85 And social conventions 
recognize and accept judicial authority to declare the meaning of words, albeit for 
a limited purpose and for a particular discourse community.86 Thus, in this regard, 
a statute or judicial opinion may, in fact, definitively resolve whether cat includes 
cougars, which of two baseball fans caught a foul ball, or whether an individual is 
in a catatonic state. The performative nature of language is indispensable for a 
legal system to execute its mandate to define the rights and responsibilities of its 
citizenry.87 
To be sure, linguistic indeterminacy is neither avoidable nor avoided in 
                                                                                                            
  82. This is not necessarily because they always get the meanings “right”; instead, 
they get the meanings “right” only in the sense that they are the final arbiters. And the 
discourse community recognizes that authority. 
  83. For an early discussion of the phrase open texture, see Friedrich Waismann, 
Verifiability, in LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 117 (Antony Flew ed., 1968). Hart later used the 
same phrase in the legal context. See HART, supra note 45, at 272. 
  84. Blake scholars have debated, among other things, the meaning of the titular 
flowers in The Lily from WILLIAM BLAKE, SONGS OF EXPERIENCE (1794). Traditional 
readings cast it as a symbol of purity, innocence, modesty and humility. See S. FOSTER 
DAMON, A BLAKE DICTIONARY: THE IDEAS AND SYMBOLS OF WILLIAM BLAKE 240 (1971); 
E.D. HIRSCH JR., INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO BLAKE 256-57 (1964). 
In contrast, D.G. Gillham offers an ironic interpretation of the lily, as the flower “appears 
white and virginal because it “knows (or senses) that it is enticing to appear to be so.” D. G. 
GILLHAM, BLAKE’S CONTRARY STATES: THE SONGS OF INNOCENCE AND OF EXPERIENCE AS 
DRAMATIC POEMS 211 (1966). John Grant directly refutes Gillham’s “theory of radical 
irony,” championing the more traditional reading of the flower.  See John E. Grant, Two 
Flowers in the Garden of Experience, in WILLIAM BLAKE: ESSAYS FOR S. FOSTER DAMON 
341-45 (Alvin H. Rosenfeld ed. 1969). 
  85. According to the theory of speech acts, originally developed by John L. 
Austin and John Searle, human language is used not only to transmit messages or influence 
people’s behavior but acts are also realized through this language. See J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO 
DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J. O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1975); JOHN R. 
SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969). Building on this 
framework, Brenda Danet classified legal language use into different types of speech acts. 
See Brenda Danet, Language in the Legal Process, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 447 (1980). 
  86. “There is a famous passage in Alice Through the Looking-Glass (Chapter VI) 
where, to Humpty Dumpty’s claim to use words in unusual senses, Alice made what may 
seem to the ordinary person to be an unanswerable question. ‘The question is,’ said Alice, 
‘whether you can make words mean different things.’ ‘The question,’ replied Humpty 
Dumpty, ‘which is to be master—that’s all.’” LAW AND LANGUAGE, supra note 61, at 141. 
  87. See MATTILA, supra note 18, at 31 (“Speech acts are of fundamental 
importance from the standpoint of the legal order. Given that the law is a metaphysical 
phenomenon that is only ‘alive’ in language, it is only by language means that it is possible 
to change legal relationships. The language of the law is an instrument of speech acts: it has 
a performative function.”). 
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legal discourse.88 Even when the meaning of a word or concept is judicially 
determined to include or exclude a situation presented, other indeterminacies can 
persist: polysemy,89 synonymy,90 evolution,91 neologisms,92 ambiguity,93 
vagueness,94 and generality95 are endemic. But because, unlike other discourse 
communities, there is a judicial infrastructure with the recognized authority to 
interpret or construct that meaning, we can confidently refer to legal words as 
having meaning within that community. The interpretive infrastructure can 
determine the content of any box that contains the meaning of any legal word. 
Thus the meaning of a legal word unquestionably exists even if it is deliberately 
protean or hopelessly unclear prior to (or even after) it is interpreted.  
Because there is an arbiter of meaning, legal language is fundamentally 
different than ordinary discourse. And because the focus of this Article is on the 
interaction of meanings, the existence of a meaning or meanings is much more 
important than either the content of any particular word’s meaning or the 
philosophical methodology by which a word’s meaning is derived. 
B. Original Meaning, Local Meaning, and Common Meaning 
Legal words begin with what I call an original meaning. The first legal 
system to introduce a word determines the original meaning of that word.96 This 
Article uses the word class action as an example of a word-symbol. But, of course, 
the word could just as easily be alimony, bond, consideration, director, eminent 
domain, felony, or something else. When the word-symbol (or “word”) class 
action was introduced, its original meaning embodied all that the legal discourse 
and the associated conventions embedded in that word. The box of original 
meaning for that word-symbol included the text of the new rule and all of its 
                                                                                                            
  88. “[F]ew would now deny the indeterminacy side of H.L.A. Hart’s repeated 
claim that language and the rules based on it contain both a core of settled meaning and a 
penumbra of uncertainty. The disputes are over whether the core is as comparatively large 
as Hart and others maintain, whether the core is as settled as it is supposed, and whether the 
notion of core (or plain or literal) meaning is coherent at all.” LAW AND LANGUAGE, supra 
note 61, at 141. See also BRIAN H. BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL DETERMINACY (1993); 
TIMOTHY A. O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 190 (2000); VAGUENESS IN NORMATIVE 
TEXTS (Vijay K. Bhatia et al. eds., 2005).  
  89. See MATTILA, supra note 18, at 109–11; TIERSMA, supra note 17, at 111–12. 
  90. See TIERSMA, supra note 17, at 113–14. 
  91. See KOOIJ, supra note 62, at 3; FERENC KOVÁCS, LINGUISTIC STRUCTURES 
AND LINGUISTIC LAWS 354 (Sandor Simon trans., 1971). 
  92. See TIERSMA, supra note 17, at 97–100. 
  93. See Ralf Poscher, Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK ON LANGUAGE AND LAW (2011). 
  94. See ENDICOTT, supra note 88; Ólafur Páll Jónsson, Vagueness, 
Interpretation, and the Law, 15 LEGAL THEORY 193 (2009); Lawrence M. Solan, Vagueness 
and Ambiguity in Legal Interpretation, in VAGUENESS IN NORMATIVE TEXTS, supra note 88, 
at 73; Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 
CALIF. L. REV. 509 (1994). 
  95. See Poscher, supra note 93. 
  96. For a theoretical discussion of whether meanings are created or discovered, 
see Patterson, supra note 59, at 177. 
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attendant features.97 The original meaning of the word class action could include a 
trans-substantive joinder device with four prerequisites, a provision for opt-outs, 
limits on compromising suits without court approval, a protocol for the 
appointment of class counsel, and so forth.98 For expository purposes, let us refer 
to this original meaning of class action as M1, and its originator legal system as 
First Country. 
The original meaning of a word, as defined here, is broad. Why isn’t the 
original meaning of class action instead defined as something narrow, such as 
“litigation by a representative on behalf of a group,” and nothing more than that? 
The answer is that we are trying to describe the meaning assigned to the word by 
the system that introduced it. If First Country introduced the word class action 
with a rule that has objectives intended to be fulfilled, prerequisites that must be 
satisfied, and a number of accompanying technicalities that must be met, there is 
no basis for including some of these and subordinating others in an original 
meaning. In the same way that a statute might introduce the word disability with a 
definition that includes a detailed list of specific medical conditions, the original 
meaning of a word should include all, not just some of those enumerated 
conditions. If we are trying to ascertain the meaning that is in the original “box,” 
the best evidence of the original meaning of M1 is what First Country has said (or 
would say) that it is. The inclination to suggest a narrower characterization of 
original meaning would often lead to a meaning that would reflect hindsight 
bias99—invoking more of the word’s legacy or essence based upon the subsequent 
uses of the word. A word’s legacy or essence tells us something important about a 
word’s meaning, but not about its original meaning. 
Once a word and its associated concept are introduced, we might expect 
some other countries to find the new idea useful. And, of course, some of these 
countries may even wish to use the same word-symbol.100 Although some of these 
countries might precisely replicate the original meaning,101 countries can—and 
                                                                                                            
  97. Cf. Steven G. Calabresi, Introduction to ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY 
OF DEBATE 1–40 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007) (discussing various meanings of original 
meaning); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 
(1999); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 917 (2008). 
  98. This history is suggested only for expository purposes. For an historical 
account of the class action, see STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION 
TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987). 
  99. See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 236 (2006); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory 
of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 574 (1998) (describing steps courts take to 
correct for the human propensity to view past events with a hindsight bias). 
  100. For a discussion of the phenomenon of transplants, see supra notes 27–33 
and accompanying text. 
  101. In some instances, the enthusiastic nature of the borrowing creates unique 
problems. See Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the 
Diffusion of (Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1813, 1858 (2009) (“Singapore decided 
to ad[o]pt the new English company law outright before the English had even finished 
drafting it, and they did not even adjust the numbering in cross-references of their securities 
laws copied from Australia.”). 
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should—tailor the device for their desired purpose.102 Because the meaning of a 
word in any legal system is a product of the legal discourse in that system, each 
legal system can assign whatever meaning it desires to the words it uses.103 Put 
another way, the system can fill the box of meaning with any mixture of borrowed 
and unique content.104 
Thus we might imagine another legal system, called Second Country, 
replicating the original meaning of class action except for a new provision that, 
say, limits the scope of the subject matter of class actions to certain substantive 
areas (e.g., available only in consumer cases). Because, in this hypothetical, M1 
has a trans-substantive scope, meaning no restriction as to subject matter, Second 
Country has introduced a slightly unique meaning of the word class action, which 
we shall label M2. Third Country might then replicate the original (M1) but change 
only the requirements for appointment of class counsel, introducing M3. At this 
stage in the hypothetical, then, we have three different countries—each with 
meanings of the word class action that are tailored for their respective systems. 
This Article refers to these tailored meanings of the word as local meanings. Thus, 
for example, the local meaning of the word class action in Third Country happens 
to be the third iteration, M3. 
A local meaning is not necessarily a unique meaning. Continuing with our 
hypothetical, Fourth Country might replicate the original, M1; and Fifth Country 
might replicate M2. And finally, Sixth Country might replicate M3, but also require 
members of the class to opt-in (as opposed to opting out of the class, as in the other 
five countries), introducing the fourth variant meaning, M4. A tailored local 
meaning can replicate another system’s meaning or it can be subtly (or 
dramatically) distinctive. And, of course, from a global perspective, each 
distinctive meaning adds another meaning to the word. In the hypothetical, we 
have six countries using the word and thus six local meanings; we also have four 
variant meanings of the word, including the original meaning. 
This Article is principally about the common meaning of a word. 
Common meaning is defined here as that which is common among all of the local 
(or variant) meanings.105 Drawing from the above example, the common meaning 
                                                                                                            
102. See MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 34, at 336–37 (“[B]orrowing a 
particular legal idea does not . . . mean that the system on the receiving end need[s] to 
follow the model in each and every detail.”). 
103. See Patterson, supra note 59, at 177. 
104. See generally JACKSON, supra note 46, at 46 (“Once constituted as a system, 
the language of law represents an entire universe of legal meanings, the choice of any one of 
which . . . reflects the exclusion or absence of the other available legal meanings.”). 
105. This defined term is not a synonym of “plain meaning,” nor of “ordinary 
meaning.” Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has used the term as such a synonym. See, 
e.g., Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (referring to the “ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning” of statutory text). Quite fittingly given the thesis of this 
Article, however, the Court has also used the term common meaning in essentially the sense 
that I use it here. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 511–12 (2008) (noting 
that the term proceeds “has not acquired a common meaning in the provisions of the Federal 
Criminal Code”). 
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of the word class action would be the content that each of M1, M2, M3, and M4 
have in common. The following Venn diagram illustrates the common meaning 
(CM) of the word class action in light of the four variant local meanings:  
 
  
Put another way, the common meaning of the word is the content of the original 
meaning, M1, less the provisions regarding subject matter (removed by M2) less 
the provisions regarding class counsel (removed by M3), and less the provisions 
regarding opt-in/opt-out procedures (removed by M4). The mathematical symbols 
and suggested calculation suggest more precision than is intended or necessary, but 
they can be conceptually useful.106 
                                                                                                            
For a general discussion of plain meaning and original meaning, see Ellen Aprill, The 
Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998); 
Alani Golanski, Linguistics in Law, 66 ALB. L. REV. 61 (2002); Lawrence M. Solan, The 
New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2036–38 (2005). 
106. Whether mercifully or unfortunately, the Venn diagram does not reflect the 
infinitely regressive nature of word meaning. See Bradley, supra note 56. Each of the circles 
above theoretically circumscribes an infinite number of circles since a word symbolizes 
something that can be described with words that, in turn, symbolize more concepts and 
more words, and so on. The meaning of each word is theoretically its own circle. For 
example, if a circle represents the meaning of the word “class action” in First Country, then 
that includes the “trans-substantive joinder device with four prerequisites, a provision for 
opt-outs, . . . .” Supra, page __ [text accompanying note 98]. But each of these words 
(“trans-substantive,” for example), in turn, has a meaning. And that meaning is describable 
by words that have meanings.  
The Venn diagram also suggests that the meaning of a word is static, when of course it 
is dynamic. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND 
CM 
M2 M1 M3 M4 
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Within any particular legal system, then, a word has both a local meaning 
and, as a subset thereof, a common meaning. The common meaning includes those 
components of the local meaning that are also manifest in all other legal systems. 
In the class action example, the word’s common meaning after M1, M2, M3, and M4 
might include such components as adequate representatives, notice requirements, 
numerosity, commonality, no compromise without court approval, and whatever 
else of the original meaning is incorporated within and unaltered by M2, M3, and 
M4. 
Common meaning has an empirical quality that might reveal the essence 
of the word. For the word class action, for example, the common meaning, after 
forty or fifty variant meanings, could be reduced to: litigation by a representative 
on behalf of a group, and nothing more than that.107 The common meaning could 
also resemble (or even be) what logicians would label as necessary and/or 
sufficient conditions to define the word.108 But, as defined here, common meaning 
could be more or less than these alternative characterizations. Instead, the term 
identifies an empirical core of common meaning that includes a word’s shared 
characteristics. 
C.  Common Meaning as a Limited Resource 
The common meaning of a word is a limited resource. In contrast to 
words and meanings generally—which are shared but not limited resources109—
common meaning is a global, shared, limited resource, like water or a species of 
fish. The common meaning of a word is a limited resource because it erodes 
progressively as legal systems assign new meanings to the shared word. Viewing 
lexical meaning through a lens of analysis reserved for limited resources offers a 
unique perspective. Importantly, it allows us to consider a word’s common 
                                                                                                            
LEGAL CRITICISM 239–41 (1994); Arthur Schopenhauer, On Language and Words, in 
THEORIES OF TRANSLATION 32–35 (Rainer Schulte & John Biguenet eds., 1992); James 
Boyd White, Judicial Criticism, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC 
READER 393 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988). Because meaning is 
dynamic, M1, M2, M3, and M4 could be the evolution of the meaning of the word within one 
system. 
107. The Global Class Actions Exchange website, maintained by Deborah 
Hensler of Stanford Law School, contains an overview of contemporary variations on the 
class action device. Global Class Actions Exchange, STAN. UNIV., 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/ (last visisted Sept. 13, 2011). The variations among 
countries include, for example, restricting the subject matter (non-trans-substantive), see 
Klaus Viitanen, Finland, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOCIAL SCI. 209, 213–14 (2009) 
(consumer cases only); requiring that the action address a shared public concern, see 
Camilla Bernt, Norway, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOCIAL SCI. 220, 223 (2009); 
emphasizing the role of a government ombudsperson in the initiation of actions, see 
Viitanen, supra, at 213–14; and requiring class members to opt in, see Elisabetta Silvestri, 
Italy, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOCIAL SCI. 138 (2009). 
108. See generally JONATHAN BENNETT, A PHILOSOPHICAL GUIDE TO 
CONDITIONALS (2003); Roger Wertheimer, Conditions, 65 J. PHIL. 355 (1968). 
109. Words and meanings are shared resources because the same word can be 
enjoyed by multiple users. Words and meanings generally are not limited resources because 
one person’s use of the word does not compromise another’s use of that word. 
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meaning as a common-pool problem.110 
The prototypical common-pool resource is a plot of public grazing land 
that all cattle farmers can use to graze cattle.111 The grass on the commons is a 
sustainable resource so long as it consumed no faster than its natural rate of 
replenishment. But as soon as consumption exceeds that rate, the resource will 
provide diminishing aggregate returns. The optimal strategy for the society as a 
whole, then, is to consume the resource at a rate that is sustainable.112 
Unfortunately, however, individual farmers will harvest for themselves at 
a rate higher than their share of the sustainable aggregate rate. Indeed, each farmer, 
acting independently and rationally, will bring more than their share of cattle to the 
commons.113 The economic explanation is that each farmer receives all of the 
benefit of each additional cow they graze on the commons (because their cattle are 
fed), but bears only part of the expense of each additional cow (since the effects of 
overgrazing are shared by all the farmers). The part of the expense borne by the 
other farmers is the externality.114 Predictably, then, the grass is consumed faster 
than it grow, and the independent rational actors in a community create losses for 
everyone. “Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all”—even though it is clear that 
it is not in anyone’s long-term interest for this to happen.115 Such is the tragedy of 
the commons. 
The common meaning of a word is likewise a shared limited resource that 
is vulnerable to this tragedy. I emphasize that this is dramatic tragedy—a tragedy 
not in the sense of unhappiness, but rather in the sense that it is something that the 
actors bring upon themselves because of the “solemnity of the remorseless 
working of things.”116 The normative consequences of preserving or losing this 
                                                                                                            
110. The origin of this line of inquiry is usually traced to Garrett Hardin. See 
Hardin, supra note 1, at 1244. See also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE 
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (James E. Alt & Douglas C. North 
eds., 1990) (deducing that Aristotle was the first person known to identify the tragedy of the 
commons). For more contemporary analyses of Hardin’s theory, see Ronen Avraham & 
K.A.D. Camara, The Tragedy of the Human Commons, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 479 (2007); 
Jerry Brito, The Spectrum Commons in Theory and Practice, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1; 
Gary D. Libecap, Open-Access Losses and Delay in the Assignment of Property Rights, 50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 379 (2008). 
111. Hardin, supra note 1, at 1244.  
112. “Examples of typical common-pool resources systems include lakes, rivers, 
irrigation systems, groundwater basins, forests, fishery stocks, and grazing areas. Common-
pool resources may also be facilities that are constructed for joint use, such as mainframe 
computers and the internet.” Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and 
Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 121 
(2003). 
113. See generally WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR 
THINKING ABOUT THE LAW 109–16 (2007). 
114. See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 20. See also JAMES E. MEADE, THE 
THEORY OF ECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES: THE CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND 
SIMILAR SOCIAL COSTS 15 (1973). 
115. Hardin, supra note 2, at 1244. 
116. ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD 17 (1938). 
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particular common-pool resource are explored separately later.117 But, before 
considering those issues, let us confirm the inevitability of the devolution of a 
word’s common meaning. 
The marginal benefit of introducing a new meaning to a shared word is 
largely internal. Legal systems have different preferences, priorities, and goals,118 
and these legitimate differences are manifest in slightly (or dramatically) unique 
versions of, say, the class action device. Second Country may have legitimate 
reasons to limit the scope of its device to consumer cases, regardless of the 
approach of other countries. But this customization has very little or no positive 
externality; in other words, no other country directly benefits from Second 
Country’s innovation. Rather, like the farmer who alone benefits from maintaining 
a larger herd of cattle, any particular legal system will receive all of the benefit of 
its idiosyncrasy.119 
                                                                                                            
117. See infra notes 332–356 and accompanying text. 
118. See supra note 19. 
119. To be sure, there could be a positive externality if innovation in one legal 
system were so enlightened (or so problematic) that other legal systems adopted it (or 
avoided it, as the case may be)—and would not have done so but for the experience of the 
former. In this sense, idiosyncrasy might add to the interpretive stock of a word, and this 
could be independently useful. The analogue is Justice Brandeis’s famous “laboratories” 
metaphor about federalism. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
But this is surely a modest externality; although some idiosyncrasies could be 
transplanted widely, see supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text, the purpose of 
customization is to tailor the device to local conditions, which are, almost by definition 
then, unique, see supra note 19. Even were the positive externality of a particular innovation 
substantial and compelling, understand that it would not forestall or directly offset the loss 
of the word’s common meaning. If, for example, five additional countries introduced a class 
action device and followed Sixth Country’s lead (codifying the opt-in component), the 
idiosyncrasy in Sixth Country provided something useful elsewhere (to-wit, a positive 
externality), but the word’s common meaning is still compromised as a result of Sixth 
Country’s customization. The values of common meaning, on one hand, and 
entrepreneurship, on the other, are not equivalents in the sense that one can directly offset 
the other. 
To emphasize this point, consider this analogue: if the cattle farmers sharing the 
common grazing land had to purchase more horses to shepherd their ever burgeoning cattle 
herds to and from the commons, the stimulus to the market for horses would be a positive 
externality—the more cattle brought to the commons, the more horses and horse equipment 
purchased by each farmer. But this positive externality would not forestall or directly offset 
the consumption of the common-pool resource. Theoretically, the positive externality might 
outweigh the negative externality—if, say, the marginal stimulus to the horse market 
spurred other economic growth worth far more than the commons—but it would not save 
the commons. I address the normative consequences of preserving common meaning at 
notes 328–356, infra, and accompanying text.  
There is a possibility that if an innovation introduced in one system was adopted by all 
other systems, the innovation would become part of the word’s common meaning. If, for 
example, the five countries that followed Sixth Country’s lead were instead First, Second, 
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However, a system bears only a fraction of the costs it creates when it 
introduces a new meaning to a shared word. The common meaning of a word 
operates as a commons. Like the depletion of the commons by the farmers, 
national legal systems, acting independently and rationally, will introduce variant 
meanings that progressively erode the common meaning of a word. Common 
meaning is a one-way ratchet. Differences in the variant meanings of a word may 
range from subtle to dramatic, with the latter presenting the bigger threat to a thick 
common meaning.  
While the social value of a commons for grazing cattle is surely obvious, 
the value of a word’s common meaning is probably less so. In other words, so what 
if a word’s common meaning is thick or thin? The answer to this question must be 
addressed in two stages. To appreciate the significance of losing this global, 
shared, limited resource we must first comprehend why, and how often, 
understanding the local meaning of foreign words is important. Thereafter, we can 
explore the relationship between common meaning and local meaning. 
III. THE RELEVANCE OF FOREIGN LAWS 
Knowing the local meaning of a word—whether in one’s own or another 
system—may be necessary or useful for myriad reasons. For example, individuals 
or institutions may want such information to ensure that they are in compliance 
with a law, so as to avoid penalties for noncompliance. Or they may want 
information about some law in order to enjoy its incentives or protections. 
Information can be useful to avoid, win, or delay litigation. And if the matter 
comes before a court, judges will review all of the available information to 
determine the meaning of a particular word or provision. 
Participants routinely study the meaning of words in their own legal 
system, but they occasionally must also ascertain the meaning of words in other 
legal systems. The need to have information on foreign law120 can arise in many 
contexts and affect almost anyone involved in the legal process. In the course of 
everyday business—in drafting contracts or considering trade with foreign 
countries, in dealing with foreign nationals or companies, or merely in buying or 
selling foreign goods at home—the need to consider the laws of a foreign nation 
arises.121 Even people’s personal lives are increasingly affected by contacts with 
                                                                                                            
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Country, the common meaning may even reset to include Sixth 
Country’s opt-in. But see infra notes 234–237 and accompanying text. 
120. “‘Foreign law’ as used in this [A]rticle refers to both” the national law of 
foreign countries and to international law, “unless otherwise noted.” Alexander, supra note 
36, at 603 n.3. The challenge of applying unfamiliar law can even be manifest in the 
application of sister-state law. Id. But these challenges are “usually not as acute as that of 
applying the rule of another nation. While some material differences do exist among the 
laws of the several states, they are not nearly as frequently encountered as differences with 
foreign national laws. In a similar vein,” some applications of foreign law are more difficult 
than others. Id. “[T]he foreign law ‘problem’ is not monolithic.” Id. See also Catherine 
Valcke, Global Law Teaching, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 160, 161 (2004) (noting that foreign law 
“typically refers to the internal law of states other than our own”). 
121. Roger J. Miner, The Reception of Foreign Law in the U.S. Federal Courts, 
43 AM. J. COMP. L. 581, 581 (1995) (“Aside from foreign law issues arising in cases relating 
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foreign countries.122 Vacationers, potential immigrants, expatriates, retirees, 
investors, and persons contemplating marriage to or adoption of foreigners all may 
wish at one time or another to inform themselves as to the operation and effect of 
foreign laws on their activities.123  
When a transnational transaction or occurrence leads to litigation, courts 
often need to engage foreign laws. A casual glance of very recent opinions from 
U.S. courts reveals dozens of such cases—implicating the laws of Argentina, 
Australia, The Bahamas, Brazil, Canada, The Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, England, Finland, French Polynesia, Germany, 
India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, The Netherlands, Nigeria, 
Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Venezuela, for example.124 From the note 
                                                                                                            
to foreign trade, federal courts throughout this nation are faced daily with immigration 
matters, tort claims, public law disputes, arbitration enforcement proceedings, domestic 
relation suits and even criminal cases that call for the determination and application of 
foreign law.”). 
122. International treaties have also extended the domain of international law to 
include private acts and transactions, such as wills, trusts, decedents’ estates, adoption of 
children, abduction of children, commercial sale of goods, electronic fund transfers, bills of 
exchange, and promissory notes. See Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order, 
and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 812 (1990). 
123. Douglas R. Tueller, Reaching and Applying Foreign Law in West Germany: 
A Systemic Study, 19 STAN. J. INT’L L. 99, 101–02 (1983). 
124. See, e.g., Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. v. Kozumi USA Corp., 2012 WL 2343670 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (Argentina); Seed Services, Inc. v. Winsor Grain, Inc., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 
2012 WL 1232320 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (Australia); Matthews v. Whitewater West Industries, 
Ltd., 2012 WL 1605184 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (Bahamas); Group CG Builders and Contractors v. 
Cahaba Disaster Recovery, L.L., 2012 WL 1906370 (S.D. Ala. 2012) (Brazil); Sonoco 
Products Co. v. ACE INA Ins., 2012 WL 2871682 (D.S.C. 2012) (Canada); Loukianoff v. 
Galitsky, 2012 WL 1144289 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (Cayman Islands); Lucas v. Hertz Corp., __ 
F. Supp. 2d __, 2012 WL 2367617 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (Costa Rica); Font Paulus ex rel. 
P.F.V. v. Vittini Cordero, 2012 WL 2524772 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (Dominican Republic); Tobar 
v. U.S., 2012 WL 2190766 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (Ecuador); Howden North America Inc. v. Ace 
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2012 WL 2367886 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (England); 
Frederiksson v. HR Textron, Inc., 2012 WL 2044588 (2d Cir. (Conn.) 2012) (Finland); Putz 
v. Golden, 2012 WL 2565017 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (French Polynesia); Mageba 
Textilmaschinen GmbH & Co. KG v. Archibald, 2012 WL 2568075 (W.D.N.C. 2012) 
(Germany); Shire Development LLC v. Cadila Healthcare Ltd., 2012 WL 2564134 (D. Del. 
2012) (India); JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. PT Inda Kiat Pulp and Paper Corp. Tbk, __ 
F. Supp. 2d __, 2012 WL 1144634 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Indonesia); Al Shimari v. CACI Intern., 
Inc., 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. (Md.) 2012) (Iraq); Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
__ F. Supp. 2d __, 2012 WL 2552475 (D.D.C. 2012) (Israel); Shah v. Kuwait Airways 
Corp., 2012 WL 1631624 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Kuwait); Nestle Waters North America, Inc. v. 
Malaysian Assur. Alliance, 2012 WL 2305940 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (Malaysia); General 
Motors Cor. v. Albert Weber GmbH, 2012 WL 2184564 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (Mexico); 
Carrasco v. Carillo-Castro, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2012 WL 1948996 (D.N.M. 2012) (Mexico); 
U.S. v. Omar, 2012 WL 2277821 (D. Minn. 2012) (Netherlands); Aeons Centro de 
Administracao de Empresas, Ltd. v. Central Bank, 2012 WL 2675259 (D. Md. 2012) 
(Nigeria); Douglas v. Smith Intern., Inc., 2012 WL 2801672 (5th Cir. (Tex.) 2012) (Saudia 
Arabia); Nuvo Research Inc. v. McGrath, 2012 WL 1965870 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(Switzerland); SignalQuest, Inc. v. Tien-Ming Chou, __ F.R.D. __, 2012 WL 1859656 
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in the margin, consider also the broad geographic spread of the courts that 
encounter questions of foreign law. 
Foreign law is invoked for many reasons. The most often-applied conflict 
of laws doctrine requires the application of foreign substantive law when a foreign 
jurisdiction has “the most significant relationship” with the underlying event.125 In 
a tort action, the foreign country may have been the place of injury or place of 
wrongful conduct; in a contract action, the foreign country may have been the 
place of contracting or place of performance.126  
Choice of law clauses may also direct a court to apply foreign law.127 
Because respect for party autonomy is an important norm in conflict-of-law theory 
surrounding contracts,128 choice of law clauses are especially popular in 
commercial and contract law.129 Even matters without a transnational component 
may be subject to a determination of foreign law if a robust “law market” 
emerges.130  
Policies such as the internal affairs doctrine in corporate law disputes may 
also compel the application of foreign law.131 Tax,132 intellectual property,133 and 
                                                                                                            
(D.N.H. 2012) (Taiwan); Skanga Energy & Marine Ltd v. Arevenca S.A.,  __ F. Supp. 2d 
__, 2012 WL 2433518 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Venezuela). 
Of course, reported cases reveal only part of the picture. See John R. Schmertz, Jr., The 
Establishment of Foreign and International Law in American Courts: A Procedural 
Overview, 18 VA. J. INT’L L. 697, 697 (1977–1978) (“Foreign law, and to a lesser extent 
international law, play an ever-increasing role in U.S. federal and state adjudications. In 
addition to the reported cases, there are many more unreported cases,” including those 
where the foreign law issues were overlooked by the parties and the court.). 
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). The most 
significant relationship test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts is the most popular, 
but is not the only extant conflicts methodology. See generally Symeon C. Symeonides, 
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2010: Twenty-Fourth Annual Survey, 59 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 303 (2011). 
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 188 (1971). 
127. For a discussion of the increasing use of choice of law clauses, see Jan M. 
Smits, The Complexity of Transnational Law: Coherence and Fragmentation of Private 
Law, 14 Elec. J. Comp. L. No. 3 (2010), available at http://www.ejcl.org/143/art143-14.pdf. 
128. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law 
Harmonization: The Coming Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 229 (2005) (“In recent 
decades national courts have shown increasing respect for party autonomy . . . .”). 
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). 
130. See generally ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 
(2009). 
131. See generally FRANKLIN GEVURTZ, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CORPORATE LAW 6–11 
(2006) (discussing McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987)). 
132. Paul N. Iannone, The Critical Role of Foreign Law and Tax Court Rule 146: 
Determination of Foreign Law by the United States Tax Court in I.R.C. Section 482 Cases, 
16 Q.L. REV. 445, 453 (1997) (“Foreign law plays a vital role for corporations that must 
determine an allocation of income and expenses among domestic and foreign affiliated 
businesses for tax purposes.”). See also I.R.C. § 901 (foreign tax credit). 
133. See generally David E. Miller, Finding a Conflicts Issue in International 
Copyright Litigation: Did the Second Circuit Misinterpret the Berne Convention in Itar-
Tass?, 8 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 239 (2000) (describing how the Itar-Tass decision is 
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immigration134 matters routinely implicate foreign laws. Domestic laws such as the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,135 Title VII,136 the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act,137 and many other statutes138 incorporate foreign law by 
reference.139 
                                                                                                            
implicating foreign law issues); Graeme W. Austin, Does the Copyright Clause Mandate 
Isolationism?, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 17, 59 (2002); Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Seventh 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 4, 2003), in 97 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 265–66 (2003); Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or Misusing 
Foreign Law to Decide Domestic Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 5, 13 
(2005). 
134. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (2006); Id. § 1182(a)(9)–(10). Foreign law may 
determine the validity of a marriage, the effectiveness of an adoption, or the legitimacy of a 
child. Amnesty cases may require inquiry into both international and local laws. See 
generally Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law and 
General Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?, 43 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 173 (2002).  
135. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a)(1)(A), 78dd-2(c), 78dd-1(c) (2006). See 
generally Elizabeth Spahn, Discovering Secrets: Act of State Defenses to Bribery Cases, 38 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 163, 181–82 (2009). 
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1(b) (2006). 
137. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2006). See generally Andrew P. Walsh, 
Employment Discrimination—Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc.: The “Foreign Laws” Exception to 
the ADEA—When a Collective Bargaining Agreement Equals a Law, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 455, 455 (1997). 
138. See, e.g., Registration and Regulation of Brokers and Dealers, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78o(b)(4)(B); 78c(a)(39)(B), (D) (granting the SEC and self-regulatory organizations 
authority to bar, suspend, or limit securities professionals based upon the findings of a 
foreign court or foreign securities authority that such persons committed specified types of 
violations of foreign law); Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1527(a) (2006) (prohibiting the 
importation of any wild mammal or bird “[i]f the laws or regulations of any country” forbid 
it); Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1372(c) (2006) (similar, for 
marine mammals); The Lacey Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A) (2006) (making it 
unlawful to possess or sell fish or wildlife taken “in violation of any foreign law”); Death on 
the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30306 (2006); National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
2315 (2006) (prohibiting the importation or transportation of “stolen” goods); see, e.g., U.S. 
v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003). 
Some other statutes include reciprocity rules that allow recovery by citizens or subjects 
of a foreign state only if that foreign state would allow an American citizen to recover were 
the situation reversed. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2502(a) (2006) (“Citizens or subjects of any 
foreign government which accords to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute 
claims against their government in its courts may sue the United States in the United States 
Court of Federal Claims if the subject matter of the suit is otherwise within such court's 
jurisdiction.”); 46 U.S.C. § 31111 (2006) (similar reciprocity rule applies in cases in which 
an alien sues the United States for damages caused by a public vessel, or for compensation 
for towage or salvage services).  
139. Similarly, some domestic statutes refer to citizens or subjects of a foreign 
state. In these instances, foreign law may determine a party’s status thereunder. See, e.g., 
JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536 U.S. 88, 91 (2002) 
(plumbing the meaning of a “corporation of a foreign state” in the context of diversity 
subject matter jurisdiction). See generally Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice of the Supreme 
28 __ Cornell Int’l L.J. __ (forthcoming)  
In addition to these situations where courts are expected to apply foreign 
law,140 there are many doctrines that require courts to consider or evaluate foreign 
law as part of the decisional calculus. On every motion to dismiss on grounds of 
forum non conveniens, for example, the court must evaluate the adequacy of the 
alternative forum.141 Similarly, every recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
judgment is premised on the notion that the judgment is “final and conclusive and 
enforceable where rendered,” and is not the product of procedures incompatible 
with due process of law.142 And whenever there is concurrent parallel litigation in 
a foreign forum, the local court must assess the nature, content, and significance of 
the foreign proceedings.143 
The list of situations in which foreign law can arise is as diverse as it is 
lengthy. In sentencing a criminal defendant, prior foreign convictions can raise 
foreign law issues.144 Criminal or tort defendants may raise a “cultural defense.”145 
In contract cases, foreign law may be invoked as a de facto excuse for 
                                                                                                            
Court of the United States, Keynote Address: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts 
(Apr. 3, 2004), in 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 305, 305 (2004) (“Much of our [JP Morgan 
Chase Bank] opinion was devoted to consideration of English law, since whether the 
corporation was a citizen or subject of a foreign state depended on its legal status under 
foreign law.”). 
140. To be clear, it is the domestic law that binds, not the foreign mandate. The 
foreign law is binding in the sense that it is recognized by or incorporated by reference into 
the domestic law. See 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 53 (1935) 
(“[S]ince the only law that can be applicable in a state is the law of that state, no law of a 
foreign state can have there the force of law.”); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (5th ed. 1857). 
141. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981) (identifying 
adequacy as threshold issue); Usha (India), Ltd. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 129, 135 
(2d Cir. 2005) (assigning burden to moving party). 
142. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 2 (1962), 
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/ufmjra62.htm; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 482. See 
generally Walter W. Heiser, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: The 
Impact on Forum Non Conveniens, Transfer of Venue, Removal, and Recognition of 
Judgments in United States Courts, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1013 (2010).  
143. See generally Kimberly Hicks, Parallel Litigation in Foreign and Federal 
Courts: Is Forum Non Conveniens the Answer?, 28 REV. LITIG. 659, 685 (2009) (explaining 
that international comity, Colorado River abstention, and inherent power theories require 
the U.S. court to examine details of the foreign proceeding); Cortelyou Kenney, Disaster in 
the Amazon: Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in Transnational Human Rights Litigation, 97 
CALIF. L. REV. 857 (2009); Austen L. Parrish, Duplicative Foreign Litigation, 78 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 237, 247–51 (2010); Louise Ellen Teitz, Both Sides of the Coin: A Decade of 
Parallel Proceedings and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Transnational Litigation, 
10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
144. See generally Alex Glashausser, The Treatment of Foreign Country 
Convictions as Predicates for Sentence Enhancement Under Recidivist Statutes, 44 DUKE 
L.J. 134 (1994); A. Kenneth Pye, The Effect of Foreign Criminal Judgments in the United 
States, 32 UMKC L. REV. 114, 127–30 (1964), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
479 (Gerhard O. W. Mueller & Edward M. Wise eds., 1965). 
145. See generally Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the 
“Cultural Defense,” 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57 (1994). 
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nonperformance of a contract.146 When a witness invokes the privilege against 
self-incrimination, the issue can be the risk of prosecution under the law of a 
foreign country.147 A foreign forum selection clause may be unenforceable after 
review of the foreign jurisdiction’s substantive or procedural law.148 A class action 
that includes foreign plaintiffs usually requires the court to consider, as part of the 
certification process, whether a foreign court is likely to give res judicata effect to 
any dismissal, judgment, or settlement.149 And foreign laws are routinely 
implicated when there is service150 or discovery151 abroad. 
Courts may also be obliged to consider foreign law when enforcing treaty 
obligations, applying uniform laws, or advancing multinational harmonization 
efforts.152 In these contexts, courts may be expected to consider foreign 
                                                                                                            
146. See generally 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1:2 (4th ed. 2007). 
147. See generally Diane Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in an International Context, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1201 
(1998). 
148. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 
341, 345–46 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing cases). 
149. See generally Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under 
Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 
26–41 (2007); Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global 
Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 480–86. 
150. The mechanics for serving process upon foreign defendants is governed by 
the forum’s procedural rules. However, some of these rules incorporate by reference the 
foreign practice rules. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(2)(A). The rules also contemplate use of 
an international treaty which, in turn, incorporates by reference foreign practice rules. See 
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil 
and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361. 
151. See FED. R. CIV. P. 28(b)(1)(C)–(D). Moreover, all of the forum’s rules are to 
be administered with “special vigilance to protect foreign litigants” from discovery abuse. 
Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987). 
Specifically, this includes “due respect . . . for any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign 
state.” Id. Demonstrating such respect may involve evaluating foreign discovery practice—
and the history behind and justifications for those rules. See, e.g., In re Anschuetz & Co., 
GmbH, 838 F.2d 1362, 1363–65 (5th Cir. 1988). 
152. See Scalia, supra note 139, at 305. The United States is a bilateral, regional, 
or international party to more than 10,000 treaties and international agreements. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2011, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/169274.pdf. 
For a discussion of the relevance of foreign law with regard to extradition treaties, see 
Jacob Dolinger, Application, Proof, and Interpretation of Foreign Law: A Comparative 
Study in Private International Law, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 225, 241–42 (1995). 
With regard to the role of foreign law in harmonization efforts, see Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation 
of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2001) (suggesting that domestic courts should use 
foreign law as a way to develop international copyright norms in transnational disputes). 
With regard to harmonization, consider also the borrowed-statute doctrine in the context of 
canons of statutory interpretation: “when a legislator copies a statute from a foreign 
legislator, it can be presumed that she was aware of the way in which the statute had been 
30 __ Cornell Int’l L.J. __ (forthcoming)  
interpretations of the shared mandate as part of the decisional calculus.153 
Litigation under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (“CISG”) is one prominent example.154 The CISG is domestic law 
by virtue of a self-executing treaty, but the purpose of the multilateral treaty is to 
achieve uniformity in its application.155 Accordingly, courts are instructed to look 
to foreign case law for guidance in interpreting the relevant provisions of the 
CISG.156  
A similar situation arises when domestic statutes or common law 
doctrines require knowledge of customary international law or the law of nations. 
This is similar because international law is “foreign law” in the sense that it is not 
state or federal law, and also because the substantive content of international law 
can require a survey of foreign domestic laws to determine whether there is a 
broad international consensus on a particular point of law.157 Further, all federal 
laws are to be construed so as to avoid “violat[ing] the law of nations if any other 
possible construction remains.”158 
The foreign law inquiry can also require combinations of international 
and foreign domestic laws. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, for example, 
allows suits against foreign sovereigns when property has been taken in violation 
of international law.159 But whether international law has been violated will 
                                                                                                            
construed by the foreign courts.” Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, Against Borrowings and Other 
Nonauthoritative Uses of Foreign Law, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 269, 275 (2003). See also infra 
notes 343–347. 
153. When interpreting the text of a treaty, for example, foreign precedents should 
not simply be considered, but be given “considerable weight.” Olympic Airways v. Husain, 
540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 
404 (1985)). 
154. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (Apr. 11, 1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. App. 
at 52 (West Supp. 1997)).  
155. See FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 8–9 (1992). See 
also International Sale of Goods: Hearing on Treaty Doc. No. 98–99 Before the S. Comm. 
on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong. 1, 13 (1984) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (commenting that 
Congress intended the CISG to create a “uniform international legal system to which each 
party to an international sales contract could refer”). 
156. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, supra note 154, at art. 7(1) (“In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be 
had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application.”). 
Further, Article 7(2) implicitly provides that courts should not rely exclusively on domestic 
law. Id. at art. 7(2). See John Linarelli, Analytical Jurisprudence and the Concept of 
Commercial Law, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 119, 154 (2009). See generally Franco Ferrari, The 
Relationship Between the UCC and the CISG and the Construction of Uniform Law, 29 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1026 (1996). 
157. See, e.g., Alien Tort Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006). See generally Yeazell, supra note 3, at 62–63. 
158. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 
(1804) (Marshall, C.J.). See generally Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American 
Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277, 2279–80 (1991). 
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2006). 
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sometimes require a threshold determination under foreign domestic law—e.g., 
who owned the property in question?160 
In a standard functionalist account of lawmaking,161 the incorporation and 
bearing of foreign law in all of these statutes and doctrines is neither casual nor 
accidental. The application, consideration, or evaluation of foreign law may be 
central to a fair and just result in a particular case. The many situations where 
courts are expected to apply or evaluate foreign law constitute efforts to calibrate a 
balance among competing interests, to achieve the right levels of deterrence and 
compensation, to ensure respect for the interests of foreign nations, or to encourage 
reciprocal treatment from foreign nations.162 
All of the above examples regarding the application of foreign law should 
not be confused with the controversy regarding when and how foreign law should 
be used as persuasive or moral authority in interpreting the U.S. Constitution.163 In 
that vein, the U.S. Supreme Court has cited foreign authority in deciding, for 
example, when the death penalty constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” under 
the Eighth Amendment164 and in determining whether particular rights are 
protected under a substantive due process analysis.165 These opinions have 
generated several arguments against the use of foreign legal authority in domestic 
constitutional interpretation, including concerns that selective invocation of 
                                                                                                            
160. See Scalia, supra note 139, at 305. 
161. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL 
L. REV. 479, 484–86 (1997). 
162. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Internalization Through Socialization, 54 
DUKE L.J. 975 (2005). 
163. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The 
Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the 
Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005); Daniel A. Farber, 
The Supreme Court, the Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign Law: The Lessons of 
History, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (2007); M.H. Hoeflich, Translation & the Reception 
of Foreign Law in the Antebellum United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2002); Vicki C. 
Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 109 (2005); John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 303 
(2006); Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign 
Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637, 666 n.212; Rosenkrantz, supra note 152. 
164. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005) (fact that no other 
country permits juvenile death penalty is not controlling, but confirms the Court’s 
conclusion that the death penalty is disproportionate for killers younger than eighteen); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (“[W]ithin the world community, the 
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is 
overwhelmingly disapproved”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03 (1958) (plurality 
opinion) (citing the virtual unaninimity of “civilized nations” to support the conclusion that 
the Eighth Amendment bars the imposition of statelessness as a punishment for crime). 
165. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560, 576–77 (2003) (noting that 
other nations have protected the “right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, 
consensual conduct” and finding “no showing that in this country the governmental interest 
in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent”); Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734–35 (1997) (experience with physician-assisted suicide in 
Netherlands supported state claims of potential for abuse). 
32 __ Cornell Int’l L.J. __ (forthcoming)  
foreign precedent gives judges too much discretion in their interpretive process,166 
that reliance on foreign law undermines democratic accountability,167 and that 
foreign law reflects local conditions and values incompatible with unique aspects 
of American history, culture, and government.168 This controversy raises a 
fundamentally different issue, however, because in this narrow category of 
constitutional interpretation, the relevance of the foreign law is often genuinely 
debatable. Indeed, even the advocates of using foreign law in the context of 
constitutional adjudication acknowledge that, in the above examples, the foreign 
laws are merely useful rather than necessary.169 By contrast, this Article regards 
situations where foreign laws are unquestionably relevant and, in many 
circumstances, even binding.170 So let us put the contentious debate about 
constitutional interpretation aside and focus instead on those matters of foreign law 
                                                                                                            
166. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 139, at 309 (“Adding foreign law to the box of 
available legal tools is enormously attractive to judges because it vastly increases the scope 
of their discretion. In that regard it is much like legislative history, which ordinarily 
contains something for everybody and can be used or not used, used in one part or in 
another, deemed controlling or pronounced inconclusive, depending upon the result the 
court wishes to reach.”); Melissa A. Waters, Treaty Dialogue in Sanchez-Llamas: Is Chief 
Justice Roberts a Transnationalist, After All?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 89, 91 n.8 (2007) 
( “[R]elying on foreign precedent doesn’t confine judges. It doesn’t limit their discretion the 
way relying on domestic precedent does. Domestic precedent can confine and shape the 
discretion of the judges. Foreign law, you can find anything you want . . . [a]nd that actually 
expands the discretion of the judge.” (quoting Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of 
John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 200-01 (2005))). 
167. See, e.g., Waters, supra note 166, at 91 n.8 (“If we’re relying on a decision 
from a German judge about what our Constitution means, no president accountable to the 
people appointed that judge, and no Senate accountable to the people confirmed that judge, 
and yet he’s playing a role in shaping the law that binds the people in this country. I think 
that’s a concern that has to be addressed.” (quoting Confirmation Hearing on the 
Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 200-01 (2005))); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Use of 
International Law in Judicial Decisions, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 423, 426 (2004) 
(“[W]hen judges rely on foreign sources, especially for difficult constitutional questions 
concerning domestic social issues, they move the bases for judicial decision-making even 
farther [sic] from the realm of both democratic accountability and popular acceptance.”). 
168. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American 
Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. 
REV. 1335, 1337 (2006) (“Americans are more individualistic, more religious, more 
patriotic, more egalitarian, and more hostile to unions and Marxism than are the people of 
any other advanced democracy. This positive account of the ways in which the United 
States truly is exceptional will call into question the practicality and wisdom of our 
Supreme Court imposing foreign ideas about law on us.”); Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, What 
Role Should Foreign Practice and Precedent Play in the Interpretation of Domestic Law?, 
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1893, 1907 (2005) (noting unique aspects of United States that 
may make reliance on foreign law inappropriate). 
169. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 163, at 111–12. Likewise, commentators who 
are suspicious of foreign law in the context of constitutional adjudication concede its 
applicability in the sort of contexts examined in this Article. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 
139, at 305–06 (recognizing “appropriate” uses of foreign laws). 
170. See supra notes 125–148 and accompanying text. 
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that are not, in this sense, controversial.  
Whatever the total number of cases and situations today when courts 
encounter, evaluate, or apply foreign law, speculation that that number will likely 
increase is eminently reasonable.171 In a world where global travel is commonplace 
and daily transactions routinely involve multiple countries, the number of disputes 
with transnational and international components will surely grow.172 Citizens of all 
countries will find themselves connected through the electronic global information 
system.173 And nations chasing prosperity will become ever more integrated into a 
                                                                                                            
171. The steady increase in the number of cases implicating foreign law has been 
acknowledged in each of the last five decades. See, e.g., Andrew N. Adler, Translating & 
Interpreting Foreign Statutes, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 37, 38 (1997) (“U.S. courts increasingly 
must decide issues involving the laws of foreign nations.”); Paul R. Dubinsky, Is 
Transnational Litigation a Distinct Field? The Persistence of Exceptionalism in American 
Procedural Law, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 301, 302 (2008) (noting “steady growth in the volume 
of litigation with an international dimension”); Arthur R. Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the 
“Fact” Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 
MICH. L. REV. 613, 615 (1967) (recognizing a “steady increment in the number of lawsuits 
with international aspects”); Rudolf B. Schlesinger, A Recurrent Problem in Trans-National 
Litigation: The Effect of Failure to Invoke or Prove the Applicable Foreign Law, 59 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1973) (foreign law questions presented “with considerable 
frequency”); John G. Sprankling & George R. Lanyi, Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law in 
American Courts, 19 STAN. J. INT’L L. 3, 4, 9 (1983) (noting foreign law issues come before 
American courts “quite often” and “no doubt will appear more frequently”). See also 
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS, at v (2008) 
(noting “the last thirty years have seen a growing torrent of cases” filed in the United States 
with foreign and international issues). 
172. See generally THOMAS O. MAIN, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 
(2006); Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over and 
Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 799 (1988) (“It 
is trite but true to observe that disputes between United States nationals and people from 
other lands have been increasing steadily and doubtless will continue to do so.”).  
For a discussion of the pressures on territorial boundaries generally, see JACK 
GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS 
WORLD 179–83 (2006) (describing and responding to the perception that notions of 
sovereignty are eroding in a borderless world); Parrish, supra note 143 at 238 n.4. 
173. See generally ANDREW S. BELL, FORUM SHOPPING AND VENUE IN 
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 3 (2003) (describing how the growth of transnational litigation 
is fueled by “great technological advances, particularly in the field of transportation and 
telecommunications and, more generally, through the internet’s facilitation of international 
commerce”); Sanchez, supra note 36, at 636 (“[T]he U.S. American practitioner, now more 
than ever before, operates in a world society and economy constituted not only of an 
international society and economy but also of interdependent nations’ societies and 
economies. The globalization process has given rise to the development of transnational law 
practice.”); Tueller, supra note 123, at 101–02 (“The need to have information on foreign 
law can arise in many contexts and affect almost anyone involved in the legal process. Thus, 
in the course of everyday business—in drafting contracts or considering trade with foreign 
countries, in dealing with foreign nationals or companies, or merely in buying or selling 
foreign goods at home—the need to consider the laws of a foreign nation arises with 
increasing frequency.”). 
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global development system.174 Necessity—“practical commercial necessity”—will 
make issues of foreign law even more common and ever more urgent.175 
IV. MEASURING FOREIGN MEANING 
When individuals, courts, or other institutions want or need information 
such as the tailored local meaning of a foreign word, they face what economists 
call a measurement problem.176 Humans can process and understand familiar 
things relatively quickly: we “know what to look for, whom to ask, which issues to 
trouble over, and which to ignore safely.”177 Conversely, to understand unfamiliar 
things, we must invest more time and resources—asking questions, conducting 
research, and consulting experts, for example—until we can relate that which is 
                                                                                                            
174. See generally Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of 
International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 557 (2002) (“Without 
attempting yet another sociology of globalisation, it may be accepted that political 
communities have become more heterogeneous, their boundaries much more porous, than 
assumed by the received images of sovereignty and the international order, and that the 
norms they express are fragmentary, discontinuous, often ad hoc and without definite 
hierarchical relationship—that we now live in a ‘global Bukowina.’” (citing B. DE SOUSA 
SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE. LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE 
PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION (New York: Routledge. 1995))); Gunther Teubner, “Global 
Bukowina”: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3–30 
(1997). 
“[F]or the first time in the history of the human race, most of the peoples of the world 
have been brought into more or less continual relations with each other. We speak without 
hesitation of a world economy, a world technology, world-wide communications, world 
organizations, world science, world literature, world scholarship, world travel, world 
sports.” Harold J. Berman, World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1617, 1617 (1995). The 
world has “shrunk.” See  Robert A. Jefferies, Jr., Recognition of Foreign Law by American 
Courts, 35 U. CIN. L. REV. 578, 578 (1966) (“This ‘shrinkage’ has produced a manyfold 
increase in the personal and commercial relations between nationals of different countries. 
As a result, today’s attorney is likely to be faced with claims and disputes that are dependent 
upon foreign law for their solution.”); Basil Markesinis, Ways and Means of Teaching 
Foreign Law: A Review of James Gordley & Arthur Taylor von Mehren’s An Introduction 
to the Comparative Study of Private Law: Readings, Cases, Materials, 23 TUL. EUR. & CIV. 
L.F. 175, 205 (2008) (referring to “a shrinking world which is getting closer and closer 
together through economic, political, scientific, and environmental concerns which are 
shared by nations”). For a popular narrative of these events, see THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE 
WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005). 
175. MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 34, at 75.  
176. Measurement costs are the costs required to obtain necessary information. 
Measurement costs and information costs are usually interchangeable concepts. See 
generally Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J.L. & 
ECON. 27, 28 & n.3 (1982); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization 
in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000). 
177. Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk 
Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385, 428 (1999). See 
generally Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789 
(2002). 
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unfamiliar to something that is familiar and understandable.178 
Imagine, for example, that you are invited to join in a card game of 
“poker.” You have played games of poker before, but are reluctant to part with 
your money without full knowledge of this particular game; so you watch a couple 
of hands before joining in. You will quickly process those parts of the game that 
are already familiar to you: you may notice a deck of fifty-two cards; suits of 
clubs, diamonds, hearts, and spades; a hierarchy of winning hands involving sets 
and runs; betting chips; and so forth. Although you are measuring these familiar 
parts through your observation, this is a process of confirmation that is swift and 
almost automatic because of the familiarity of what you observe.  
Before, during, and/or after that process of confirmation, you will 
undertake something much more complicated: discovering and measuring those 
parts of this game of poker that are unfamiliar to you. These differences—whether 
major or minor—will occupy the bulk of your attention: Why didn’t the bidding 
proceed in a clockwise fashion around the table? Why didn’t that straight flush 
beat a full house? Why do these players make such a point of articulating the 
amount of each of their bids twice? The answers to each of these questions would 
likely lead you to ask follow-up questions, leading to more answers, and perhaps 
still more questions. This process of discovery is a measurement expense. 
These categories of confirmation of the familiar, on one hand, and 
discovery of the unfamiliar, on the other, differ in degree, rather than kind. 
Although the unfamiliar components of a word or concept will require discovery, 
that process of discovery and measurement will involve relating the unfamiliar 
components to something familiar and digestible.179 The difference between 
confirmation and discovery, then, is simply the number of steps to be taken before 
knowledge is achieved. But additional steps require additional investment, whether 
of time or money. Accordingly, the discovery of something new costs more, by 
way of measurement, than the confirmation of something familiar. 
A.  The Unique Challenge of Ascertaining Foreign Law 
Measuring foreign law is notoriously difficult.180 As a threshold matter, 
                                                                                                            
178. I draw upon the constructivist viewpoint on learning theory. This literature 
emphasizes the active role of the learner in building understanding and making sense of new 
information. See generally JEAN PIAGET, BIOLOGY AND KNOWLEDGE (1971); JEAN PIAGET, 
STUDIES IN REFLECTING ABSTRACTION (2001). People construct new knowledge by using 
their perceptions (prior conceptual knowledge) to determine the initial path or foundation 
from which to build. See generally PIAGET, BIOLOGY AND KNOWLEDGE, supra, at 147–85. 
“[P]eople adapt their thinking to include new ideas, as new experiences provide additional 
information. This adaptation occurs in two ways, through assimilation and accommodation. 
In the former process, new information is simply added to the cognitive organization 
already there. In the latter, the intellectual organization has to change somewhat to adjust to 
the new idea.” KATHLEEN S. BERGER, THE DEVELOPING PERSON: THROUGH CHILDHOOD AND 
ADOLESCENCE 55 (1978).  
179. See supra note 178. 
180. Applying foreign law is “exceedingly difficult.” Alexander, supra note 36, at 
637; see also Schmertz, supra note 124, at 698 (describing why applying foreign law poses 
“a major intellectual challenge”). 
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simply accessing foreign law can be challenging.181 To be sure, enthusiasm for 
globalization has led to a proliferation of materials about foreigners, foreign legal 
systems, and foreign laws.182 However, this information is still difficult to digest, 
explain, adapt, and “make usable” elsewhere.183 Unfortunately, “databases do not 
furnish comprehensive access to foreign law; there are no convenient 
Restatements; [and] American legal education does not systematically equip 
judges or lawyers to carry out research in a foreign legal system.”184 
“Globalization not only renders legal information more readily available, but often 
also considerably more opaque.” 185 Information is not the same thing as 
knowledge. 
Understanding foreign law is difficult, first, because it incorporates all the 
challenges inherent in understanding domestic law. For example, interpreting the 
                                                                                                            
181. Justice Breyer, for example, has admitted (and lamented) that neither he nor 
his clerks can easily find relevant foreign material (despite their close physical proximity to 
one of the world’s top legal libraries). See Breyer, supra note 133, at 267–68 (suggesting 
inability to find foreign material). See also Iannone, supra note 132, at 445–46 (“[M]erely 
identifying the law of a foreign country may be a difficult and perplexing problem.”); Adler, 
supra note 171, at 63 n.110 (“Commentators typically worry that judges ‘may do a half-
baked job of research in totally unfamiliar materials and come to a conclusion without basis 
in foreign or domestic law.” (quoting Thomas F. Bridgman, Proof of Foreign Law & Facts, 
45 J. AIR L. & COM. 845, 854 n.38 (1980))). 
182. See generally Shirely S. Abrahamson & Michael J. Fischer, All the World’s a 
Courtroom: Judging in the New Millennium, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 291 (1997) 
(describing how advances in technology have led to the growing internationalization of the 
judiciary); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 3 (2003) 
(“The Internet affords access to foreign judicial decisions, law journals contain all manner 
of commentary, course materials are well packaged.”); Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, The 
Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist 
Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 25 (1998) (describing how the Internet and other advances in 
communication technology allow judges to more easily access decisions from foreign 
jurisdictions); Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 80 
(2005) (noting “the growing literature on constitutional courts in other countries—a 
literature that is growing in part because the number and activity of such courts are 
growing”); Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second 
Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 675 (2002) (acknowledging the role 
of comparative law in generating “a veritable panoply of books, articles, and reports about 
foreign law”). 
183. MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 34, at 369–70.  
184. William Ewald, The Complexity of Sources of Trans-National Law: United 
States Report, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 59, 65 (2010). See also id. (“Although newly-
appointed federal judges receive some basic instruction under the auspices of the United 
States judicial Conference in how to deal with issues of foreign law, and although some 
federal courts (e.g., the Southern District of New York), because they deal with a significant 
number of cases involving multinational corporations, have become familiar with the 
application of foreign law, still this training falls short of their training in American law. As 
for judges in the state court systems, their formal training in the application of foreign legal 
materials is minimal.”). 
185. David J. Gerber, Globalization and Legal Knowledge: Implications for 
Comparative Law, 75 TUL. L. REV. 949, 954 (2001). 
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laws of a foreign system can be aggravated by the inherently inconstant character 
of laws: the effect of any law may differ from time to time.186 The measurer must 
also consider questions of constitutional validity and other threshold matters.187 
The law may vary depending upon whether one adopts the interpretive lens of 
intentionalism, purposivism, textualism, or something else.188 The foreign law may 
be unsettled and controversial.189 And because the instruments of lawmaking are as 
mobile as words and laws themselves, one may encounter such phenomena as 
deliberately ambiguous laws.190 
Further, to apply or evaluate foreign law begs the jurisprudential 
question: what is law? Trawling the depth of that question, the legal pluralism 
literature explores the characteristics and consequences of the relationship between 
and among the overlapping semiautonomous layers of formal law and informal 
law.191 To the uninitiated, the applicable foreign law is often presumed to be some 
state code.192 But there may be other formal codifications that amplify or qualify 
that code provision.193 Some legal systems are formally pluralistic, recognizing 
                                                                                                            
186. See Alexander, supra note 36, at 633. See also Benjamin Busch, Recent 
Developments in the Proof of Foreign Law, 1959 A.B.A. SEC. INT’L & COMP. L. PROC. 22, 
32 (1959) (“Is the law of Cuba the same after Castro as it was before . . . ?”).  
187. John R. Brown, 44.1 Ways to Prove Foreign Law, 9 MAR. L. 179, 191 
(1984). 
188. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 141–73 (1994); Adler, supra note 171, at 51. 
189. John Henry Merryman, Foreign Law as a Problem, 19 STAN. J. INT’L L. 151, 
164 (1983) (“A related difficulty is that foreign law is often no less unsettled and 
controversial than domestic law . . . . The candid expert will so present it: ‘The authorities 
are divided, the opinions go in different directions, the law is not clear.’”). 
190. See Jeffrey W. Barnes, The Odd Couple: Statutes and Literature, in THE 
HAPPY COUPLE: LAW AND LITERATURE 296, 303–04 (J. Neville Turner & Pamela Williams 
eds., 1994); Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes With Multiple Personality 
Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 627, 637–42 (2002); Victoria Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative 
Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 596–97 (2002). See also 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, WTO Negotiators Meet Academics: The Negotiations on 
Improvements of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 237 (2003) 
(discussing the role of constructive ambiguity in treaty language). See generally SEAN 
FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE 47 (2010) (recounting how scholars have identified a 
number of factors that can result in ambiguous Congressional mandates). 
191. For an overview of the legal pluralism literature, see John Griffiths, What is 
Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. OF LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1986); Brian Z. 
Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J. L. & SOC. 296 (2000); 
Gordon R. Woodman, Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent Debate about 
Legal Pluralism, 42 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 21 (1998); Gordon R. 
Woodman, The Idea of Legal Pluralism, in LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD 3 
(Baudouin Dupret et al. eds., 1999). 
192. Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of 
Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209, 1215 
(2005). 
193. See, e.g., Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 
87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801 (2010) (suggesting that substantive law should not be applied 
without its presumed procedural platform). 
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family, religious, business, or customary legal systems.194 And various forms of 
“soft law,” which are influential even if nonbinding normative orders, further 
complicate the foreign law inquiry.195 A comprehensive application of foreign law 
requires the measurer to unpack the normative heterogeneity and then to apply the 
relevant mandates faithfully. 
For a number of overlapping reasons, knowledge of foreign law is 
especially and inherently difficult to achieve.196 “There are very few points [of 
                                                                                                            
194. See M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND 
NEO-COLONIAL LAWS 1 (1975) (“Legal systems typically combine in themselves ideas, 
principles, rules, and procedures originating from a variety of sources. Both in the 
contemporary world and historically the law manifests itself in a variety of forms and a 
variety of levels.”). See also MASAJI CHIBA, LEGAL CULTURES IN HUMAN SOCIETY: A 
COLLECTION OF ARTICLES AND ESSAYS, at v (2002); John Flood, Globalization and Law, in 
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 315 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 
2002); Anne Griffiths, Legal Pluralism, in AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 
289, 290–92 (2002). 
195. TWINING, supra note 44, at 362; Sanchez, supra note 36, at 656–657. 
196. See generally RICHARD FENTIMAN, FOREIGN LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS: 
PLEADING, PROOF AND CHOICE OF LAW (1998) (discussing the difficulty of applying foreign 
law); Richard Fentiman, Foreign Law and the Forum Conveniens, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A 
MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 276 (James A.R. 
Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002) (discussing the difficulty of applying 
foreign law as a factor in identifying the forum conveniens); Ernesto J. Sanchez, A Case 
Against Judicial Internationalism, 38 CONN. L. REV. 185 (2006) (arguing that judges with 
expertise in U.S. law lack access to adequate resources to research, interpret, and apply 
foreign law). See also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 787 (1997) (Souter, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
Some judges are much more sanguine about applying foreign law. See, e.g., Bodum 
USA, Inc. v. La Cafetière, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 628–29, 633 (7th Cir. 2010) (Judges Posner 
and Easterbrook both write that applying foreign law is not especially difficult); First 
American Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 22 (2d Cir. 1998) (“We think that 
there is no risk that an American court will commit an error in interpreting foreign 
law. . . .”). Judge Milton Pollack of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York expressed his thoughts on the subject this way:  
In any event, though we view another country’s law but through a 
glass darkly, I am less pessimistic than Justice Holmes as to our ability 
to handle foreign legal authorities. Of course, arguing foreign law is 
more complex than when the law is domestic. More of the steps must be 
spelled out, more assumptions made explicit, less taken for granted. Yet, 
if what is relied on is law, and not some primitive religion or the whim 
of a tyrant, the form of reasoning will be familiar. In civil law countries, 
the express language of statutes may be entitled to more weight than we 
give it, and judicial decision to less—but the law is still proved by 
pronouncements of suitably constituted authorities. I am told that in 
Mexico a single decision construing a statute has no precedential effect, 
but that a line of consistent decisions has. That’s not our rule, but the 
notions of precedent and construction are familiar, and an American 
court can understand and apply the Mexican rule if it is called to the 
court’s attention. 
Milton Pollack, Proof of Foreign Law, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 470, 474 (1978). Judge Pollack’s 
viewpoint is not without contention. See Adler, supra note 171, at 78 n.186 (noting 
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foreign law] which lend themselves to . . . simple treatment.”197 “‘Applying’ 
foreign law requires more than mere reference to that law; it demands that foreign 
law be considered on its own terms.”198 But words are embedded within a legal 
system, and that system employs a certain vocabulary, corresponding to certain 
legal concepts; it uses certain methods to interpret them, and these methods, in 
turn, incorporate certain notions of social order and the capacity and  functions of 
law.199  
“[O]ne of the most problematic features of legal discourse is that much of 
it is ‘invisible’ . . . ‘the most serious obstacles to comprehensibility are not the 
vocabulary and sentence structure employed in law, but the unstated conventions 
by which language operates.’”200 Part of this extraordinary challenge can be 
explained as a matter of cognitive science. “Speakers produce the minimum 
linguistic information sufficient to achieve the speaker’s communicational 
needs.”201 The discourse community that is contemplated for a national law, for 
example, is a domestic audience.202 Such a text is not written for the purpose of 
effective communication with an outsider. Thus the foreign law will not express all 
of the cues, assumptions, presumptions, exceptions, canons, common sense, and 
peripheral knowledge essential to a comprehensive understanding.203 An apt 
analogy to the task of understanding foreign law is trying to learn the law on a 
                                                                                                            
decision-makers “are likely to overassess their own competency”) (citing Frederick 
Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 
45 VAND. L. REV. 715, 732 (1992)).  
197. William B. Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 
CALIF. L. REV. 23, 40 (1957). 
198. Dolinger, supra note 152, at 266. 
199. See John C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 
631–32 (1998); Gordley, supra note 34, at 1075. 
200. CAO, supra note 36, at 28; James Boyd White, Law as Language: Reading 
Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 415, 423 (1982). See also Vijay K. Bhatia, 
Translating Legal Genres, in TEXT, TYPOLOGY, AND TRANSLATION 208 (Anna Trosburg ed., 
1997). 
201. Slocum, supra note 58, at 17 (emphasis added) (citing JOHN A. HAWKINS, 
EFFICIENCY AND COMPLEXITY IN GRAMMARS 38 (2004)). This principle is supported also by 
the canon of construction that statutes ought to be construed so that no sentence or word 
will be rendered superfluous, void, or insignificant. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 
167, 174 (2001) (stating that it is “a cardinal principle of statutory construction” that “a 
statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, 
sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant”). The canon discourages over-
drafting. 
202. See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in 
Conflict of Laws Methods, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 77, 82 (1963) 
(noting that legislators draft with a domestic audience in mind). 
203. See Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U.S. 102, 105–06 (1923) (Holmes, J.) (“When we 
contemplate such a system from the outside it seems a wall of stone . . . .”); Wood & Selick, 
Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941, 943 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.) 
(“The embarrassment is . . . that we have to interpret another system of law according to 
notions wholly foreign to it.”). 
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complex, unfamiliar, specialized subject solely from bar review outlines.204 
Much of the difficulty in understanding foreign law might be described as 
a product of inevitable cultural differences between the legal systems at issue.205 
Legal words are immersed in a cultural context and are modulated by “systems,”206 
“substructural forces,”207 “invisible patterns,”208 and “legal formants”209 that 
inform and explain each word.210 Laws do not exist in the abstract;211 they 
constitute a cultural understanding “which presupposes a community of 
interpreters.”212 Legal language is a social practice, and the box of meaning for 
each legal word necessarily bears the imprint of distinctive discursive practices.213 
Law is local knowledge.214 
For all these reasons, to understand foreign law and all of these unique 
factors upon which it depends is a remarkably ambitious undertaking. According 
to some, an understanding of another legal system can be acquired only through 
                                                                                                            
204. Cf. Adler, supra note 171, at 78. Others have said that when a judge applies 
his own legal system he acts as an architect; but when he deals with foreign law he acts as a 
mere photographer. See 1 ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 193 
(1974); FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 85–86 (1993). 
205. JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE 344 (1988). 
206. Alexander, supra note 36, at 636. 
207. Edward J. Eberle, The Method and Role of Comparative Law, 8 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 451, 452 (2009). 
208. Bernhard Grossfeld & Edward J. Eberle, Patterns of Order in Comparative 
Law: Discovering and Decoding Invisible Powers, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 291 (2003). 
209. Sacco, supra note 36, at 22. 
210. Pierre Legrand, Comparative Legal Studies and Commitment to Theory, 58 
MOD. L. REV. 262, 263 (1995). See also Esin Örücü, An Exercise on the Internal Logic of 
Legal Systems, 7 LEGAL STUD. 310 (1987)). 
211. William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was it Like to Try a 
Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1940 (1995) (“We must . . . conceive of law as a cognitive 
phenomenon, seeing in it not just a set of rules or a mechanism for the resolution of 
disputes, but a style of thought, a deliberate attempt, by people in their waking hours, to 
interpret and organize the social world: not an abstract structure, but a conscious, 
ratiocinative activity.”). See also MATTILA, supra note 18, at 105 (describing how law is 
inseparable from the context of the society that created it). 
212. Adler, supra note 171, at 82. See also Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and 
the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 
44 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 164 (1995) (asserting equilibrium among rule of law and democratic 
values in other countries’ systems); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, 
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994); Philip P. Frickey, Faithful 
Interpretation, 73 WASH U. L.Q. REV. 1085, 1090–91 (1995) (“The faithful interpreter, then, 
is not merely a literal reader, but faithful to the many broader concerns wrapped up in the 
established practices of the legal interpretive community.”); Allan Hutchinson & Derek 
Morgan, Book Review, The Semiology of Statutes, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 583, 594 (1984) 
(“Communities of interpretation have their own bonding mechanisms, a mixture of moral 
values and social customs. Interpretation is inextricably bound up with values . . . .”). 
213. GOODRICH, supra note 43, at 2. 
214. Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative 
Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 
167, 215 (1983). 
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immersion with that system and its values.215 Absent intimate contact, the forum 
will examine unfamiliar laws as a foreigner, interpreting a foreign law in light of 
its own values.216 Proper examination “requires some degree of empathy for the 
values peculiar to that system.”217 But this empathy extends to a long list of 
influences and factors, including the foreign country’s “political arrangements, 
social relations, interpersonal interactional practices, economic processes, cultural 
categorizations, normative beliefs, psychological habits, philosophical 
perspectives, and ideological values.”218 It includes understanding a society’s 
“religion, history, geography, morals, custom, philosophy, or ideology.”219 (It may 
even include watching their movies!220) To navigate such an inquiry meaningfully, 
one is expected to have the “skills of a scientist” and the “skills of an 
anthropologist.”221 Some insist that it is outright “impossible to avoid distortion in 
one’s analysis of another legal tradition: it is an inescapable fact of life, for the 
process of comparison can never become sufficiently objective.”222 Although most 
                                                                                                            
215. Eberle, supra note 207, at 458 (“Law really cannot be understood without 
understanding the culture on which it sits. And to understand the culture, we need to employ 
acute observation, linguistic skill, and immersion in the milieu and social setting.”); Ewald, 
supra note 211, at 1973–74 (suggesting that we need to compare law from an interior point 
of view). See generally PIERRE LEGRAND, FRAGMENTS ON LAW-AS-CULTURE 27–34 (1999); 
UGO A. MATTEI ET AL., SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW 125 (7th ed. 2009); Oliver 
Brand, Conceptual Comparisons Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative Legal 
Studies, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 414 (2007) (suggesting that, absent cultural 
“immersion . . . the comparatist will always remain bound by his or her preconceptions and 
cultural disposition: the comparatist will stay ‘one of his [or her] own people”); Vivian 
Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative 
Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43, 43, 51 (1998);  
216. MATTEI, ET AL., supra note 215, at 125–26.  
217. Alexander, supra note 36, at 636. 
218. Janet E. Ainsworth, Categories and Culture: On the “Rectification of 
Names” in Comparative Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 19, 28 (1996) (citing Salley Engle 
Merry, Disputing Without Culture, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2057, 2063 (1987)). See also Adler, 
supra note 171, at 56 (“[O]ne must dive into philosophy, history, and the social sciences in 
order to gain pragmatic familiarity with foreign law.”). 
219. Eberle, supra note 207, at 452. See also CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE 
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748). See 
id. at 231–45 (“On the laws in their relation to the nature of the climate.”); id. at 285–307 
(“On the laws in their relation with the nature of the terrain.”); id. at 308–33 (“On the laws 
in their relation with the principles forming the general spirit, the mores, and the manners of 
a nation.”). 
220. MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 34, at 354–55. 
221. Eberle, supra note 207, at 453. We need to understand the examined 
country’s history and “philosophical and religious traditions” and comparativists need 
“strong linguistic skills and maybe even the skills of anthropological field study in order to 
collect information about foreign legal systems at first hand.” Reitz, supra note 199, at 631–
32. See also MATTEI DOGAN & ALI KAZANCIGIL, COMPARING NATIONS: CONCEPTS, 
STRATEGIES, SUBSTANCE (1994); JEROME KIRK & MARC L. MILLER, RELIABILITY AND 
VALIDITY IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 12–14 (1986). 
222. Legrand, supra note 210, at 266–67 (citing Hans-Georg Gadamer, Text and 
Interpretation, in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION: THE GADAMER-DERRIDA ENCOUNTER 
27 (Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard E. Palmer eds., 1989)). See also DOUGLAS R. 
HOFSTADTER, GÖDEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 698 (1989) (“Though 
42 __ Cornell Int’l L.J. __ (forthcoming)  
of this literature about how legal rules are embedded in local dimensions of the law 
has emerged from postmodernists, this constituency has an unlikely ally in 
conservatives who make a similar point when arguing against the use of foreign 
law to interpret the United States Constitution.223  
When foreign laws must also be translated from another language, this 
presents a related but additional obstacle.224 Legal translation is almost always 
difficult and may be “impossible” to accomplish.225 Translations can be difficult to 
                                                                                                            
you may imagine that you have jumped out of yourself, you never can actually do so.”); 
Legrand, supra note 42, at 526 (“The singularity of law is that it necessarily exceeds being 
understandable in universal (or universalizable) terms.”). 
223. Compare Anne Peters & Heiner Schwenke, Comparative Law Beyond Post-
Modernism, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 800, 801 (2000) (insert explanation) with McGinnis, 
supra note 163, at 311–12 (insert explanation); Rosenkrantz, supra note 152, at 293–94 
(insert explanation). See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 626–27 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (insert explanation). 
224. On the overlap between culture and translation, see generally ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 373 (1988) (observing that a translator 
must realize that linguistic expression is the product of “beliefs, institutions, and practices” 
at a “particular time and place”); Reuben A. Brower, Seven Agamemnons, 8 J. HIST. IDEAS 
383, 383 (1947) (depicting the translator of poetry as attempting to make “the poetry of the 
past into poetry of his particular present”); David Cousens Hoy, Interpreting the Law: 
Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 S. CALIF. L. REV. 136, 138 (1985) 
(“To understand is to grasp the relevant context that determines the possible parameters of 
the sentence or expression.”); Burton Raffel, Translating Medieval European Poetry, in THE 
CRAFT OF TRANSLATION 53 (John Biguenet & Rainer Schulte eds., 1989) (“If then there is 
any overarching lesson to be learned from my remarks, it is . . . that the literary translator is 
necessarily engaged with far more than words, far more than techniques, far more than 
stories or characters or scenes. He is . . . engaged with worldviews and with the passionately 
held inner convictions of men and women long dead and vanished from the earth. A large 
part of his task, and perhaps the most interesting . . ., is the mining out and reconstruction of 
those worldviews, those passionately held and beautifully embodied inner convictions.”). 
225. SUSAN SARCEVIC, NEW APPROACHES TO LEGAL TRANSLATION 272 (1997). 
See also Oliver Cachard, Translating the French Civil Code: Politics, Linguistics and 
Legislation, 21 CONN. J. INT’L L. 41, 56 (2006) (“Ninety percent, no doubt, of all translation 
since Babel is inadequate and will continue to be so. Although all translation is inadequate 
in the eyes of a linguist, only some of them must be regarded as faulty from the perspective 
of a lawyer. For lawyers, a faulty translation is an erroneous translation that so deforms the 
text of origin that it injures those who trust the translation. Mistranslation leads a judge to 
decide a case differently.” (quoting GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL: ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE 
AND TRANSLATION 417 (2d ed. 1992) (1975))); Gutteridge, supra note 36, at 402 (“It 
would . . . almost be impossible from the standpoint of comparative studies to exaggerate 
the perils which lie hidden in terminology of this description.”); Legrand, supra note 42, at 
530 (“[H]ow much longer can interpreters continue to practice vacuous interpretations of 
law-texts, whether deliberately or through ignorance, to satisfy themselves with atomism 
(law re-presented as units) or reductionism (law re-presented as ‘thin’ or disarchivized), to 
‘purchas[e] a sense of universality in law but only at the price of the ideas and arguments 
that make the law a worthy creation of the human intellect.’” (quoting George P. Fletcher, 
Comparative Law As a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 683, 694 (1998))); John E. 
Joseph, Indeterminacy, Translation and the Law, in TRANSLATION AND THE LAW 13, 14 
(Marshall Morris ed., 1995) (“[t]ranslation always falls short”). 
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comprehend because the laws are often merely translated into the target language 
rather than “packaged in a manner that makes it usable by the judges and lawyers 
of the receiving system.”226 Effective packaging would locate the text within the 
larger context of all those factors described above.227 But even if capturing all of 
that context were possible, there are other dangers in “packaging,” because when 
translating, “people tend to find what they seek.”228 Manipulation can occur 
because translation necessarily requires a certain amount of creativity and 
interpretation;229 there is no sense of equivalence in the abstract that can guide the 
practice of translation.230 Indeed, elementary hermeneutics teaches us that every 
interpretation or translation, no matter how conscientious, will involve active 
participation by the translator.231 Even if fidelity to the original language were 
possible,232 there are always interlinguistic gaps: some words may be 
untranslatable.233 
                                                                                                            
For an historical overview of translation theories, see Hugo Friedrich, On the Art of 
Translation, in THEORIES OF TRANSLATION, supra note 106, at 11–16. 
226. SIR BASIL MARKESINIS & DR. JÖRG FEDTKE, JUDICIAL RECOURSE TO FOREIGN 
LAW: A NEW SOURCE OF INSPIRATION? 145 (2006). 
227. See generally CAO, supra note 36, at 31. 
228. Adler, supra note 171, at 54. “The courts’ inquiries . . . very often (implicitly 
or explicitly) conclude that alien and forum rules correlate quite closely.” Id. at 63. Maybe 
this is because they are more comparable than they appear—a benign explanation. “The 
general methodological problem of ‘wish-fulfillment’ mars the universality thesis. Put 
simply, interpreters tend to spot false similarities. Notwithstanding their flattering self-
appraisal, jurists who do not contemplate this problem display a troubling lack of 
knowledge.” Id. 
229. See Ainsworth, supra note 218, at 27 (“The ethnographer is caught in 
a . . . paradox . . . . He must render the foreign familiar and preserve its very foreignness at 
one and the same time.” (quoting Vincent Crapanzano, Hermes' Dilemma: The Masking of 
Subversion in Ethnographic Description, in WRITING CULTURE, THE POETICS AND POLITICS 
OF ETHNOGRAPHY 51, 52 (James Clifford & George E. Marcus eds., 1986))). 
230. Lessig, supra note 37, at 1201 (“‘[E]quivalence’ is endogenous to a practice 
of translation, and . . . the practices themselves determine what will be considered 
equivalent. Practices will differ, and if practices differ, ‘equivalence’ will differ.”). 
231. See Adler, supra note 171, at 45 (noting that notwithstanding the challenges 
and inherent instability of language translations, surprisingly “few in the U.S. legal 
profession appreciate or discuss the translation process”); Sacco, supra note 36, at 20 (“The 
complexity of the problems involved in legal translation makes the carelessness with which 
they are approached seem incredible.”); Peter W. Schroth, Legal Translation, 34 AM. J. 
COMP. L. SUPP. 47, 47 (1986) (“Despite its great practical importance, legal translation is 
little discussed; despite its difficulty, it is frequently assigned to translators without legal 
training. Plainly both the importance and the difficulty are commonly underestimated.”). 
232. Lessig, supra note 37, at 1265 (“[F]idelity is not binary. There will be more 
and less faithful, not faithful and unfaithful, readings.”). 
233. MACINTYRE, supra note 224, at 375 (“The characteristic mark of someone 
who has . . . acquired two first languages is to be able to recognize where and in what 
respects utterances in the one are untranslatable into the other.”). See also Adler, supra note 
171, at 46–47 ; CAO, supra note 36, at 32; SARCEVIC, supra note 225, at 233; King-Kui Sin 
& D. Roebuck, Language Engineering for Legal Transplantation: Conceptual Problems in 
Creating Common Law Chinese, 16 LANGUAGE & COMM. 235 (1996); Schopenhauer, supra 
note 106, at 32, 36 (“Not every word in one language has an exact equivalent in another. 
44 __ Cornell Int’l L.J. __ (forthcoming)  
B.  The Significance of a Word’s Common Meaning 
Sensitivity to the vagaries of translation and the cultural dependence of 
the law increases the measurement expense. When measuring a foreign word, the 
measurer must proceed with extra caution (i.e., more measurement) to avoid error. 
As a practical matter, no foreign word may be so familiar that its meaning can be 
confirmed swiftly or automatically. Still, some parts of the word’s meaning will be 
more familiar than others. And, again, we can crudely divide this measurement 
process into the relatively familiar (which will require measurement resembling 
confirmation) and the relatively unfamiliar (which will require measurement 
resembling discovery).234 
Building on the hypothetical introduced in Part II, imagine that a judge 
somewhere outside of Sixth Country is measuring Sixth Country’s class action 
(M4). This judge may be deciding a motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non 
conveniens, for example, and upon consideration of the adequacy of Sixth Country 
as an alternative forum for the suit, a critical issue may be whether or not the 
plaintiffs would be able to pursue a class action there. Hence, there is a need for 
measurement.  
The judge who is measuring the foreign device in Sixth Country, then, 
would be measuring M4, the content of the circle with the solid boundary in the 
figure below. If the judge is familiar with one or more of the other five countries 
that have a class action (including, perhaps, her own country), she will have a head 
start in measuring Sixth Country’s M4. Exactly how much of a start depends upon 
with which country or countries she is familiar. 
                                                                                                            
Thus, not all concepts that are expressed through the words of one language are exactly the 
same as the ones that are expressed through the words of another.”). 
234. On the terms confirmation and discovery, see supra notes 176–179 and 
accompanying text. 
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This figure demonstrates that the judge need only confirm the common 
meaning (CM) of the word and will necessarily need to discover the unique 
meaning (UM) of the word. Whether the bands that appear in between CM and 
UM require confirmation or discovery depends on with which device(s) she is 
already familiar.  
Of course, this measurer is not the only measurer of M4. And when one 
considers the aggregate of measurers, some measurers may know only M2, 
requiring more discovery, and others will be familiar with M3, requiring less. The 
more that the measurement process requires only confirmation, the lower the 
aggregate measurement expense. And because common meaning (CM) requires 
only confirmation, the more robust a word’s common meaning, the lower that 
aggregate expense. 
Further, a sophisticated or experienced measurer of foreign laws could 
have familiarity with several different variant meanings of a particular word, rather 
than just one.235 For example, imagine that the judge who is measuring the 
meaning of Sixth Country’s M4 was already familiar with each of M1, M2, and M3. 
In this situation, almost all of M4 would be familiar to her because of the slight 
difference between M3 and M4. Yet, keenly aware of the difficulty in interpreting 
foreign law generally, and conscious of the variations in the meaning of the word 
“class action” in particular, one might expect her to “double-check” the meaning 
                                                                                                            
235. The globalization of the judiciary makes such knowledge more likely. See 
generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, 40th Anniversary Perspective: Judicial Globalization, 40 
VA. J. INT’L L. 1103 (2000). 
M2 M1 M3 M4 
CM UM 
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of those parts of M4 that, although similar to M3, are unlike M1 and M2. This 
suggests a three-tiered measurement process: (i) confirmation of that which is 
familiar to all meanings of the word; (ii) double-check of that which looks familiar 
(and, in fact, is familiar) but is known to the measurer to vary elsewhere; and (iii) 
discovery of that which is unfamiliar. 
This three-tiered process, even if a rather crude model, resonates with our 
experience. If you were joining the game of poker described earlier,236 you would 
survey and confirm the familiar parts and focus your attention on the unfamiliar 
parts. But if you had played different versions of poker in the past—say, 
occasionally with “wild” cards—you would also double-check whether those 
particular variations were applicable even when they do not appear to be present 
(and, in fact, are not). A similar situation is present when a driver considers 
making a U-turn while driving outside of their home state: the other state might, in 
fact, have the same rule, yet there is hesitation because of awareness of variation 
on this point. There would be no hesitation, however, regarding, say, the legality of 
entering an intersection on a green light. In both instances the law could be 
familiar as a matter of fact—but the known variation elsewhere leads one to 
double-check (or have second thoughts about) the familiar law regarding U-turns. 
In contrast, the common meaning of a green light streamlines the measurement 
process. 
The common meaning of a word, then, plays an important role in the 
measurement process. Specifically, the more robust a word’s common meaning, 
the lower the measurement cost. If the term class action had only one meaning 
worldwide, the cost of measuring any particular class action device would be 
modest. If the measurer had (or obtained) familiarity with any class action device, 
they would know the meaning of any other class action device. Measurement 
would be a swift and virtually automatic process of confirmation.  
If only sixty percent of a word’s meaning were common worldwide, the 
heavy costs of measuring would need to canvass the remaining forty percent. Only 
sixty percent of the measurement would necessarily be a swift and virtually 
automatic process of confirmation. The rest would be confirmation, double-
checking, or discovery, depending upon circumstances unique to the measurer and 
the device being measured. The example demonstrates how measurement costs 
rise as the content in a word’s common meaning falls. 
Introducing a variant meaning that consumes even part of a word’s 
common meaning affects not only those who are measuring that system’s word 
meaning; the idiosyncrasy in just one system237 can increase the information 
processing costs of all other systems that are interacting with any other unfamiliar 
system. Another illustration may solidify this point. Assume that all legal systems 
use the word day in the articulation of certain timing requirements and other 
                                                                                                            
236. See supra text accompanying notes 178–179.  
237. Because the model this Article proposes is merely conceptual, it is certainly 
possible that the idiosyncrasies of some national systems may not register elsewhere, or 
perhaps there would be only a regional effect of the sort of phenomenon described here. The 
trigger would be the extent to which knowledge of a particular system is relevant or known 
elsewhere. 
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obligations—e.g., a response is due in ten days. Although we would expect slight 
variations of meaning in different legal systems with respect to holidays, 
weekends, and such, the common meaning would surely include that a day is a 
twenty-four-hour period. But then suppose that one rogue country redefines the 
word day for its own system to mean a twelve-hour period. Naturally, this changes 
the measurement expense for outsiders who will be measuring the meaning of the 
word in the rogue country; that is one dimension of the externality. But further, 
awareness that a word has a different meaning in any one system can also change 
the measurement expense for all persons interacting with any other foreign system. 
This is true even if neither the measuring country nor the country whose system is 
being measured is the rogue country. Knowledge of the variation can convert a 
measurement from the category of mere confirmation to the category that requires 
a double-check. Accordingly, there are externalities in this rogue country’s 
decision-making process: they enjoy all the benefits of the decision to adopt this 
idiosyncratic meaning, but will not suffer all of the social costs that their conduct 
precipitates. When terms such as class action or day lose common meaning, the 
loss of information increases the information costs incurred by others. 
V. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF MEASUREMENT 
An individual or institution will measure until the marginal costs of 
additional measurement equal the marginal benefits—or until the marginal benefit 
in reduced error costs exceeds the marginal cost of measurement.238 Because 
“[o]ur law is a law of words,”239 the creation, modification, and vindication of all 
legal rights, responsibilities, and obligations ultimately rely on the interpretation of 
words.240 Accordingly, ascertaining the correct meaning of a word is important for 
the planning, behavior, and success of individuals and institutions—and it may be 
essential for the integrity and legitimacy of courts. The interpretation of a word in 
a foreign law can be as important as the situation or case in which that issue 
arises.241 Thus the marginal benefit of obtaining additional information about the 
                                                                                                            
238. Merrill & Smith, supra note 176, at 26. 
239. TIERSMA, supra note 17, at 1 (“Morality or custom may be embedded in 
human behavior, but law—virtually by definition—comes into being through language. 
Thus, the legal profession focuses intensely on the words that constitute the law, whether in 
the form of statutes, regulations, or judicial opinions. Words are . . . a lawyer’s most 
essential tools . . . . Few professions are as dependent upon language.”). 
240. See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. 
241. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION 
IN UNITED STATES COURTS 775 (5th ed. 2011) (which state’s law applies can determine the 
litigation outcome); Alexander, supra note 36, at 632 (“[J]ustice is achieved when the forum 
judge applies the rules of the legal system most ‘concerned’ in the dispute, thereby 
disposing of the matter in a manner consistent with that followed in other jurisdictions.”); 
id. at 638 (“our sense of justice demands that the attempt be made to [meaningfully] 
accommodate foreign elements”); Benjamin Busch, Recent Developments in the Proof of 
Foreign Law, 1959 A.B.A. SEC. INT’L & COMP. L. PROC. 28, 28 (1959) (tools for pleading 
and proof of foreign law are “the bulwarks for the protection of rights and the enforcement 
of obligations.”); Arthur Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 
1018, 1019 (1941) (“Savigny, the founder of [the nineteenth century internationalist school] 
had proclaimed the doctrine that recognition of foreign legal systems is a corollary to the 
equality between nationals and foreigners demanded by the Law of Nations.” (citing 
48 __ Cornell Int’l L.J. __ (forthcoming)  
meaning of words is often very high.242 
Although the marginal benefit of additional measurement can be 
significant, the cost of measuring is also substantial. As already described, foreign 
law is complex, nuanced, and layered—and ascertaining meaning in any particular 
context is fraught with perilous traps for the unwary and wary alike.243 Ordinary 
cost-benefit analysis recognizes some point at which a risk of error becomes 
preferable to the return on any additional measurement.244 Accordingly, an 
individual who is contemplating action in another country may stop measuring 
laws in the target country as soon as she is willing to assume the risk of 
interpretive mistakes and overlooked laws. A corporation that is contemplating 
investment in another country may make a similar decision—or, at the margins, 
might reject the foreign investment opportunity because of the cost of measuring 
the applicable foreign laws.245 
Courts, however, are in a very different position than these individuals 
and corporations. Prevailing doctrines and laws compel courts to engage with 
foreign laws.246 And generally speaking, our judiciary has a very low tolerance for 
error—especially with regard to questions of law. Errors in ascertaining foreign 
law can happen, of course, but the legitimacy of courts depends upon the faithful 
execution of their responsibility to identify, interpret, and apply the law—foreign 
or domestic—whatever the burden.247 
                                                                                                            
FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (William Guthrie trans., 
2d ed. 1880))); Cachard, supra note 225, at 56. 
242. James McComish, Pleading and Proving Foreign Law in Australia, 31 
MELB. U. L. REV. 400, 402 (2007) (regarding proof of foreign law, “its importance can 
hardly be overstated” (quoting EDWARD I. SYKES & MICHAEL C. PRYLES, AUSTRALIAN 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1991))); Tueller, supra note 123, at 108 (“[D]ifficulty 
of application cannot excuse failure to adhere to norms of law.”). 
243. See supra Part IV.A. 
244. For an introduction to cost-benefit analysis, see E.J. MISHAN & EUSTON 
QUAH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (5th ed. 2007). 
245. For an introduction to margins, see FARNSWORTH, supra note 113, at 24. 
246. See supra notes 125–175 and accompanying text. 
247. See Marc Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES 
OF COURTS 123, 132, 135–36, 138 (Keith O. Boyum & Lynn Mather eds., 1983); Dan M. 
Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 352–61 
(1997). See also supra notes 125–175 and accompanying text. 
For a somewhat contrary view, see Pollack, supra note 196, at 471–72 (“A general 
concern that people should satisfy their obligations, wherever incurred, opens the 
courthouse doors to parties asserting rights under foreign law, but that concern is not so 
pressing as the interest in enforcing domestic law. Certainly it is not so great as to justify 
devoting more judicial time to cases involving foreign law than to those presenting only 
domestic law issues . . . .”). See also Budget Rent-A-Car Corp. of Am. v. Fein, 342 F.2d 
509, 514 n.9 (5th Cir. 1965) (“The traditional function of conflicts-of-laws rules in contracts 
is to afford a degree of certainty and symmetry as controversies stray to localities which are 
strangers. They need not, therefore, necessarily make sense.”). 
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A.  The Process of Measurement 
Ascertaining foreign law suggests great expectations of the judiciary.248 
And very importantly, the content of foreign law must be decided by judges as a 
matter of law.249 In 1966, Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was 
promulgated “to make the process of determining alien law identical with the 
method of ascertaining domestic law to the extent that is possible.”250 In other 
words, the content of foreign law cannot be buried (as a question of fact) in the 
black box of jury decision-making.251 Judges must resolve these questions of law 
on the record—and with an explanation of the ruling. Moreover, the high 
expectation of and attention forced upon the judiciary resurfaces anew on appeal 
since the content of foreign law must be decided by appellate judges de novo.252  
In determining the content of foreign law, courts “may consider any 
relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a 
party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.”253 It behooves the 
litigating parties to present expert testimony to assist the court on issues regarding 
the content of foreign law, and this is the ordinary course.254 Although the absence 
                                                                                                            
248. Ascertaining the law even of another state within the United States can be 
difficult. And to the extent that that statement is true, much of what I discuss in this Article 
applies to situations involving the application of non-forum but otherwise “domestic” law. 
This challenge is evidenced in part by the extant solution: “More than thirty states authorize 
certification of the disputed question to an appropriate court of the other state in such a case, 
most of them on the basis of the Uniform Certification of Questions Law, 12 U.L.A. 49 
(1975).” DAVID P. CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 88 (8th ed. 2010) (citing John B. Corr 
& Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 
411 (1988)). 
249. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. Many states have replicated Rule 44.1 for their state 
courts. A small number of states have adopted the Uniform Interstate and International 
Procedure Act of 1962, which has substantially the same content. For more on state 
practice, see SOFIE GEEROMS, FOREIGN LAW IN CIVIL LITIGATION 123–25 (2004). 
250. 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2444 (1971). 
251. Common law courts treated foreign law as a matter of fact to be pleaded and 
proved by the party relying upon it. See 3 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT 
OF LAWS § 621.2 (1935). For history and background, see Miller, supra note 171, at 624. 
252. See Miner, supra note 121, at 586 (“[B]oth trial and appellate courts must 
research and analyze the law independently.”). See also Louise Ellen Teitz, From the 
Courthouse in Tobago to the Internet: The Increasing Need to Prove Foreign Law in US 
Courts, 34 J. MAR. L. & COM. 97, 110 (2003) (“Determination of a foreign country’s law is 
an issue of law . . . . Even though the District Court heard live testimony from experts from 
both sides, that Court’s opportunity to assess the witness’s demeanor provides no basis for a 
reviewing court to defer to the trier’s ruling on the content of foreign law. In cases of this 
sort, it is not the credibility of the experts that is at issue, it is the persuasive force of the 
opinions they expressed.” (quoting Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 
153 F.3d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 1998))). 
253. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. 
254. See Brown, supra note 187, at 191 (“Although expert testimony is no longer 
a rigid requirement under 44.1, it is rare for most American judges to admit documents or 
apply foreign law without some form of expert input.”); Merryman, supra note 189, at 170 
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of a qualified expert witness can be a problem for courts,255 the problem is more 
commonly somewhat the opposite. In many cases each party will have a foreign 
law expert who contradicts the other.256  
A battle-of-the-experts can become an “ignominious and unseemly 
spectacle.”257 The problems and dangers generally associated with a system of 
party-controlled experts are likely quite familiar: The process can be expensive 
and inefficient,258 experts can become partisans,259 and substance can be 
perverted.260 The process can be so tainted that some of the most qualified experts 
                                                                                                            
(“[A]s a practical matter, access to foreign law is available only through the use of 
experts.”). 
255. See GEEROMS, supra note 249, at 143 (referring to the “geographical vastness 
of the country . . . the absence of any academic tradition in comparative or foreign law and 
the fact that the [United States] has not created colonies”). 
256. See generally Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 
1218 (1991) (“In civil trials . . . experts on one side are generally opposed by similar experts 
on the other side.”). Merryman, supra note 189, at 154 (“The experts may—indeed very 
probably will—disagree . . . .”); Miner, supra note 121, at 582 (suggesting that conflicting 
experts is the norm); Teitz, supra note 252, at 110 (same). 
257. See Merryman, supra note 189, at 158. See also Julius Hirschfeld, Proof of 
Foreign Law, 11 L.Q. REV. 241, 241–42 (1895). 
258. See Gross, supra note 256, at 1126 (noting the process “is inefficient because 
it produces duplicate investigations”); Merryman, supra note 189, at 156 (“Experts in 
foreign law, like other experts, are expensive . . . . [W]ealthier party can more easily afford 
to ‘buy’ the better expert,” which leads to “imbalance in litigative power.”); Nussbaum, 
supra note 241, at 1029 (“the cost of acquiring an expert may become extremely 
burdensome”); Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 171, at 47 (finding a qualified expert 
“frequently is an immensely difficult and expensive task . . . . [C]ost may become 
astronomical”). 
259. Hans W. Baade, Proving Foreign and International Law in Domestic 
Tribunals, 18 VA. J. INT’L L. 619, 641–42 (1978) (“Professor Cardozo and others who 
disfavor expert testimony are concerned primarily with what has been called the ‘venality’ 
of expert witnesses; that is, their willingness to testify in favor of any proposition for a 
fee . . . . [They place m]ore value on ‘principal’ than principle.”); Gross, supra note 256, at 
1139; Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 171, at 52 (“[A party expert] may be biased—either 
knowingly or innocently—in favor of the party retaining him.”). See also Bodum USA, Inc. 
v. La Cafetière, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (Easterbrook, J.) (expert testimony 
“adds an adversary’s spin, which the court then must discount”); id. at 633 (Posner, J., 
concurring) (noting that experts are “paid for their testimony” and are “selected on the basis 
of the convergence of their views with the litigating position of the client, or their 
willingness to fall in with the views urged upon them by the client,” and that such problems 
“are the banes of expert testimony”). 
260. See generally Robert A. Jefferies, Jr., Recognition of Foreign Law by 
American Courts, 35 U. CIN. L. REV. 578, 602–03 (1966) (“[S]killful advocates may 
succeed ‘in developing confusing divergencies between experts on purely verbal matters’ in 
situations where no substantive differences exist.”) (citing Nussbaum, supra note 241, at 
1029); Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Appointed Experts and Judicial Reluctance: A Proposal to 
Amend Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 480, 482 (1988) 
(asserting a system of party-controlled experts favors the “side that has the most money to 
hire experts”). 
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may be unwilling to serve.261 When only the dubious are willing to serve, the pool 
of experts gets progressively less reliable.262 
Hosting a battle-of-the-experts can be a source of great embarrassment to 
the judge who has to determine between the two adversaries.263 An abiding 
articulation of the problem facing judges is Learned Hand’s query: “[How should 
one choose] between two statements each founded upon an experience confessedly 
foreign in kind to their own? It is just because they are incompetent for such a task 
that the expert is necessary at all.”264 
Unfortunately, the cross-examination of experts is not the best tool to 
obtain the truth on foreign law.265 Judge Pollack argued in this regard that the 
classic instruments of assuring veracity—the oath and cross-examination—are not 
really appropriate to the problems of determining foreign law.266 Only in “rare 
cases” is it a question of whether the expert is credible or reliable.267 Indeed, it is 
perfectly possible that legal experts arrive at different conclusions on the law of a 
foreign legal system in the best of faith; such is certainly the case when reasonable 
minds disagree about the applicability or meaning of some domestic law.268 To 
resolve conflicting expert testimony, then, the court may “be forced either to turn 
to the qualifications of the experts or to find an answer wholly independent of 
reliance on the experts.”269 Let us consider each of those two options in turn. 
The first option can be unattractive because “[j]udging the messenger 
rather than the message is an unsatisfactory mode of evaluating expert 
information. . . .”270 Indeed, “[c]redentials . . . are an imperfect proxy for 
knowledge under the best of circumstances, and far worse in court where they 
become yet another factor for lawyers to manipulate.”271 Moreover, there is 
randomness and unpredictability since it is not clear exactly what qualifications are 
preferred. Occasionally judges prefer an expert who practices in the foreign legal 
                                                                                                            
261. See generally Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Foreign Rules as Sources of Law, in 
LEGAL THOUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNDER CONTEMPORARY PRESSURES 71, 
77 (John N. Hazard & Wencelas J. Wagner eds., 1970) (“When I was still willing to engage 
in this less than dignified game of legal craftsmanship, I was repeatedly employed to 
“testify” in American courts on foreign law . . . .”); Gross, supra note 256, at 1136. 
262. Lee, supra note 260, at 483. For the classic explanation of the spiraling 
nature of this phenomenon, see George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (examining pathology in 
the market for used cars). 
263. See Merryman, supra note 189, at 158. See also Hirschfeld, supra note 257, 
at 241–42. 
264. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert 
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1902). 
265. Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 171, at 50. 
266. Pollack, supra note 196, at 474. 
267. Id. at 471. 
268. See supra notes 186–190 and accompanying text. 
269. Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 171, at 54. 
270. Gross, supra note 256, at 1187. 
271. Id. at 1182–83. 
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system;272 others suggest that an American lawyer who is learned in the law of a 
foreign country may be better situated to locate the foreign law within the context 
of the pending litigation.273 Even within this latter mind-set, questions abound. For 
example, which expert is more qualified: the mid-career practitioner from a U.S. 
office of an international law firm who has considerable first-hand experience in 
the foreign country or the senior comparative law professor from the University of 
Texas who has studied that foreign system in depth? Experience and expertise can 
be difficult to compare; for the same reason, these measures can be inadequate 
criteria for finding one foreign law expert more credible than another. 
The Federal Rule, which empowers the court to ascertain the foreign law 
itself, encourages the second option.274 In fact, Rule 44.1’s invitation to consider 
“any relevant material” suggests that the court can (or perhaps even should) play 
an active role in the process of ascertaining foreign law.275 After all, the court has 
the ultimate responsibility for arriving at a correct decision on the content of 
foreign law.276 Yet an independent investigation into the content of foreign law—
and all of that law’s attendant context277—is unappealing to “[m]ost judges [who] 
do not have the time, the knowledge, or scholarly predilection to undertake their 
own research.”278 As one judge expressed: “We have quite a few things to do 
besides decoding the Código Civil.”279 There is no mystery, then, as to why 
American “courts are not at all inclined to engage in independent research of 
foreign law.”280  
Judges thus find refuge in a third option: avoiding most applications of 
foreign law.281 This perception is empirically supported. For example, Professor 
                                                                                                            
272. See Teitz, supra note 252, at 109 (citing In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant 
Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d in part and modified in part, 809 
F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
273. See Merryman, supra note 189, at 155–56; Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 
171, at 47. 
274. See FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. See also supra note 249 (regarding similar state 
procedural rules). 
275. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 250, at § 2444; 
Miller, supra note 171, at 728 (“Rule 44.1 expresses a philosophy that federal courts should 
ascertain foreign law accurately whenever possible.”). 
276. See Miner, supra note 121, at 581. See also infra notes 295–298, 310–312, 
321–324, and accompanying text. 
277. See supra Part IV.A. 
278. Symeonides, supra note 125 at 393. 
279. Pollack, supra note 196, at 471. See also George P. Fletcher, Comparative 
Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 683, 690 (1998) (“One can understand 
why lawyers and judges pay little attention to foreign law. They have a job to do.”) 
280. GEEROMS, supra note 249, at 121. 
281. Adler, supra note 171, at 38 (“Most judges strive mightily to avoid even 
having to glance at foreign laws.”); Miller, supra note 171, at 618–19 (“American 
adherence to the common-law conception of foreign law cannot be rationalized in the same 
terms as have been offered for the English experience because foreign causes of action 
never have been viewed as anathema in this country and our jury institution never has been 
concerned with the jurors’ testimonial qualifications or tied to notions of fact-venue; most 
probably our incorporation of the common-law view of foreign law simply represents blind 
obedience to entrenched attitudes.”); Miner, supra note 121, at 581 (“the tendency of the 
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Jose Vargas surveyed hundreds of American federal and state court opinions that 
cited Mexican law during the years 2000 through 2007.282 For a number of 
reasons, there are probably more American cases that cite Mexican law than cite 
the laws of any other foreign country.283 Yet Professor Vargas found only two 
cases in California, two cases in Texas, and five cases in other states—over the 
course of eight years—where the court actually engaged the Mexican law.284 The 
author’s “disappoint[ment]” with the paucity of applications may have been 
tempered, however, by the quality of those applications.285 Delicately put, in those 
rare instances when foreign law is applied, mistakes can be made.286 Indeed, this is 
primarily why courts try to avoid foreign law altogether.287 
                                                                                                            
federal courts is to duck and run when presented with issues of foreign law”). See also 
Dolinger, supra note 152, at 266–67 (“In actuality, U.S. courts rarely decide legal actions 
based on a foreign country’s law.”); Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 171, at 9 (“Judges will 
often go to great lengths to avoid questions of foreign law because they feel uncomfortable 
dealing with non-U.S. legal systems.”); Teitz, supra note 252, at 97–98 (“Federal judges 
have been slow to apply foreign law often opting to employ the more familiar law of the 
forum. This reluctance to address the content of foreign law has unfortunately not 
diminished with the increasing accessibility to courts and parties of foreign sources, 
especially in the age of the Internet.”). 
282. Jorge A. Vargas, Mexican Law in California and Texas Courts and the (Lack 
of) Application of Foreign Law in Mexican Courts, 2 MEX. L.R. 45, 48 (2009).  
283. Jorge A. Vargas, The Emerging Presence of Mexican Law in California 
Courts, 7 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 215, 217–18 (2005) (citations omitted). See also Vargas, 
supra note 282, at 53. 
284. Vargas, supra note 282, at 48. The suggestion that these are cases where the 
court engaged foreign law is generous. See infra note 286. 
285. Vargas, supra note 282, at 48 (finding the small number of cases 
“disappointing”). 
286. Professor Vargas addresses each of the nine cases in his article. In at least 
one case, the court may have applied the law wrong. In a second, the court simply referred 
to a Fifth Circuit case and stated only that it agreed with their colleagues’ reasoning. In a 
third, the court did not cite any Mexican codes or cases on the premise that the concepts of 
contributory negligence were the same in Mexico and in the US. In a fourth, an appeals 
court was reviewing the judgment of a district court that had applied New York law; the 
appeals court affirmed but said that Mexican law should have been applied (with same 
result). In several cases Professor Vargas politely and modestly suggests that the court 
“would have benefited” from more expertise of Mexican law. Vargas, supra note 282, at 
54–59. 
287. For a discussion of the close connection between the difficulty of applying 
foreign law and the unwillingness to apply foreign law, see Adler, supra note 171, at 95 
(“[T]he judges’ extreme uneasiness might cause her to evade the responsibility with such 
tools as forum non conveniens . . . .”); Dolinger, supra note 152, at 266–67 (“it appears that 
any excuse is good enough to apply lex fori”); Merryman, supra note 189, at 152 (“Foreign 
contacts, conflict issues, and foreign-law questions are, in an undetermined but probably 
significant number of cases, ignored or finessed by counsel and judge in litigation before 
state and federal courts in the United States.”); Miner, supra note 121, at 581 (judges avoid 
applying foreign law out of “fear of the unknown”);  Stephen L. Sass, Foreign Law in 
Federal Courts, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 118 (1981) (“The difficulty of ascertainment is one 
of the main reasons for not applying foreign law unless it is invoked and proved by the 
parties.”); Tueller, supra note 123, at 101 (“This belief . . . stems from the assumption that 
the actual application (or avoidance) of foreign law by domestic courts and practitioners 
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B.  The Avoidance of Measurement 
The artful dodge of foreign law comes in many forms. The most popular 
is the forum non conveniens dismissal. In federal courts and in most state courts, 
judges have the authority to dismiss a case on grounds of forum non conveniens.288 
In Professor Vargas’s survey, over ninety percent of the hundreds of American 
state and federal court cases that cited Mexican law were dismissed on forum non 
conveniens motions.289 Several other recent studies demonstrate (i) an increasing 
number of filings of forum non conveniens motions,290 (ii) high percentages of 
dismissals pursuant to such motions,291 and (iii) avoidance of foreign law as the 
most frequent explanation for those dismissals.292 
Although the large number of dismissals on this basis might surprise 
some, the difficulty in applying foreign law is one of more than a dozen factors 
that courts are instructed to consider when deciding forum non conveniens 
motions.293 Ironically, however, a threshold determination that courts are 
instructed to address on forum non conveniens motions is the adequacy of the 
                                                                                                            
depends, to a large extent, on the ready availability of reliable and reasonably-affordable 
sources of information on the applicable foreign law.”); id. at 109 (“difficulties faced in 
attempting to reach foreign law have a direct effect on the actual resort to such law”); 
George T. Yates, III, Foreign Law Before Domestic Tribunals, 18 VA. J. INT’L L. 725, 727 
(1978) (“A major factor impeding or at least often complicating the application of foreign 
law has been the difficulty of knowing it. A judge must know the law of his own 
jurisdiction, but generally is not held to know foreign law.”). 
288. See generally Edward L. Barrett, Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non 
Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380 (1947). See also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 
235, 251–52 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 (1971); Uniform Interstate and International 
Procedure Act, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 418, 422 (1962).  
For a discussion of the broadly discretionary nature of the forum non conveniens 
inquiry see Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 
51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1106 (2010); Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the 
Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 785 (1985). See also Am. 
Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (noting that the great 
discretion that district judges have in deciding whether to dismiss, combined with the 
“multifariousness of the factors relevant to its application . . . make uniformity and 
predictability of outcome almost impossible”). 
289. Vargas, supra note 282, at 62. 
290. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 288, at 1092–93 (describing the increase in 
forum non conveniens decisions). 
291. See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock, Politics and the Rule of Law in 
Transnational Judicial Governance: The Case of Forum Non Conveniens (Working paper, 
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969033 (finding 
dismissal rates of roughly 50% on forum non conveniens motions for the period from 1990 
to 2005); Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
1531, 1562 (2011) (updating Whytock’s survey and finding dismissal rates of 63%). 
292. Childress, supra note 291, at 1562-1566. See also Christopher A. Whytock, 
The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011). 
293. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947) (including 
among the “public factors” a court is to consider “the avoidance of unnecessary problems in 
conflict of laws, or in the application of foreign law”). 
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foreign forum—an inquiry that requires some engagement with the foreign law 
and the foreign legal system.294 
The expense of measuring foreign law is avoided when a case is 
dismissed on a forum non conveniens motion, but at what cost? When a court 
dismisses such a case, the plaintiff is being denied access to a court that had 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case, personal jurisdiction over the defendant, 
proper venue, and the authority to vindicate the plaintiff’s rights and the 
defendant’s liabilities.295 Most plaintiffs who suffer forum non conveniens 
dismissals are either unable or justifiably unwilling to go forward in the 
hypothesized foreign forum.296 Indeed, as an empirical matter, only a disposition 
on the merits is more dispositive than a forum non conveniens dismissal.297 
Although there undoubtedly are many instances where forum non conveniens 
dismissals are appropriate, this Article is concerned with those dismissals that are 
occasioned solely or principally by the difficulty of applying foreign law.298 In 
these cases, the difficulty of applying foreign law leads to a denial of access to a 
United States court and, as a practical matter, to a denial of any legal redress at all. 
These unfortunate outcomes constitute error costs that are attributable to avoidance 
of the foreign law question. 
A second reason that courts cite but do not apply foreign law is that 
conflict of laws methodologies give a tremendous amount of discretion to judges. 
When deciding what substantive law to apply, the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflicts, for example, provides judges with a list of many factors to evaluate in 
                                                                                                            
294. See supra note 141. Occasionally the foreign forum is unavailable because 
the plaintiff intentionally foreclosed that option. In other instances, the foreign forum may 
be unavailable because the foreign system has enacted a blocking statute to thwart 
dismissals by U.S. courts. For a discussion of these issues see Robertson, supra note 288, at 
1101–05. 
295. See Stein, supra note 288, at 782 (stating that forum non conveniens 
dismissal is predicated on jurisdiction and venue being properly established). 
296. David W. Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: “An 
Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion,” 29 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353, 371 (1994). But see 
Robertson, supra note 288, at 1082, 1130 (suggesting that an increasing number of cases are 
filed in foreign fora after forum non conveniens dismissals).  
297. See David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: 
“A Rather Fantastic Fiction,” 103 LAW Q. REV. 398, 417–21 (1987). The survey found 
that, after dismissal in the U.S. courts, none of the plaintiffs in the eighty-five cases in the 
sample prevailed at trial. In almost fifty percent of the personal injury and twenty-seven 
percent  of the commercial cases, plaintiffs gave up their claim or settled for less than ten 
percent  of the potential value. Id. at 419–20. See also Martin Davies, Time to Change the 
Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309, 351 (2002) (recognizing 
that suit in the alternative forum is usually a “bluff . . . unlikely to be called”); Beth 
Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic 
Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 31 (2002) 
(noting that when cases are re-filed in the alternative forum, damage awards tend to be 
significantly lower). 
298. See supra note 287. 
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deciding which jurisdiction has the most significant relationship to the case.299 
Because none of these factors is essential and none is dispositive, there is “total 
flexibility” in choosing the law that governs.300 And courts usually find some way 
to apply forum law.301 In fact, “ease in the determination and application of the law 
to be applied” is one of the many factors that courts are instructed to consider.302 
Further, the escape devices of conflict-of-laws doctrine are legendary: 
characterization, renvoi, the distinction between substance and procedure, and the 
public policy reservation each can facilitate the application of forum even when 
                                                                                                            
299. For the list of factors that one should take into account in the judicial 
fashioning of an ad hoc solution, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 
(1971). See also supra notes 125–130 and accompanying text. 
300. Professor Symeon C. Symeonides uses the words total flexibility and 
anarchy to describe the open-ended, individualized, and ad hoc choice-of-law 
decisionmaking under the Second Restatement. SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN 
CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (2006). See also Michael H. 
Gottesman, Adrift on the Sea of Indeterminacy, 75 IND. L.J. 527, 527 (2000) (characterizing 
the Second Restatement as “a cacophonous formula of formulae, a blend of interdeterminate 
indeterminacy.”); Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 
49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 379–80 (1992) (“in practice none of [the conflicts 
methodologies] is much of a check on judicial discretion”). 
301. See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 
GEO. L.J. 883, 893 (2002) (“[J]udges tend to be biased in favor of local law . . . .”); Louise 
Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1652 (2005) 
(“[H]istorically, forum law has been the overwhelming judicial choice.”). See also Erin Ann 
O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Conflict of Laws and Choice of Law, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 631, 639 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) 
(“[J]udges are always tempted . . . to apply more easily ascertained local laws.”); Joseph 
William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 59 (1989) (“In practice, it is quite clear 
that what courts ordinarily do in conflicts cases is to apply forum law.”); Ralph U. Whitten, 
U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, International and Domestic 
(Revisited), 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 559, 560 (2002) (“Both the empirical evidence and the 
existing scholarly consensus . . . indicate that there is a strong tendency under all modern 
conflicts systems to apply forum law.”). 
Several empirical studies have confirmed the prevalence of this so-called “homeward 
trend.” See Michael A. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 
24 GA. L. REV. 49 (1989); Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice of Law Revolution: An Empirical 
Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357 (1992); Stuart Thiel, Choice of Law and the 
Home‑Court Advantage: Evidence, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 291 (2000). A recent study by 
Christopher Whytock suggests that the homeward trend may be somewhat exaggerated. 
From a sample of 213 published opinions in transnational tort cases from 1990–2005, 85 of 
the choice-of-law inquiries arose in the forum non conveniens context. In only 55.5% of the 
remaining 128 cases, did the court conclude that domestic law applied. See Christopher A. 
Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 
740–41 (2009) (providing overview of all three processes). See also SYMEONIDES, supra 
note 300.  
The Constitution permits a court to apply forum law provided the forum state has some 
significant interest in the application of its law to the facts of a case. It need not be the only 
state with an interest, nor the state with the most significant interest. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
302. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(g). 
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foreign law otherwise applies.303 Further still, on occasions where judges purport 
to be applying foreign law, a host of implausible presumptions and remarkable 
fictions invade the judicial process.304 A presumption of similarity, for example, 
enables courts to conclude that, absent compelling evidence to the contrary, 
foreign law is the same as forum law.305 And, of course, the more difficult it is to 
ascertain foreign law,306 the more difficult it is to overcome this presumption. 
Hence a court may presume that Mexico and California have the same common 
property law,307 or that Illinois and Germany have the same commercial law.308 For 
                                                                                                            
303. See David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. 
REV. 173, 198–202 (1933); CURRIE, supra note 202, at 180–81; R. LEA BRILMAYER & JACK 
L. GOLDSMITH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 114–72 (5th ed. 2002). 
304. See Alexander, supra note 36, at 610 & 613 (discussing the “sophistry of 
presumptions,” which are “little more than a thin disguise for the application of the forum’s 
law . . . .”); Adrian Briggs, The Meaning and Proof of Foreign Law, 2006 LLOYD’S MAR. & 
COM. L.Q. 1, 4 (a “truly grotesque proposition”); Brainerd Currie, On the Displacement of 
the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 964 (1958) (discussing “artificial” presumptions); 
McComish, supra note 242, at 432 (labeling presumptions “highly implausible,” 
“unrealistic” and “incredible”—a “regrettable solution”); Miller, supra note 171, at 635, 
637 (noting many commentators have referred to these presumptions as “naïve” and 
“unrealistic” evasive procedures); Miner, supra note 121, at 582–85 (Courts “consciously 
apply the wrong law” by applying forum law pursuant to “fictitious presumptions” and 
dubious fictions); Nussbaum, supra note 241, at 1037 (“The alleged presumption is an 
obvious non sequitur and nothing but a crude fiction disguising the substitution of the law of 
the forum for the unproved or unascertainable foreign law.”); id. at 1038 (“so unrealistic 
that it offends common sense”); Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 171, at 87 (commenting 
that the presumption that common law prevails is a “fantasy”). 
305. 1 ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (1974) 
(suggesting that the presumption is “nothing but a crude fiction” and discussing Italian 
authors who stigmatized the presumption as manifestamente priva di senso). For 
explanation and criticism of presumptio similitudinis, see Dolinger, supra note 152, at 260; 
Miller, supra note 171, at 694; Sass, supra note 287, at 107; Konrad Zweigert, Some 
Reflections on the Sociological Dimensions of Private International Law or What is Justice 
in Conflict of Laws, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 293–94 (1973). 
 Some states have codified this principle. See, e.g., Disputable Presumption no. 39, 
N.D. Cent. Code § 31-11-03 (2000); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-16R.9(3) (1976). 
306. See supra notes 180–233 and accompanying text. 
307. See Butler v. IMA Regiomontana S.A. de C.V., 210 F.3d 381 (9th Cir. 
2000). See also Miner, supra note 121, at 582–83 (offering an example involving 
Vietnamese law). 
308. See, e.g., In re Griffin Trading Co., 399 B.R. 862 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009) 
(presuming similarity of Illinois UCC to English and German laws). See also 
Commercializadora Portimex, S.A. de CV v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 645 
(E.D. La. 2005) (presuming similarity of Louisiana and Mexican law); United States v. 
Hing Shair Chan, 680 F. Supp. 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (assuming similarity of U.S. and Hong 
Kong laws and finding “[t]his assumption is bolstered by the fact that Hong Kong, like the 
United States, is a common law state.”); Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Lee, No. A10–852, 2010 
WL 5293453, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App., Dec. 28, 2010) (“Because appellant failed to show that 
German law differs from Minnesota law . . ., we conclude that no choice-of-law issue was 
presented and the district court did not err by determining that Minnesota law 
applies . . . .”). See generally ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 27, at 40 (defending 
presumption of similarity). 
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decades courts presumed that absent contrary proof, all civilized countries had 
essentially the same laws.309 
The expense of measuring foreign law can be avoided by manipulating 
the conflict of laws inquiry to require the application of forum law instead, but 
again: at what other cost? Naturally, a legally-accurate outcome requires 
invocation of the proper law.310 Applying some other system’s law is “inconsistent 
with our most fundamental intuition about law—that its function is to regulate 
human action and its consequences. One would think that the applicable law ought 
normally to have something to do with the real world events that gave rise to a 
dispute.”311 Although there undoubtedly are many instances where forum law 
should be applied to cases with transnational contacts, this Article is concerned 
only with those applications of forum law that are occasioned solely or principally 
by the difficulty of the task of applying foreign law.312 In these cases, the difficulty 
of applying foreign law leads to the application of forum law to determine the 
rights and responsibilities of the parties, even though that is the wrong law. 
Although measurement costs are avoided, error costs are introduced. 
A third technique for avoiding applications of foreign law is to assign a 
burden to prove foreign law. Most judges “simply refuse to consider foreign law if 
the parties have not raised it or have not assisted the court in ascertaining its 
content.”313 Prior to 1966, in federal court, the content of foreign law was a 
question of fact that the parties had to prove.314 Accordingly, if the issue of foreign 
                                                                                                            
309. See generally Edwin P. Carpenter, Presumptions as to Foreign Law: How 
They Are Affected by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, 10 WASHBURN L.J. 296, 299 
(1971); MATTEI ET AL., supra note 215, at 95–125. 
310. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 CT. REV. 
26 (2007); see also Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of 
Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 284 (2003). 
311. Larry Kramer, More Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of 
Laws, 24 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 245, 255 (1991). See also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE 
OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 119 (2004) (rule of law requires that judges make 
decisions based on “public, prospective laws, with the qualities of generality, equality of 
application and certainty”); Ralf Michaels, Two Economists, Three Opinions? Economic 
Models for Private International Law—Cross-Border Torts as Example, in AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 143, 146 (Jürgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono 
eds., 2006).  
Focal point, reputational, and normative theories of compliance suggest that a choice-
of-law system that applies the “wrong” law will undermine transnational rule of law. See 
generally ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY 33–41 (2008) (setting forth reputational theory of legal compliance); James G. 
March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, in 
EXPLORATION AND CONTESTATION IN THE STUDY OF WORLD POLITICS 309–11 (Peter J. 
Katzenstein et al. eds., 1999) (distinguishing normative process of compliance from 
instrumental processes driven by “logic of expected consequences”); Richard H. McAdams, 
A Focal Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000) (describing focal point 
theory of legal compliance); Whytock, supra note 301, at 740–41 (providing an overview of 
all three processes).  
312. See supra note 287. 
313. Symeonides, supra note 125, at 393. 
314. See Miller, supra note 171, at 684–88; Stern, supra note 197, at 27. 
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law was not raised or if the content of foreign law was not proven to the 
satisfaction of the judge, the party’s failure of proof would lead either to the 
application of forum law or to dismissal of the case.315 But with foreign law now 
regarded as a question of law, it is less clear whether this relieves the parties of the 
task of proving the law of a foreign country. On one hand, Rule 44.1 authorizes but 
does not require the judge to do independent research.316 Yet on the other hand, 
because foreign law is a question of law, it may be incumbent upon the court to 
find and apply foreign law once it becomes apparent that it governs.317 
Contemporary practice follows the former interpretation,318 offering sufficient 
opportunity for courts to avoid the question of foreign law by blaming the parties 
for failure of proof.319 And, of course, the more difficult it is to ascertain foreign 
law,320 the more readily available this particular mode of avoidance. 
Here again, the cost of measuring foreign law is avoided but an error cost 
is introduced. The concerns about accuracy of legal outcomes already expressed 
are equally applicable here: the wrong law is used to determine the parties’ rights 
and responsibilities.321 Yet there is also an interesting twist in this context. 
                                                                                                            
315. The harshness of a dismissal is what led to many of the presumptions and 
fictions described in the preceding paragraph. See Currie, supra note 304 at 981; Miller, 
supra note 171, at 635. 
316. See Brown, supra note 187, at 185 (“Rule 44.1 has freed the hands of judges, 
but has not freed the parties of their responsibility of informing the court of the foreign law 
issue and of the content of the pertinent provisions.”); Schlesinger, supra note 171, at 3 
(“[T]he ascertainment and interpretation of foreign law require[s] skills which the court 
simply does not possess, the procedural treatment of a foreign law question cannot be quite 
the same as that of a question of domestic law.”); id. at 16 (“These judicial notice statutes, it 
should be emphasized at the outset, have not displaced the common-law doctrines discussed 
above. The statutes are merely superimposed on the common-law doctrines, which thus 
retain their vitality in the many situations in which the statutory provisions do not lead to 
actual notice being taken of the foreign law.”). 
317. Consider the principle iura novit curia (the court knows the law). See 
generally Schlesinger, supra note 171, at 25–26 (Expecting more of the court “does not 
place too heavy a burden on the court . . . . [W]hen dealing with foreign law issues—that is, 
issues no longer covered by the ancient principle of purely adversary litigation—a judicial 
duty to seek clarification must go along with the power.”). 
 The application of foreign law ex officio is the approach of many civil law nations. See 
generally GEEROMS, supra note 249, at 103. 
318. See Pollack, supra note 196, at 471 (“Rule 44.1 expressly authorizes the 
Court to do independent research into the foreign law. Yes, it does—but it doesn’t require it 
to. Trial judges usually can’t. Indeed, they usually shouldn’t. And they probably won’t.”); 
Sass, supra note 287, at 117–18 (“The principle of iura novit curia cannot be applied to the 
law of foreign countries. However, the court should also apply the relevant foreign law on 
its own volition whenever such application appears to be necessary to protect the justifiable 
interests of the litigants.”). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1, 1966 advisory committee’s note 
(“[T]he court is free to insist on a complete presentation by counsel.”). 
319. See, e.g., Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Lee, No. A10–852, 2010 WL 5293453, 
at *2 (Min. Ct. App., Dec. 28, 2010) (“Because appellant has failed to show that German 
law differs from Minnesota law . . . we conclude that no choice-of-law issue was presented 
and the district court did not err by determining that Minnesota law applies . . . .”). 
320. See supra notes 180–233 and accompanying text. 
321. See supra notes 310–312 and accompanying text. 
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Appreciate that the party charged with the burden of proving something about 
foreign law can be a plaintiff or a defendant. Consider, for example, an action 
seeking to enforce a foreign judgment; the defendant may be resisting recognition 
and enforcement on the grounds that the foreign judgment was procured by 
fraud.322 Here, the inability of the defendant to satisfy the burden of proof with 
regard to some aspect of foreign law might lead to enforcement of the foreign 
judgment (and, by extension, the mandate of foreign law) rather than to rejection 
of it.323 Interestingly, then, the courts while anti-measurement, are not necessarily 
isolationist or provincial. Indeed, the United States is probably the most likely 
jurisdiction in the world to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment.324  
So the consequences of avoiding foreign law can lead in several 
directions. First, pursuant to a forum non conveniens dismissal, for example, a 
party can be denied access to a court which, in some sense, it may be entitled; it is 
relegated to a foreign forum (or left without a remedy). Second, pursuant to 
conflicts analysis, a party can be denied the rights or protections of foreign law 
which, in some sense, it may be entitled; it is subject to forum law instead. And 
third, pursuant to the enforcement of a foreign judgment, a party can be denied the 
rights or protections of forum law which, in some sense, it may be entitled; it is 
subject to foreign law instead. 
The purpose of this Part was three-fold: to demonstrate that courts try to 
avoid applying foreign law; that they may do so because of the difficulty of that 
task; and that avoidance is consequential. 
VI. SOLUTIONS TO THE COMMON-POOL PROBLEM 
A common grazing pasture faces an impending crisis when the limited 
resource is consumed at an aggregate rate that exceeds its rate of replenishment. 
The standard response to avert the tragedy of the commons is to reduce the 
                                                                                                            
322. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(2)(c). 
323. Most regimes regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments are written to presume enforcement. The presumption is rebuttable on a showing 
of certain enumerated grounds why the foreign judgment should not be enforced. See, e.g., 
id. § 481. 
324. See generally Matthew H. Adler, If We Build It, Will They Come?—The Need 
For a Multilateral Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Monetary 
Judgments, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 79, 109 (1994); Contemporary Practice of the 
United States Relating to International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 387, 420 (Sean D. Murphy 
ed., 2001); Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge for the ALI: 
Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an International Treaty, and an American Statute, 
75 IND. L.J. 635, 638–39 (2000); Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial Is Our Need For a 
Judgments-Recognition Convention And What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 167, 220 (1998); STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY & THOMAS O. MAIN, 
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THEORY AND APPLICATION 613 
(2010).  
For computations and collections of cases, see also Brandon B. Danford, Note, The 
Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the United States and Europe: How Can We 
Achieve a Comprehensive Treaty?, 23 REV. LITIG. 381, 417 (2004); J. Noelle Hicks, Note, 
Facilitating International Trade: The U.S. Needs Federal Legislation Governing the 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 155, 176 (2002). 
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demand on the common-pool resource so that it does not exceed the available 
supply. For example, regulation or strict cooperation reduces demand by restricting 
the number of cattle that farmers will graze on the commons.325 Alternatively, 
privatization of the commons eliminates each farmer’s incentive to introduce more 
cattle than the commons can naturally sustain.326 Solutions that address the supply 
of the resource are seldom considered or are presumed exhausted—the premise of 
a common-pool resource, after all, is that it is limited. Yet supply-side solutions 
may be available: a faster-growing grass or a different combination of vegetation 
in the commons could enhance the supply of the limited resource to accommodate 
the existing demand. 
Word commons face a crisis when idiosyncratic local meanings 
progressively consume the content of a word’s common meaning, another 
common-pool resource. The paradigmatic response is to minimize the demand for 
idiosyncratic meanings. But, unlike a common grazing pasture, the meaning of 
words cannot be effectively managed through supranational regulation.327 And 
because words cannot be converted from common goods into private property, 
privatization is also not an option. 
Reformers thus turn, perhaps instinctively, to another demand-side 
solution: harmonization and unification. Harmonization reduces the demand for 
idiosyncratic meanings because the local is universal, and vice versa. Further, 
harmonization taps into the root of uniformity, which is so deeply embedded in our 
thought that many find it difficult or unnecessary even to explain why uniformity 
                                                                                                            
325. For literature on the use of regulation to avert tragedy, see C. Edwin Baker, 
Three Cheers for Red Lion, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 861, 866 (2008); Lili Levy, The Four Eras 
of FCC Public Interest Regulation, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 819 (2008); Richard J. Pierce, 
Jr., State Regulation of Natural Gas in a Federally Deregulated Market: The Tragedy of the 
Commons Revisited, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 15, 22 (1988). For literature on the use of self-
governing forms of class action to avert tragedy, see OSTROM, supra note 110, at 25; Carol 
M. Rose, Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled 
Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-Fashioned Common Property Regimes, 10 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 45 (1999). 
326. See generally Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: 
Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9–10 (1991); James 
Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 607, 609 (2000); Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of 
a Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 556 (2007). 
327. If it were possible to regulate the meaning of words, the cost of the 
administrative infrastructure would surely overwhelm the benefit of supranational 
regulation. On administrative costs, see Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two 
Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135, 
1147 (2005) (listing administrative costs “such as judicial salaries, legal fees, and 
discovery”); Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network 
Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19 (2001) (identifying, in the antitrust context, 
“administrative costs, monitoring costs, and the misallocation of resources associated with 
rent-seeking activity”). 
There would also be substantial frustration costs. See infra notes 348–351 and 
accompanying text. 
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is thought to be good.328 When there is fragmentation or lack of uniformity, 
scholars see this as “the problematic issue of consistency.”329 Difference is often 
viewed as an unfortunate interim measure—and a target for reform.330 Indeed, 
much of the entire discipline of comparative law has an implicit drive toward 
harmonization.331 
Because all countries are measuring foreign laws, all could benefit 
directly from some sort of coordination. In fact, because of standard network 
effects, we should expect a certain amount of standardization and uniformity.332 
Most countries and legal systems want to be accepted—or at least want foreign 
investment and tourists.333 One example of effective harmonization is the 
worldwide acceptance of the standard definitions of eleven terms of trade (the 
Incoterms) promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce.334 A second 
                                                                                                            
328. Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: 
A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 311–12 (2001) (“Whether because of the 
lure of simplicity, the appearance of neutrality, the likeness to science, the feel of efficiency, 
the imprimatur of professionalism or some combination of these, the norm of . . . uniformity 
enjoys virtually universal approval. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the rhetoric of 
uniformity is both pervasive and predominant . . . .”). See generally Amanda Frost, 
Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008). 
329. Legrand, supra note 42, at 521–22 (quoting Andreas Fishcer-Lescano & 
Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999, 1003 n.17 (2004)). 
330. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 279 (1980) (“The 
lawyer is likely to become impatient when he hears that social arrangements can be more or 
less legal, that legal systems and the rule of law exist as a matter of degree . . . and so on.”); 
WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASIA 
AND AFRICA 29 (2d ed. 2006) (“From a conventional perspective, difference becomes an 
invitation for lawyers to unify, streamline and harmonise.”); Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi 
Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 
553, 559 (2002) (“Systemic thinking has always been a preserve of academics.”). 
331. Ewald, supra note 211, at 1981. See also MENSKI, supra note 330, at 5 (“Yet, 
mainstream legal science continues to behave as though globalisation simply means 
uniformisation, resisting evidence, from everywhere in the world, that global harmony and 
understanding will only be achieved by greater tolerance of diversity, not by enforced 
uniformity.”); ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 27, at 61 (describing the lodestar of some 
comparative law inquiry as the science of a droit commun legislatif). 
332. For a general discussion of network effects see Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In 
Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 814–815 (1998); Marcel Kahan & Michael 
Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior 
and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 348 (1996); Michael Klausner, Corporations, 
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 759 (1995); Mark A. 
Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. 
REV. 479, 488 (1998). 
333. See generally Merrill & Smith, supra note 176. 
334. See Incoterms 2010, INT’L CHAMBER COM., http://www.iccwbo.org/
incoterms/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2011) (the terms are EXW, FCA, CPT, CIP, DAT, DAP, 
DDP, FAS, FOB, CFR, and CIF). See generally Franklin E. Gevurtz et al., Report 
Regarding the Pacific McGeorge Workshop on Globalizing the Law School Curriculum, 19 
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 267, 294 (2006). 
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example is communications between and among airplane pilots and air traffic 
controllers; governments require communication in one language, usually 
English.335 In both of these examples, the demand for idiosyncrasy is reduced to 
preserve the common meaning of shared words. 
Additionally, efforts to harmonize or unify laws have found traction in 
particular spheres of interest;336 other substantive areas are likely targets for future 
action.337 These efforts are qualitatively different than Incoterms, however, 
because effective harmonization requires two steps: first, the laws must be 
harmonized; second, the meanings of the words in the shared text must be 
harmonized. The first step is ambitious; the second step may be naive. 
“‘[T]he actual harmonization of divergent national laws and legal 
traditions seems to be meagre’ and at times ‘drastically overstate[d].’”338 While 
                                                                                                            
335. See STEVEN CUSHING, FATAL WORDS: COMMUNICATION CLASHES AND 
AIRCRAFT CRASHES (1994); Robert Baron, Editorial, Barriers to Effective Communication: 
Implications for the Cockpit, AIRLINESAFETY.COM, http://airlinesafety.com/editorials/
BarriersToCommunication.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2011). 
336. See Ulrich Drobnig, General Principles of European Contract Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: DUBROVNIK LECTURES 305–08 (Petar Sarcevic & Paul 
Volken eds., 1986). 
There are certain standardized rules, definitions, and terms adopted by international 
private commercial actors such as the International Chamber of Commerce or the 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) that are used 
uniformly (or nearly so). These include the standard trade definitions of the International 
Commercial Terms (INCOTERMS). See Incoterms 2010, supra note 334. See also 
generally Franklin E. Gevurtz et al., supra note 334, at 294 (“[S]upplementing applicable 
binding sources of transactional law are standard agreement forms developed by the 
International Chamber of Commerce, now called ‘Incoterms.”). Another example is the 
banking terms in the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) that 
constitute the operative legal rules for man letter of credit transactions. See JH Dalhuisen, 
Legal Orders and Their Manifestation: The Operation of the International Commercial and 
Financial Legal Order and Its Lex Mercatoria, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 129, 167 (2006). 
Further, “the International Chamber of Commerce has a role in creating international rules 
in such diverse areas as E-business, telecoms, financial services, insurance, taxation, trade 
and investment, international transportation, anti-corruption rules, arbitration, and customs, 
to name just a few.” James D. Wilets, A Unified Theory of International Law, the State, and 
the Individual: Transnational Legal Harmonization in the Context of Economic and Legal 
Globalization, 31 PA. J. INT’L L. 753, 759 (2010). 
For a general discussion of global networks see ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW 
WORLD ORDER (2004). 
337. See Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 129, 135 (2005) (“A quick survey of modern scholarship reveals that experts 
believe that ius gentium affords a useful framework for thinking about such topics as data 
protection, antitrust, and copyright.”) (citing Marsha Cope Huie et al., The Right to Privacy 
in Personal Data: The EU Prods the U.S. and Controversy Continues, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 391, 402–03 (2002)); MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 34, at 335 (“Possible 
candidates for the development . . . of sub-systems [of transnational law] include maritime 
practice, the international oil industry, information technology, the construction industry, 
the insurance sector, and international finance and securitisation.”). 
338. Legrand, supra note 42, at 519 (quoting Harald Halbhuber, National 
Doctrinal Structures and European Company Law, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1385, 1404–
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globalization intensifies the migration of words and concepts across national 
boundaries, it does not lead inexorably to the harmonization of laws.339 Even the 
concentrated effort undertaken in Europe over the last half century to achieve 
harmonization has been slow and difficult. 340 And, as a relative matter, that 
context is unusually suited for harmonization since there is a supranational central 
authority that can issue binding regulations, order uniformity, and trump national 
courts.341 
But, more fundamentally, even where there is harmonization of words, 
there is not necessarily harmonization of word meanings. Indeed, absent 
disciplined and universal cooperation by all who share the word, common meaning 
will inevitably erode.342 Even substantial cooperation will not suffice, because 
similar to the few cattle farmers who can overgraze the common ground while 
other farmers exercise restraint, the common meaning of a word can be consumed 
by a few to the others’ detriment.  
Consider, for example, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”), which is generally recognized as the 
most successful multilateral harmonization effort.343 Although obliged to consider 
foreign case law when deciding cases under the CISG,344 American courts tend to 
look exclusively at domestic cases instead.345 Because of limited access, language 
barriers, and cultural difference, “decisions handed down by foreign courts are 
                                                                                                            
08 (2001)). For a specific example of overstatement by other comparative law scholars, see 
id. at 522 (discussing how “[a] 750-page book aiming to promote the view that there is to be 
found a meta-law of good faith within the European Community chose to overlook a 
sophisticated argument showing otherwise”) 
339. MENSKI, supra note 331, at 10. 
340. MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 34, at 333–34 (explaining how various 
forces “render the concept of ‘uniform’ European law a relative one”). See also Legrand, 
supra note 42, at 519 (“‘European businesses are not relying on the company law 
directives.’” (quoting Halbhuber, supra note 338, at 1406–08)); Christian Joerges, The 
Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal 
Discipline, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 149, 160 (2004) (“[T]here are as many European 
laws as there are relatively autonomous legal discourses, organized mainly along national, 
linguistic and cultural lines.”). 
341. See generally PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, 
AND MATERIALS 1–37 (4th ed. 2007). 
342. See supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text. 
343. Peter Huber, Some Introductory Remarks on the CISG, 6 INTERNATIONALES 
HANDELSRECHT 228, 228 (2006), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/
huber.html. 
344. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
supra note 154; see supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
345. See generally Francesco G. Mazzotta, Why do Some American Courts Fail to 
Get it Right?, 3 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 85 (2005); Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal 
Hachem, The CISG—Success and Pitfalls, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 457 (2009); LARRY 
DIMATTEO, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CISG 
JURISPRUDENCE 177 (2005). 
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‘usually ignored’ even when they concern uniform law.”346 Accordingly “[t]he 
unifying effect of the CISG must thus be taken with a strong pinch of salt.”347 A 
comprehensive solution would require some sort of effective regulatory 
enforcement mechanism. 
Even if regulating the meaning of words were possible, frustration costs 
could outweigh the savings in measurement costs.348 Legitimate goals and 
objectives could be frustrated if the meaning of words could not be customized for 
a particular jurisdiction’s conditions and demands. The tailoring of a class action 
device, for example, can be a useful and productive exercise. Idiosyncrasy can 
reflect the unique priorities, preferences and goals of a judicial, political, or social 
system.349 The dynamic nature of word meaning also permits adaptation to 
changed and unforeseen circumstances.350 Forced uniformity would thwart this 
progress and would squelch useful entrepreneurship.351 
Harmonization is premised on the conviction that there exists a single 
answer to a particular problem or a best meaning for a particular word. Yet, in fact, 
there is much to suggest that while the world may be ontologically unitary, it can 
only be “understood through epistemological diversity.”352 And, of course, the 
pursuit of uniformity can also be an imperialistic threat to the profound diversity of 
legal experience within and across jurisdictions.353 
                                                                                                            
346. MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 34, at 333 (quoting Thomas Simons, 
European and International Uniform Law, 2007 EUR. & INT’L UNIFORM L. 1, 1–4). See also 
Huber, supra note 343, at 228. 
347. MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 34, at 333. 
348. Frustration costs are the costs that result from the systems’ inability to tailor 
words as desired. It is essentially the inefficiency that is created by the difference between 
the standardized mandate and the desired idiosyncrasy. For a discussion of frustration costs, 
see Merrill & Smith, supra note 176, at 35. See also sources in supra note 327 (regarding 
administrative costs). 
349. See supra note 19. 
350. For more on the evolving nature of word meaning see supra note 106. 
351. See generally Jeffrey S. Parker, Comparative Civil Procedure and 
Transnational “Harmonization”: A Law-and-Economics Perspective (George Mason Univ. 
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-03), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1325013; 
Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 
AM. J. COMP. L. 97 (2002); Spamann, supra note 101, at 1858. 
352. Pierre Legrand, Codification and the Politics of Exclusion: A Challenge for 
Comparativists, 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 799, 806 (1998). 
353. Id. at 807; JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN 
AGE OF DIVERSITY 197 (1995) (“The suppression of cultural difference in the name of 
uniformity and unity is one of the leading causes of civil strife, disunity and dissolution 
today.”). 
For debates about the relative merits of uniformity and harmonization as opposed to 
difference and fragmentation, see Legrand, supra note 210, at 271–72 (“[T]he convergence 
thesis effectively represents an attack on pluralism, a desire to suppress antinomy, an 
attempt at the diminution of particularity? Is difference not positive? Is it not the case that 
‘whatever conclusions [the comparative study of law] comes to must relate to the 
management of difference not to the abolition of it?’” (citing Geertz, supra note 214, at 
215–216)); MENSKI, supra note 331, at 11 (“[M]uch of the current debate on globalisation 
seems still inspired by the theme of ‘civilizing mission,’ now in the name of universalism 
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Because of the inevitable differentiation in word meaning, harmonization 
of laws can exacerbate the problems associated with ascertaining foreign law. 
When words are shared yet the meanings are different, these faux amis become 
terms that the measurer is most likely to overlook or, even if noticed, find the 
“most difficult to understand.”354 In the former, the measurement expense is traded 
for an error cost;355 in the latter, the measurement expense is not avoided (and may 
even be increased).356 
The challenge presented is not a text problem that requires a textual 
solution. Rather, this is a foreign law problem that requires a foreign law solution. 
The problem is that judges are expected to consider, evaluate, and apply foreign 
law, but are simply unwilling or unable to do so. Some of that reticence may be 
traceable to the work of a generation of scholars who have described the task of 
understanding foreign law as “impossible”357—impossible because of “the 
impenetrability of the otherness of the other.”358 This message deters courts from 
performing a task that doctrine and statutes require.359 And when courts avoid 
foreign law questions, litigants suffer.360 
If it is impossible for courts adequately to understand foreign law, we 
                                                                                                            
and human rights. For, in common parlance today, globalisation seems to mean economic 
and political domination of a Western-focused, even Eurocentric process of development in 
linear fashion, moving more or less inevitably towards global uniformity.”). 
354. See Gutteridge, supra note 36, at 409 (“[T]he English legal terms which are 
derived from French or, perhaps, more properly from Anglo-Norman sources, are precisely 
those which a continental lawyer finds it most difficult to understand.”). Janet Ainsworth 
described the problem this way: 
The wise man is careful to . . . regulate names so that they will apply 
correctly to the realities they designate. In this way he . . . discriminates 
properly between things that are the same and those that are 
different . . . . [A]dopting Western legal terminology to discuss Chinese 
law would inevitably lead to misinterpretation of Chinese legal discourse 
and misperception of Chinese legal practice . . . . Some, including Paul 
Bohannan, insisted on using native words for legal concepts as much as 
possible, because they believed that Western terminology was 
inescapably misleading in its connotations. Using familiar terms to 
describe unfamiliar terms “obscures the normative framework . . . . No 
matter how neutral and objective descriptive legal categories may 
appear, they are themselves creatures of a historically and culturally 
contingent social world, bearing the normative patina of the context from 
which they were derived. 
Ainsworth, supra note 218, at 19–20, 31 (citing Paul Bohannan, Ethnography and 
Comparison in Legal Anthropology, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 401 (1969); Pierre 
Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 811–14 (1991); and 
other sources). 
355. For the significance of errors in the application of law, see supra notes 295–
298, 310–312, 321–324, and accompanying text. 
356. See supra note 176. 
357. See supra notes 222, 225, and accompanying text. 
358. Legrand, supra note 210, at 266–67 (citing Gadamer, supra note 222, at 27). 
359. See supra notes 125–160 and accompanying text. 
360. See supra notes 295–298, 310–312, 321–324 and accompanying text. 
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should revise all of the relevant statutes and doctrines so that courts need not (or 
may not361) apply, consider, or evaluate foreign law. Of course, this approach 
resembles the status quo somewhat, since the doctrines that require engagement 
with foreign law also tolerate avoiding it,362 and since courts rarely, in fact, 
genuinely engage foreign law.363 Although this solution would solve the 
measurement problem, the error costs associated with avoiding foreign law would 
then be entrenched: cases would still be dismissed, and the “wrong” law would 
still be applied. Prohibiting the consideration or application of foreign law would 
merely shift responsibility for these costs to those who are setting the new policy. 
One benefit of such a reform, however, is that it would improve 
transparency.364 Such reform would clarify that courts do not, as a practical matter, 
engage with foreign law. Greater transparency, in turn, could precipitate legal 
reforms to account for the fact that foreign law is not, in fact, applied. Doctrines 
and statutes that assume foreign law is being evaluated may have different 
complementary provisions if they were (re)constructed under the assumption that 
foreign law would not be applied. For example, because the forum non conveniens 
framework assumes that foreign law will be fully evaluated to ensure the adequacy 
of the alternative forum prior to a dismissal, removing the assumption (by 
prohibiting consideration of foreign law) may lead reformers to revisit that 
framework. Specifically, the framework might be adjusted to make it harder for 
defendants to win a forum non conveniens motion. How or even whether reforms 
would compensate for the loss of consideration of foreign law is, of course, 
speculative.  
Instead of retrenchment, however, which is yet another demand-side 
solution, a better approach may be found on the supply-side. In the same way that 
a faster-growing grass or a different combination of vegetation might increase the 
supply of the common pasture to accommodate the extant demand, a complement 
to common meaning could enhance the supply of information about foreign law. 
                                                                                                            
361. See, e.g., Save Our State Amendment, HR 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 
2010), available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/755.pdf (“The Courts . . . 
when exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in 
the United States Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated 
pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated 
pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the United States provided the 
law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions. The courts 
shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall 
not consider international law or Sharia Law.”) The voter initiative passed with a majority 
of nearly 70% but a court order enjoined operation of the law. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. 
Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010). 
362. See supra notes 293, 302, and accompanying text. 
363. See supra notes 289–292, 301, 316–320, and accompanying text. 
364. On the importance of transparency in judicial decisionmaking, see Lon L. 
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 365–72, 388 (1978) 
(noting that “[b]y and large” that “fairness and effectiveness of adjudication are promoted 
by reasoned opinions” and arguing that reasoned response to reasoned argument is an 
essential component of the judicial process); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial 
Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 736–50 (1987) (arguing that honesty and candor in judicial 
decisions are essential attributes of the judicial process). 
68 __ Cornell Int’l L.J. __ (forthcoming)  
For example, courts should take advantage of two devices that are already 
available to them yet are hardly ever used. First, judges could more frequently 
appoint a neutral expert to assist the court in ascertaining foreign law.365 Court-
appointed experts function essentially as third-party expert witnesses, but avoid the 
consequences of partisan choice, compensation, and preparation—all of which can 
bias the evidence.366 In some cases, court-appointed experts might alleviate the 
need for party-controlled experts.367 In other cases, the neutral expert might help 
the judge resolve conflicting testimony presented by the parties’ experts.368 In any 
event, the court may split the expense of a neutral expert between the parties or, as 
part of court costs, charge them to the losing party.369  
Second, judges could more frequently appoint a special master to manage 
the inquiry into the particulars of foreign law.370 The parties’ experts would present 
their research or experts before the master and would be subject to cross 
examination.371 The master could invest more time in the endeavor than would a 
judge, and could draw upon his or her expertise in comparative methodology, if 
not also the laws of the specific country in question. The master would prepare a 
report analyzing the foreign law issues.372 The court would then allow the parties 
an opportunity to object to that report, and the court would review the master’s 
                                                                                                            
365. For the authority to appoint a neutral expert, see FED. R. EVID. 706. See 
generally GEEROMS, supra note 249, at 145. 
For the virtues of court-appointed experts, see Miner, supra note 121, at 589 (a “highly 
desirable tool for ascertaining the governing foreign law”). See also Theodore I. Botter, The 
Court-Appointed Impartial Expert, in USING EXPERTS IN CIVIL CASES 57 (Melvin D. Kraft 
ed., 1977); Gross, supra note 256, at 1187–1208 (1991); Lee, supra note 260, at 500. Many 
states have analogous statutory provisions and common law authority. See Stephanie 
Domitrovich et al., State Trial Judge Use of Court Appointed Experts: Survey Results and 
Comparisons, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 371 (2010). 
366. Gross, supra note 256, at 1188. 
367. See generally Gross, supra note 256, at 1193 n.259 (“Any significant use of 
netural experts will ultimately reduce the total bill for experts by reducing the number and 
the complexity of litigated disputes on expert issues.”); Miner, supra note 121, at 589 
(“persuasive advice submitted to the court may prompt a stipulation that settles the foreign 
law question”) (quoting Schmertz, supra note 124, at 713). 
368. See Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 171, at 47 (“[A] court often has no way 
to evaluate the expert, except perhaps by comparison with other experts.”); Teitz, supra 
note 252, at 108. 
369. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) (2006); Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 171, at 56.  
See generally Teitz, supra note 252, at 108 
370. For the authority to appoint a special master, see FED. R. CIV. P. 53. For the 
virtues of special masters, see Carpenter, supra note 309, at 305 (“[S]pecial masters could 
be appointed to determine foreign law issues.”); Merryman, supra note 189, at 168 (noting 
that, with masters, counsel has “two occasions on which to deal with the special master: in 
the hearing and after submission of the report. With the court-appointed expert, he has only 
the opportunity to cross-examine after the expert submits his opinion.”); Sprankling & 
Lanyi, supra note 171, at 73 (“Probably the most underused method of determining foreign 
law—yet potentially the most valuable—is reference to a special master. . . . [T]heir 
potential applicability in the foreign-law arena appears to have gone without notice.”). 
371. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(c). 
372. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(e). 
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conclusions de novo.373 Again, the court could split the expense between the 
parties or, as part of court costs, charge them to the losing party.374  
Yet courts very rarely use these useful and economical resources.375 
Although focusing on the issue of expert testimony generally rather than expert 
testimony about foreign law in particular, Professor Samuel Gross laments: 
Judges simply do not [appoint neutral experts] . . . Attempts to 
change that fact have been uniformly ineffective. Demonstrating the 
logic of the procedure has not worked. Enacting rules that codify the 
courts’ authority . . . has changed nothing. Exhorting judges to do so 
has had no effect.376 
Indeed, while several surveys of federal and state judges have confirmed that these 
devices would be helpful in certain types of cases—including those involving 
foreign law—the majority of these judges have never actually used any of them.377 
There are two principal reasons that judges may be reluctant to use these 
devices. One reason is a general hostility to any deviation from the adversarial 
system.378 To be sure, neutral experts and special masters are a deviation from the 
                                                                                                            
373. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(f). 
374. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g). See, e.g., Sukumar v. Direct Focus, Inc., No. 
00CV0304-LAB (AJB), 2008 WL 1860677, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2008) (applying rule 
53(g)).  
375. See GEEROMS, supra note 249, at 145 (“[C]ourts rarely use this 
opportunity.”); Edward K. Cheng, Scientific Evidence as Foreign Law, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 
1095, 1106 (2010) (“[T]he reality on the ground is that court-appointed experts are rarely 
used.” (citing DAVID H. KAYE, ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 10.4.1, at 348))); Stephanie Domitrovich et al., supra note 365, at 
375; Merryman, supra note 189, at 164 (“It is a striking fact that courts infrequently appoint 
expert witnesses in foreign-law cases . . . . It is striking because the authorities heavily favor 
their use.”); Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 171, at 55 (“[C]ourts rarely . . . appoint their 
own experts.”). 
See generally JOE S. CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING, COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS: 
DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 706 
(1993); Gross, supra note 256, at 1190–91 (lamenting that procedures are “rarely used. 
Weinstein and Berger, for example, comment on ‘the remarkably few cases in which federal 
judges have appointed experts,’ and add that ‘the federal experience is not unique.’ This 
observation was confirmed in two recent studies conducted by the Federal Judicial 
Center . . . .”)); Lee, supra note 260, at 495 (noting that “judges rarely appoint experts”); 
Robert F. Taylor, A Comparative Study of Expert Testimony in France and the United 
States: Philosophical Underpinnings, History, Practice, and Procedure, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
181, 211 (1996). 
376. Gross, supra note 256, at 1220. 
377. See CECIL & WILLGING, supra note 375, at 7–8; Louis Harris and Associates, 
Judges’ Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and Federal Trial Judges Who 
Spent at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV. 731, 741 (1989); 
Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 171, at 93–95. 
378. Cheng, supra note 375, at 1111 (“[T]he legal system often resists and ignores 
inquisitorial reforms [such as court appointed experts].”). See also CECIL & WILLGING, 
supra note 375, at 4–5 (“[M]uch of the uneasiness with court-appointed experts arises from 
the difficulty in accommodating such experts in a court system that values, and generally 
anticipates, adversarial presentation of evidence”); Gross, supra note 256, at 1197–98 
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traditional model of party control. Accordingly, there is a risk, real or perceived, 
that an expert or master may have too much power or may lack the incentive to do 
a good job.379 A second reason that judges may not use their authority to appoint a 
neutral expert or a special master is that judges may be unaware of an appropriate 
individual for the task.380 How many judges could readily find an appropriate 
expert on the finer points of Slovakian contract law? 
But each of these two hurdles is surmountable. Regarding the innate 
resistance to inquisitorial techniques, it is critical to appreciate how foreign law 
differs both legally and practically from other matters that call for expert 
testimony. The content of foreign law is a question of law for the judge—it is not a 
fact that must be proven.381 Because there is no question for a jury, nor even any 
rules of evidence to apply,382 the usual resistance should find less traction in this 
context. Moreover, testimony on foreign law does not lend itself to the usual 
alignments; unlike experts on, say, medical testimony, there are not separate camps 
of experts on foreign law that are sympathetic to plaintiffs or defendants.383  
Although it is undoubtedly true that litigators prefer control over every 
                                                                                                            
(“social and structural . . . . [namely,] the steadfast hostility of trial lawyers. Opposition by 
the organized trial bar is strong, and the public statements of prominent lawyers run to 
alarmism: the use of court-appointed experts ‘would fit well into . . . a non-adversary, 
almost communistic scheme,’ but we should ‘cling with liberty-loving, jealous loyalty to 
our system. The use of court-appointed experts ‘would literally obliterate . . . medical 
malpractice cases,’; ‘trial by jury . . . [would] become[] no more than an empty illusion, a 
shibboleth . . . .’”); Merryman, supra note 189, at 166) (referring to “the relative strangeness 
of the idea . . . . For the judge to appoint his own expert on his own motion jars the 
expectation that lawyers move and argue while judges preside and decide. The court-
appointed witness is inconsistent with the model, and this makes those who are totally 
committed to the model (most lawyers and judges) uncomfortable. For party counsel it 
threatens some loss of control over the proceeding. It is a step into unfamiliar territory.”). 
But see Lee, supra note 260, at 496 (“Legal historians agree that the Anglo-American trial 
system has, since the late nineteenth century, been moving closer to the so-called 
‘inquisitorial’ system of countries on the European continent.”); Judith Resnik, Managerial 
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (recognizing a shift in the judicial role from passive 
observer to active participant). 
379. Gross, supra note 256, at 1193–94; Lee, supra note 365, at 480 (explaining 
that judges are reluctant to appoint experts because of the risk of judicial influence on jury 
deliberation). 
380. See GEEROMS, supra note 249, at 143 (“[T]he search for a qualified expert 
can be problematic. All American authors dealing with the issue of expert testimony on 
foreign law mention this as an important problem. The geographical vastness of the country 
coupled with the absence of any academic tradition in comparative or foreign law and the 
fact that the USA has not created its own colonies all probably have to do with this lack of 
qualified experts.”); Gross, supra note 256, at 1191 & 1202–04 (“The judge has no reason 
to worry about the preparation of a partisan expert; that is the responsibility of the attorney 
who calls the witness . . . . A court-appointed expert, however, is nobody’s 
responsibility . . . . [A] court appointed expert is a horse with no rider.”). 
381. See supra note 14. 
382. See FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 (“The court may consider any relevant material or 
source . . . whether or not . . . admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.”). 
383. See Merryman, supra note 189, at 171–72. 
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aspect of their cases (including the appointment of experts), this is a generalized 
preference; there is no specific constituency of the bar for whom party-control of 
witnesses is critical.384 To the extent that expert testimony about foreign law is 
different than other types of expert testimony, philosophical opposition may not 
explain judicial behavior as much as inertia; the parties are unlikely to suggest the 
appointment of a neutral expert or special master.385 Yet judges could do so on 
their own initiative—and to their benefit—with or without the parties’ blessing.386 
Second, a judge may be more likely to appoint a neutral expert or special 
master if an appropriate specialist were readily available. To address this concern, 
some have suggested creating and maintaining a roster of experts.387 But because 
quality control is a problem with such lists, these efforts have consistently 
failed.388 Accordingly, there is need for a resource upon which judges could 
confidently rely for assistance on matters of foreign law. Ideally, the resource 
would provide assistance no matter the country or subject matter in question. Such 
a resource could, in turn, lead to the more frequent appointment of neutral experts 
and special masters. 
Consider, then, an academic institute that aims to provide assistance to 
courts on inquiries regarding foreign law. Although the United States has no 
tradition of foreign law institutes,389 there are many European foundations and 
academic institutes that could provide inspiration.390 German and French courts in 
particular have benefited from research conducted by comparative law centers.391 
Because, in some countries, the burden of researching foreign law is placed 
entirely on the court, considerable use is made of such institutes.392 In fact, “[t]he 
availability of this form of research assistance has relieved the burden to a 
considerable extent, obviating in most cases the need, for example, for expert 
witnesses.”393  
Quite fittingly, the issue presented here is the transplantability and 
tailoring of the foreign law institute. As Professor Merryman recognized long ago, 
                                                                                                            
384. Id.  
385. See Cheng, supra note 375, at 1106. 
386. Brown, supra note 187, at 194. 
387. See OTTO C. SOMMERICH & BENJAMIN BUSCH, FOREIGN LAW: A GUIDE TO 
PLEADING AND PROOF 42 n.155, 121 (1959); Jefferies, supra note 260, at 606–07. 
388. See Gross, supra note 256, at 1220 (suggesting that the assembly of panels of 
experts has made little difference in the short run, and none over the long haul). 
389. Robert A. Riegert, The Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International 
Private Law, 21 ALA. L. REV. 475, 476 n.2, 484 n.17 (1969) (recounting how the possibility 
of establishing a comparative law institute as a joint venture of several American law 
schools was discussed by the American Association for the Comparative Study of Law and 
by the AALS in the 1960). 
390. Consider, for example, in Germany, the Max Planck Institute of Hamburg, 
the Munich Institute of International and Comparative Law, and the Munich Institute for 
East-European Law. In the Netherlands, consider The International Legal Institute and the 
TMC Asser Institute for International Law. In Switzerland, consider the Swiss Institute of 
Comparative Law.  
391. See generally GEEROMS, supra note 249, at 151. 
392. See id. 
393. Alexander, supra note 36, at 638. 
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in the United States, with its much greater emphasis on party autonomy and 
adversary proceedings, an expert from a research institute would be inserted into 
an entirely different litigation context. Whereas Germans are likely to accept such 
an opinion, American lawyers may be inclined to sabotage any efficiency gains 
and to undermine the expert’s authority.394 Yet if the problem is the lack of a 
reliable unbiased source of information on matters of foreign law, an institute 
associated with a law school could be part of a viable solution. 
Any number of law schools could establish institutes scaled to a size 
commensurate with the group of comparative law experts qualified and willing to 
engage in such activity. The venture could leverage a source of talent that leading 
educators have recognized as a largely untapped resource: a school’s foreign 
LL.M. students,.395 As fellows or with some other designation, these graduate 
students could share their interests, foreign contacts, and expertise with the 
institute.  
A foreign law institute situated within a law school could be the resource 
to which judges would confidently turn for assistance on matters of foreign law. 
The institute would develop and maintain contacts in foreign countries who could 
provide assistance in solving difficult questions of the law of these nations.396 
Although an institute would not always have in-house expertise on the particular 
foreign law at issue, the institute could always provide the court with expertise to 
ascertain any particular foreign law at issue. The institute could provide the court 
with an individual who would serve as a neutral expert or as a special master. 
Institutes could offer unbiased, authoritative, and credible expertise. 
Generally speaking, academic institutions are held in high esteem.397 Concern for 
the reputation of the law school generally and the institute in particular would 
create incentive to perform this service for the judiciary proficiently and 
efficiently. The tradition of academic freedom offers a stark contrast to the partisan 
expert who is a hired gun.398 And the ascertainment of foreign law on a particular 
subject requires the sort of rigorous scholarly inquiry that is familiar to the 
academy.  
The establishment of an organization to perform any public function 
raises concerns about capture by industry or special interests.399 But that 
                                                                                                            
394. See Merryman, supra note 189, at 162 (suggesting that institutes “may be a 
flower that blooms only in German legal soil”). 
395. See generally Carole Silver, Internationalizing U.S. Legal Education: A 
Report on the Education of Transnational Lawyers, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 143 
(2006) (announcing survey results regarding the content of LLM programs). 
396. Riegert, supra note 389, at 485. 
397. See Baade, supra note 259, at 642; Thomas F. Bridgman, Proof of Foreign 
Law & Facts, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 845, 859–60 (1980); Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 
171, at 52 n.306. See also David Hricik & Victoria S. Salzmann, Why there Should Be 
Fewer Articles Like This One: Law Professors Should Write More for Legal Decision-
Makers and Less for Themselves, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 761, 786 (2005) (“Law professors 
are . . . the best source for unbiased engaged scholarship.”). 
398. See Gross, supra note 256, at 1130–35. 
399. For a classic description of capture, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 3 (2d ed. 1971); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An 
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phenomenon is unlikely here. First, courts retain ultimate responsibility for 
declaring the content of foreign law; neutral experts merely offer testimony, and 
special masters make recommendations. The judge would always have the benefit 
of the parties’ input. Second, it is difficult to imagine what industry or group 
would commandeer the institute to benefit themselves. There is no view of foreign 
law that is systematically pro-plaintiff, pro-business, or anti-big-government, for 
example. And finally, no single foreign law institute would have a monopoly on 
this outsourcing opportunity. Any number of law schools could provide this 
service—especially since the institutes should be largely self-funding.400 
These are but some examples of ways that the supply of information 
regarding foreign law could compensate for lack of common meaning. More 
important than these specific suggestions, however, is the argument for supply-side 
reforms more generally. The urgent need is a practical approach to foreign law that 
could better meet the needs of a judiciary that confronts a docket transformed by 
globalization. 
CONCLUSION 
The costs of measuring foreign law are inversely related to the amount of 
content in a word’s common meaning. But common meaning is a limited resource 
that is inevitably consumed by national legal systems acting independently and 
rationally. The loss of common meaning, in turn, is a loss of information that leads 
courts to avoid the applications of foreign law because of the difficulty of applying 
it. The information deficit thus becomes a justice deficit because the avoidance of 
foreign law leads unnecessarily to, depending upon the specific circumstances, a 
denial of access to court or to application of the wrong law. Efforts to harmonize 
laws are an instinctive response to this phenomenon—but these efforts are 
misdirected. The solution to the tragedy is an improved supply of information 
about foreign law.  
 
                                                                                                            
Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep 
Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 213–14 (2003) (“If administrative regulators are 
vulnerable to the forces of capture by certain interests, as most everyone agrees they are, 
then the likelihood of a deeper capture seems undeniable. There is nothing special about 
administrative regulators—except, perhaps, the general concern that they may be captured. 
Virtually every other institution in our society seems just as vulnerable.”); George J. Stigler, 
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (discussing 
how the state can be used by an industry or group for its own purposes). 
400. See supra notes 369, 374, and accompanying text. 
